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arbab appointed village leader
bazkar sharecropper, usually a settled community member
bai landowner, trader, rich man
beg leader, clan head
char kot literally “four piles,” sharecropping where farmer gets one quarter
of crop
chul loess dunes
farz provision of shares, as in Civil Code
firman state order/decree
graw, bai jaez pawning or mortgage
graw-dar the person to whom land is pawned
gharibkar/charikar very poor sharecroppers, usually accommodated by landlords
Hannafi Sunni law/jurisprudence
hizb party
hoquq law office, Ministry of Justice




khan notable, landowner, landlord
khar/hezum literally thorns or spikes, thorn bushes collected from mountains for
fuel
khistmand tenant sharecropper/“middle peasants” who have farm inputs
lalmi dryland farming/rain-fed agriculture land
Mahkama-i Morafa’a provincial appeals court
Mahkama-i Ibtedaia district primary court
Mahkama-i Tameez high court
maldar herd owner
malik landlord, owner
mantiqa area, ward, territory, cluster of villages with a linked identity
maraka in Pashtun areas, local council similar to shuras
mard-i kar/muzdakar  landless daily paid workers, often from outside the area
mohallah area/cluster; used in Uzbek areas
moquofa charitable gifted lands
mujaheddin Holy Warriors fighting in jihad, or Holy War
mullah religious teacher, mosque prayer leader
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) iinimcha bai half landlord, able to employ worker/sharecropper
Northern Alliance coalition of anti-Taliban forces
orfi customary documents




sarad literally “cold land,” meaning land fed by springs or highland ponds,
neither by rain nor irrigation from rivers
seer seven kilos of grain
Shari’a Islamic law
shura community committee





Note: The term household is used in this report to refer to what are generally extended
households living in a single compound. Several nuclear families and several generations
may be members of this household.
Dates: Laws are indicated by their Afghan date. Excepting the Taliban regime, which used
the Arabic lunar calendar, Afghanistan follows a solar calendar beginning in 622 AD, the year
of the Hijrat. The first day of the year coincides with the first day of spring (the month of
Hamal) which, except in a leap year, falls on 21 March in the Common Era. The approximate
corresponding western date is derived by adding 621 years, two months and 21 days to the
Afghan date.
Months:
Hamal begins March 21st
Sawr begins April 21st
Jawza begins May 22nd
Saratan begins June 22nd
Asad begins July 23rd
Sumbula begins August 23rd
Mizan begins September 23rd
Aqrab begins October 23rd
Qaus begins November 22nd
Jadi begins December 22nd
Dawl begins January 21st
Hut begins February 20th
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Looking for Peace on the Pastures
This paper draws together findings from three
rural field studies in Bamyan, Faryab and
Badakhshan Provinces. The first two were
rapid appraisal studies but concurred in a
main finding that pastureland tenure needs
priority attention. The third (commissioned)
focal report on pasture issues in Badakhshan
built upon in-depth and longitudinal research
by its author.
Land Relations
As in most modernising agrarian states, the
rural economy in Afghanistan is a complex
mix of on- and off-farm activity and
characterised by intra-rural and rural-urban
mobility and multiple sources of livelihoods.
Despite this, land ownership continues to
represent a significant divider between rich
and poor. Owning a home in the rural areas
is also found to be a critical platform for
survival and a factor that has received too
little attention to date. Homelessness carries
over from generation to generation and
itinerant farm labourers are exploited in their
dependence upon others for winter shelter.
Declared rural homelessness is in the region
of 15 percent of the population but is likely
much higher when the multitude of (especially
female-headed) households living in others’
houses is considered. Small herds of small
stock are generally the single capital asset
of itinerant homeless labourers. Rising
cultivation of pastures and privatisation of
pastures means loss of access to these and
further constrains livelihoods in this sector.
Despite many studies and surveys over the
last 50 years, uncertainty as to the exact
dimensions of landlessness (and homelessness)
remains. This is only partly the result of
current fluid post-war circumstances. Regional
diversity is extreme, thus limiting the utility
of national data. Sampling procedures are
often flawed, as a great deal is still not known
as to how social units configure themselves.
Mechanisms of land access are typically
Executive Summary
complex and there is frequently insufficient
distinction between lands owned and lands
accessed. The fact that rain-fed farms are
frequently farmed on a temporary basis adds
to difficulties. As a whole, landholding data
must still be viewed with caution, even where
every attempt has been made to accurately
upscale and weight findings.
Land concentration continues to be significant
despite conventional wisdom that few large
rural estates exist. Polarisation of landed
and landless persons is likely going through
a period of acceleration at this time, due to
unsettled and unregulated circumstances,
the effects of drought, rapid capital
accumulation in the poppy sector, and
rampant land grabbing and arable expansion
by elites into areas previously designated as
not available for cultivation (pasture).
Militant economic elites rather than the
traditional landlord class may be the main
beneficiaries.
Land mortgaging seems to be less common
than expected (less than 2% mortgaging land
in or out in 2003), with outright distress sales
especially common in the recent past. This
has fuelled an active land market in which
those who purchase land appear to be existing
owners. Conventional wisdom that women
cannot and do not own land appears untrue,
with the 2003 National Risk and Vulnerability
Assessment (NRVA) finding that 56 percent
of female-headed households own some land.
Land Law and Policy
Land relations are primarily regulated by
custom, and custom itself is highly influenced
by religious law. Much of this is in turn
embedded in a formal civil code. There is no
lack of statutory national law on land matters,
but its utility is limited, due both to difficulties
with enforcement and to its unsatisfactory
paradigms. Prime among these is the absence
of clear legal support for the customary abilityAfghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 2
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of communities to own land in common, of
most importance in respect of pastureland.
Since the Bonn conference in late 2001, only
a handful of new land decrees have been
issued. These relate to the establishment of
a dedicated land disputes court and attempts
to restore as much public land to government
as possible. Much of this land, this paper
finds, is more accurately community-owned
property (common property), the lack of
legal recognition of which has enabled the
state to claim such land— and often reallocate
it to favoured persons or groups.
Rural land policy is non-existent, although
steps have been taken to generate this in
the hands of a special commission. For the
moment, the outstanding strategy suggested
in government documents is towards a
classical titling programme. This raises
alarming prospects of embedding dubious
privatisation of public and common
properties, and of entrenching a generally
unsatisfactory set of tenurial paradigms. Land
disputes are rife, with two-thirds of all cases
brought to the normal court system relating
to landed property and a recently established
dedicated land court additionally swamped.
This is so even though many poor (and those
wary of ethnic bias) do not go to courts at
all. Communal (ethnic) and communal
property-related disputes dominate in
practice and reflect a simmering “war” over
pastures, in which a common trigger is
expansion of cultivation into pastureland.
Neither the terms of law nor the centralist
and court-driven regime of rural land
administration in place are competent to
resolve these often ethnically heated, and
sometimes warlord-abetted disputes.
The three case studies demonstrate the
importance of history to understanding
current tenure patterns and the problems
facing pastures today. This history reaches
back specifically to Pashtun land conquest
and colonisation in the 1880s effected by
Amir Abdur al Rahman, with British
encouragement and support, and delivered
thereafter up until 1978 in various versions
of Pashtunisation. In the Bamyan study, the
rebellious Hazaras found their pastures taken
from them and handed over formally to
Pashtun nomads (Kuchis), which fuelled
today’s bitterness against Kuchis and Hazaras’
refusal to permit Kuchis to return to the
pastures. In the Faryab case study, Abdur al
Rahman colonised the area with Pashtuns
and encouraged these traditional livestock
keepers to additionally take up farming. This
they did with considerable success, but the
Pashtuns also steadily co-opted much of the
pasture to the dismay of the non-Pashtun
populations in the area. The final case study
of the Shiwa pastures in Badakhshan has many
elements in common with the first two cases,
including the fact that land appropriation
was largely to the benefit of non-local persons
and especially to the favoured Pashtun tribe
— but much less exclusively so than in the
other two areas.
Key Findings and Recommendations
There are three major areas for developing
and improving land policy in Afghanistan:
• The outstanding tenure issue facing rural
Afghanistan relates to pastures and
requires clear legal and practical
support for common property as
private, group-owned estates belonging
to specific villages or clusters of villages.
• Related, there is an urgent need for public
land to be redefined as nationally-
owned property, as a residual category
beyond local commons, and administered
(not owned) by the government of the
day.
• Similarly, there is an outstanding need
for the overhaul of current land
administration systems. As a matter of
priority, such a system should operate at
a community or minimally, district level
and be made locally accountable, rather
than be accountable to the central state,
and which in its procedures for
adjudication and recognition of rightsbuilds directly upon established majority
customary norms.
None of these recommendations are
achievable through simple declamatory new
policy or laws, even should they be
enforceable (which in the current
environment they are not). For soundness of
formulation and to enable essential popular
ownership of the reforms, and sustainability,
such changes should emerge out of concrete
“learning by doing” projects, and expanded
incrementally. Given the dangerous and still
unresolved nature of so many disputes relating
to rights over remote rain-fed and
pasturelands, conflict resolution is a priority.
A localised pasture-based procedure is
described, through which the needed tenurial
and administration reforms may at the same
time be safely arrived at and implemented.
A critical element of this is that disputants
themselves arrive at agreed norms, including
definition of viable boundaries between
farming and pastoral use on the ground, and
the rules through which access will be
implemented, regulated, monitored and
disputes in the future mediated. What are
in effect land use plans for specific pastures
will emerge, and within which tenure and
access rights can be ordered and agreed. It
is these agreements that should be first
registered, along with recordation of the
boundaries of the pastures referred to.
Community-based mechanisms for sustaining
agreements (and in which seasonal users are
represented) would form the first basis of
localised land administration institutional
development. New and less partisan
supporting district institutional mechanisms
could then be incrementally put in place.
Such an approach allows for practical progress
in resolving conflicts and testing and refining
of systems through practice.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 3
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Land is now on the agenda, but action is
slow to get underway
Studies conducted by the Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) since
20021 consistently demonstrate that landed
property issues in Afghanistan are deeply
intertwined with both continuing instability
and slow recovery and reconstruction, and
need to be tackled in direct ways to contribute
to lasting peace and progress. Recognition
of this has grown within the Transitional
Administration and assistance community.
Whereas land issues failed to be mentioned
in the Tokyo Ministerial Meeting of January
2002, land matters were very much on the
1.  Introduction
agenda at a regional cooperation meeting
held in Bishkek in May 2004 and made a
priority under two of six new National Priority
Programmes announced in the same month.
Action on the ground is thus far limited. By
mid-2004, this prominently included the
establishment of a land disputes court for
returnee claims. A small project funded by
the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) has put the property records of the
Kabul Court into improved order. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the Norwegian Refugee Council
among others had initiatives underway
assisting refugee returnees to reclaim land
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 4
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by limited policy guidance, weak rule of law,
contradictory state authority and unsettled
land relations at large in both the urban and
rural sphere. USAID, The World Bank, and
UNHCS-Habitat have registration related and
settlement proposals in hand, with an urban
focus. Little has been advanced in the rural
sphere, but with Asian Development Bank
support, the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal
Husbandry (MAAH) has proposed “land titling”
as a priority project, a strategy commented
upon in this paper.
In the interim, an important institutional
development has taken place in the
establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Land
Commission, the terms of reference of which
will broadly be to devise a National Land
Policy. Aside from grappling with the difficult
task of producing meaningful policy and
supporting legal paradigms, the Commission
will need to pay careful attention to the
means through which these are arrived at.
It will be critical to developed strategies that
enable popular adherence to new policies,
especially by the poor. These people
prominently include those without land or
housing, as elaborated in Section 2.
Development soundness and good
governance need to be fundamental
concerns of tenure administration
Reform in property systems is currently
widespread around the globe, and there is
much to be learnt from these experiences.2
Some of the more common conclusions that
may be drawn refer to the tendency for:
• Especially aid-driven approaches to result
in too costly and institutionally
burdensome systems;
• Too much top heavy planning to be
undertaken without being grounded in
practical experience;
• Too ambitious programmes and systems
to be designed and to lie unimplemented
for years;
• Too critical pursuance of classical titling
approaches as the panacea for all tenure-
related ills; and
• Too little space made for grievances to
be properly heard and addressed.
Dwindling political will is also widely proving
problematic, not least because of entrenched
elite capture by one sector of society or
another. Insufficient popular ownership of
changes is proving a particularly strong
impediment to change.
All of the above suggest that matters of sound
process need to be taken extremely seriously.
Dealing safely with people’s land interests is
first and foremost a matter of governance
and subject to the same requirements of
good governance as other processes.
Incremental and devolutionary approaches
which allow for real participation of
landholders at the local level, systems that
are straightforward enough for the majority
to use and help regulate themselves, and
more localised decision-making in even policy
planning, are (slowly) emerging as prominent
breakthroughs in the face of expensive
systems failures. The insecure conditions still
facing millions of Afghans in 2004 merely
increase the urgency of getting the strategies
“right.”
It is on matters of strategy that this synthesis
accordingly concentrates. Its focus is the
rural sphere. Constraints such as land grabbing
opportunism by economic-political or militant
elites, and lack of confidence in the courts
2 For general reviews refer to The World Bank. Proceedings: Conference on Land Policy, Translating Principles into Action:
Lessons and Challenges. Washington 4-5 March, 2004; The World Bank. Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection. Human
Development Unit, South Asia Region (DRAFT). 2004; Deininger, K. Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction. A World
Bank Policy Research Report, Washington. 2003; De Janvry and E. Sadoulet (eds). Access to Land and Land Policy Reforms.
Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research. 2003; FAO. Land Reform, Land Settlement and Cooperatives.
Issue 2002/2. Rome. 2002; FAO. Land Reform, Land Settlement and Cooperatives. Issue 2003/3. Rome. 2003; Toulmin, C.
and J. Quan (eds). Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa. London: DFID/IIED/NRI. 2000; and Alden Wily, 2003,
op cit.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 5
Looking for Peace on the Pasturesto rule fairly and/or have their rulings
enforced equally afflict both rural and urban
spheres. Other factors such as distinctions in
the way in which property is acquired and
held in rural and urban areas demand different
approaches to be effective.
The findings of field studies and sources
of information and data
This paper brings together findings from three
studies: two minor field studies were
conducted in Bamyan (13 days in June 2003)
and then Faryab (10 days in November 2003)
Provinces. Pasture-related issues emerged
as a priority issue in both field studies. As a
consequence, AREU commissioned a third
report, this time relating solely to pastoral
issues in north eastern Badakhshan. Unlike
the first two rapid reconnaissance studies,
the Badakhshan study was founded upon in-
depth study of the selected pastures as
outlined below.3
The resource base of the two minor field
studies is similar. In Bamyan, field work was
carried out in eight village clusters (mantiqa)
in the province’s seven districts (Appendix
A). The selection of communities and
interviewees was opportunistic, accessibility
and security being main determinants.
In Faryab, interviews were undertaken in 11
villages in six mantiqa, in three of the 12-16
districts claimed as belonging to Faryab.
Twenty-seven widows in Maimana City were
also interviewed (Appendix A). Neither
districts nor mantiqa were randomly selected,
but again chosen for their accessibility and
in this instance, ethnic composition, a
relevant factor in land relations.
The resource base of the Badakhshan case is
different. The author, Mervyn Patterson, only
dealt with pastures and used detailed data
and information collected over four summers
between 2000 and 2003. This enabled a
comprehensive analysis to be made of
changing use and rights of the selected study
area, the high and rocky pastures of the
Shiwa area. These lie between Faizabad and
Baharak. Although Shiwa has a spatial
cohesion of its own, it falls partly within
Baharak District and partly within Sheghnan
District. Patterson identified around 200
distinct pastures within 34 distinct areas.
Each on average sustains a flock of 800 sheep
for a whole summer.
The field studies also make much use of
historical resources for background setting.
Section 2 of this paper also draws substantially
upon past surveys and reports and in particular
upon the National Risk and Vulnerability
Assessment (NRVA) carried out between July
and September 2003. The NRVA provided
data from 11,227 households in rural
Afghanistan and more general information
from 1,800 community and higher level
committee meetings. While this represents
an extraordinary effort, the resulting data
on land holding have limitations, resulting
from the complexity of many questions,
ambivalent responses, a high level of non-
response and data inputting problems. As
this paper broadly concludes, thanks to NRVA
and other work, we do know a great deal
more about land relations — but still not
enough.
3 The findings of each of the studies are fully reported upon in the AREU Land Case Study Series (see footnote on previous
page).
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 6
Synthesis Paper SeriesAttaining an accurate picture of land
distribution has always been problematic in
Afghanistan, not least because of stark
regional diversity, the complexities of
separating land access with land ownership,
and sampling problems. Nonetheless there
is sufficient information, prominently
including the recent NRVA exercise of 2003,
to confirm that rural landholding is
inequitable, with a high rate of landlessness
(21-24 percent depending upon analysis) and
significant concentration among those who
do own land. Farmland
remains, however, less
unequally distributed
than in most Asian
states. Nor is the
farming economy quite
as deeply rooted in
contract labour (sharecropping) as
conventionally ascribed. Nonetheless,
polarisation appears to be continuing apace
and possibly making leaps and bounds in
current conditions, exacerbating what had
always been profound if typical exploitation
of farm labour. Rural homelessness could,
however, be an equally significant factor in
keeping the poor, poor and another area of
opportunity for intervention.
2.1 Land Distribution
Findings relating to rural land relations need
to be set against these caveats:
(i) Regional and even district differences are
stark due to complex agro-ecological and
historical differences, limiting the utility of
national figures.
(ii) Although studies have been undertaken
and continue, a great deal is still not known
as to how rural society configures itself in
respect of land ownership and the implications
for wealth and poverty. Predictably, pre-
1978 conditions do not always apply today.
Continuing movement beyond the norm, land
grabbing, poppy production, recent drought
and the giving of food and cash aid, are just
some factors clouding the picture of land
access and ownership, labour relations and
levels of land-based dependence. It may also
be the case that property relations were
incompletely understood or reported upon
even prior to the
war years. Rural
homelessness is a
case in point; this
has been argely
ignored.
(iii)   Large discrepancies have
characterised land survey data since the
1960s, and continue to do so. Sometimes this
is because of geographical specificity as above
or possibly political tinkering.4  More often
it stems from the complex way in which land
is farmed, within which a single household
may own, sharecrop in or out and rent in or
out land. Many surveys have paid insufficient
attention to the crucial distinction between
land accessed and land owned. At times rain-
fed farms have been excluded from
calculations, and in some cases with
justification: this survey finds that rain-fed
farms are often not under ownership, but is
held by the community at large. There has
also often been a failure to draw the necessary
distinction between the house and its
surrounds and farmland ownership. Many
households classified as land owners in fact
own only a few square metres of garden
around their houses; this factor alone can
dramatically skew figures on ownership.
4 Political interference was suspected in the late 1970s-1980s with the startling interpretation of 1968 official figures presented
in 1978 that only 12% of the rural population owned land (CSO. Afghanistan Agriculture in Figures. Kabul: CSO. 1978).  If
this referred strictly to individuals, this may in fact have been correct; with the inclusion of immediate family members
at an average of five persons per family, this would have raised the proportion of land owners to around 60% of the rural
population. Using household figures, Russian figures published in 1981 partly using the same data showed only 30% owned
land. Glukhoded 1981 cited by Emadi, H. State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan. Karachi: Royal Book Company,
Karachi. 1997.
2.  An Overview of Rural Land Relations
Facts and figures about land ownership are still
uncertain, despite a great deal of official
surveying. Sampling that doesn’t really reflect
regional diversity and the complex way in which
people access land are the main constraints.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 7
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contradictory figures. Field work reported
upon here shows that even immediately
adjacent villages may vary dramatically in
levels of land ownership because one
represents a land owning community and
another is a client landless village of the
former. In order to gain a correct profile of
rural communities, future sampling will
advisedly adopt the village cluster or mantiqa
as the unit, not single villages within the
cluster.5 Temporary residents such as itinerant
labourers are also often excluded, and where
they are homeless, may not appear in the
statistics of any community at all. The
existence of female-headed households left
in the care of relatives while male heads out-
migrate for work also often goes unreported.
Different foci upon nuclear families or
extended households (much extended in
recent years) sharing land also produces
different figures, and increasingly suggest
that per capita analysis may be a more reliable
means of gauging trends in farm size, among
other features. Reliable weighting by district
and province in the absence of census data
limits accuracy of regional trends, even as
deriving from the large sample (11,000+
households) of the 2003 NRVA.6 The choice
by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development (MRRD) and The World Bank to
assess poverty not on the basis of subjectively
sampled wealth groups as were surveyed by
NRVA, but upon their calorie intake, is proving
a helpful innovation but one not yet fully
applied to land holding data. Although
available NRVA data are reported upon here,
further analysis of data is underway in 2004
and in due course will yield instructive results.
However, the fact that each analysis thus far
produces such divergent figures sounds a
warning and tends to suggest that a great
deal more work is needed to find the ideal
sampling and weighting frames.
Finally, as often the case, anecdotal evidence
sometimes provides more insights as to issues
and trends than hard but static data. It is on
this basis that the minor field appraisals upon
which this analysis mainly draws are
considered, in conjunction with hard data as
available.
2.1.1. The Rural Economy
All farming economies (including pre-capitalist
peasant agriculture but more especially
commoditised economies) are typically a
complex mix of on- and off-farm activity;
that is, cultivation and livestock-raising are
always complemented by a host of processing,
trading and service activity, in both the home
and beyond. The role of land ownership
becomes especially complicated where the
rural economy is significantly based upon
contractual labour (and sharecropping in
particular), which is the case in Afghanistan.
Out-migration to neighbouring villages for
farm or other work, to local towns or even
outside the province and country, are long-
standing and anticipated features. Rural
households around the world do their best
to maximise income opportunities and these
typically take them — especially with the
help of education and wealth — into
definitively non land-based production and
outside the rural sphere. Increasing
urbanisation is a world phenomenon as is the
return of income or goods to the rural sphere
(remittances). Nonetheless, at the end of
the day, Afghanistan remains mainly agrarian,
with around three-quarters of households
living outside cities and towns and the largest
share of gross domestic product deriving from
the agricultural sector (arable and livestock).7
5 A mantiqa or mohallah in Uzbek areas typically represents a cluster of related villages or hamlets among whom there are
close socio-economic ties, and which often share common properties. While traditionally the Pashtun watan (home area)
was usually a single village, the notion of inter-related villages and shared commons is well-known today and is believed
to broadly apply throughout much of Afghanistan.
6 The World Bank, 2004 and 2004b, op cit. and MRRD and The World Bank (Ministry of Rural Development and Rehabilitation).
Rural Poverty in Afghanistan: Initial Insights from the NRVA 2003. February 2004.
7 Variously cited as around 50%, now believed to be rising to 70% when the opium economy is included. TISA/IC (Transitional
Islamic State of Afghanistan/International Community). Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic
Path Forward. January 2004, and The World Bank, 2004b, op cit.
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farm their land, land ownership classically
represents a pivotal socio-economic
foundation and indicator of living standard,
providing a stepping stone to income and
opportunities (including off-farm jobs) not
typically available to landless families.
As recent studies adopt a more holistic
approach to assessing rural livelihoods, the
complex nature of rural livelihoods in
Afghanistan is better understood. 8 The NRVA
2003 confirms the importance of migration
and remittances nation-wide and shows nearly
half the population are classifiably “poor” in
food consumption terms; while the top 20
percent of the rural population consumes
more than seven times the food consumed
by the poorest 20 percent.9 Proportionately
fewer people are “poor,” however, when
these data are set against findings in other
post-conflict states.10
AREU’s recently completed longitudinal study
of 390 rural households in 21 villages adds to
understanding of rural livelihoods.11 This
study found that nearly half the households
surveyed had five or more income sources
and that the most important source for 54
percent of households was non-farm related
labour.12 Because the cash equivalents were
not calculated for myriad in-kind labour
activities and because neither on-farm nor
off-farm activities were aggregated and
valued, the conclusion certainly cannot be
drawn that rural people depend
predominantly upon non-agrarian activities.
Nor is it yet known how far off-farm incomes
are currently disproportionately high due to
drought, the effects of which were still being
surveyed in 2002/03, and typically
constraining labour investment on-farm. Nor
were substantial opportunities for cash/food
for work through aid programmes (which may
not be a lasting phenomenon) able to be
factored out.13 Nonetheless, the AREU survey
does provide an important insight into the
characteristically multi-sourced nature of
the current rural economy. It also illustrates
the complex linkages that exist between on-
farm and off-farm activity. This is most easily
seen in the time-old choice that surveys face
in whether to locate skin and wool-based
activities (leather work, carpet making, rug
making) as on- or off-farm activities.14 In
this instance, AREU chose to locate these as
off-farm, while analyses of the livestock
sector’s contribution to the economy include
these activities under that heading.
The altogether much larger NRVA 2003 is
beginning to throw more light on just how
much of the rural sector is farm-based
activity. Draft analysis by The World Bank in
June-July 2004 showed that just over half of
employed individuals work in agriculture
(53%) and fairly consistently across food
consumption groups.15 Not surprisingly, those
who are self-employed farmers (owner-
operators, or owners who hire in labour) do
much better out of farming than those who
are employed as sharecroppers or labourers.
The analysis also confirms that almost half
8 See Christopolos, I. Out of Step? Agricultural Policy and Afghan Livelihoods. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit. 2004.
9 Forty-eight percent of rural households fall below the poverty line in terms of food consumption, rising to 60% in the north-
west and west of the country (MRRD and The World Bank, op cit.).
10 For example, Eritrea (71%), Guatemala (75%) and Tajikistan (86%). Refer to MRRD and The World Bank, op cit.
11 Grace, J. and A. Pain. Rethinking Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. July
2004.
12 Diversification in itself does not correlate consistently with poverty or with other indicators (see The World Bank, 2004b,
op cit.). As Grace and Pain. indicate, multiple income sources may reflect a desperate search for any work possible where
it is episodic and unreliable (coping strategy of the poor) or a conscious asset accumulation strategy (the better off).
13 World Bank analysis shows 33% of the NRVA sample of 2003 participated in food for work programmes; 19% in cash for work
programmes; 13% received relief food and 3% participated in UN, NGO and other programmes (The World Bank, 2004b, op
cit.).
14 Similarly, construction work tends to be categorised as off-farm labour although it often prominently includes construction
and repair to irrigation ditches. Locating remittances as off-farm sources is also problematic where a mobile farm labour
force typically remits returns to family members.
15 The World Bank, 2004b, op cit.
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non-agricultural sector as either self-employed
(10%) or as wage earners (36%).16
Low landholding and poverty correlate
NRVA data also confirm that poverty
correlates strongly with (among other
attributes) large families, female-headed
households, households with disabled
member(s), lack of access to education, lack
of high-earning job opportunities, lack of
access to infrastructure and services, and
lack of capital assets like land and livestock.
Clusters of particularly vulnerable rural
households are shown in Table 1. It will be
noted that returnees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs) and rain-fed farmers are better
off in respect of cow ownership (Table 2).
Landless and female-headed households do
consistently worst.
Land shortage is real
Before looking at how farmland is distributed,
it is important to note how limited the
resource actually is. Only five percent of
Afghanistan is naturally fertile or irrigated
and another seven percent is usable for rain-
fed farming every two, three or more years.17
Pastureland is conversely abundant, covering
around 45 percent of the total land area or
29 million hectares according to FAO land
use analysis in the 1990s. In good months, in
good years the range for grazing extends into
some part of otherwise barren lands (deserts
and mountain tops). The precise hectarage
of pasture is therefore unknown, but is clearly
the major past and potential area of land
16 Ibid.
17 FAO and UNDP. Provincial Landcover Atlas of Islamic State of Afghanistan, 1999. Kabul. 1999.
Table 1: Vulnerable Groups in the NRVA 2003 Sample
Most Groups of Vulnerable % poverty rate  Per capita Per capita




The average rural HH 48 2,800 5,403
Returnees/IDPs HH 52 2,688 5,369
HH has physically disabled member 58 2,646 4,661
HH is farm labourer 61 2,728 4,754
Landless HH 61 2,532 4,500
Female-headed HH 67 2,657 4,282
HH resides in rain-fed zone 65 2,715 4,386
Data Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by The World Bank, June 2004.
Table 2: Base Rural Asset Holding by Vulnerable Groups in the NRVA 2003 Sample
Most Groups of Vulnerable % Owns Some % Owns Mean Number
Households (HH) Land Irrigated Land of Cows Owned
The average rural HH 76 65 0.7
Returnees/IDPs HH 81 74 0.7
HH has physically disabled member 74 57 0.8
HH head is farm labourer 71 55 0.9
Landless HH 0 0 0.3
Female-headed HH 56 43 0.5
HH resides in rain-fed zone 72 32 1.2
Data Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by The World Bank, June 2004.
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clearly lends itself to pastoral activity with
high stock numbers and small stock in
particular.18 A significant sector (1-2 million
households) is practising transhumance,
moving with their stock between winter and
summer pastures on migrations that may take
several months (discussed later).
Although there are no reliable data on the





this extends to the poor and extreme poor.
Both the Bamyan and Faryab field studies
routinely encountered landless and even
homeless labourers who nonetheless own
sheep, their only capital asset. This may be
the reason for the uneven correlation of small
stock numbers by wealth group in the AREU
livelihoods study.20
Shocks and in particular the recent drought
have sent numbers of livestock plummeting
to one-third of the levels in 1995,21 and the
poor accordingly suffer most. In Faryab,
livestock counts in 1991 and 2002 in the field
study villages showed a ten-fold drop and
those with few animals are currently
stockless.22 Where Taliban abuses combined
with drought, such as in some of the villages
in the Bamyan study, livestock was lost even
more quickly, as people sold off their last
sheep to pay taxes and tithes or bribes to
prevent their sons being taken away for
military service.23 In both study areas landless
people interviewed consistently aim to own
(or regain) sheep ahead of land; the latter
is considered too expensive to purchase
despite an active land market.
Social norms may play as great a role in
preventing the landless poor from acquiring
land as does financial means. Everywhere
the studies encountered a view of landless
people and especially itinerant laboured as
lacking the capacity to own and manage
farms of their own. Farming is considered a
skill and farmers as artisans. Those who
sharecrop with their
own tools and oxen
are “farmers”; those
who have historically
only provided their labour are identified as
labourers. Nor do landless people typically
have the kinship or other connections that
would make them viable purchasers of land
in the eyes of larger owners selling land. In
all cases of sales recorded in the Bamyan and
Faryab studies, land was sold to persons who
already owned land and were buying to
increase their hectarage. In the Shiwa study,
cases of landless persons acquiring pastureland
for farming were recorded, but notably these
were purchases made from the administration
and paid for over time, in the same manner
as land was distributed and paid for by
landless people during the earlier land reform
programmes (1975-1984).24
2.1.2. Skewed Distribution of Land
Ownership
Farming economies in the region are
historically founded upon skewed access to
resources and exploitation of labour,
manifested in characteristically large estates,
18 In 1995 there were 3.6 million cattle and 31 million sheep and goats. This fell to under 20 million sheep and goats in 1998,
and to under 5 million in 2002 following the 1999-2001 drought. See Maletta, H. Crop and Food Supply Assessment Survey
2002: A Preliminary Statistical Report. Kabul: FAO. August 2002.
19 Khan, U. and M. Iqbal. Role and the Size of Livestock Sector in Afghanistan. Islamabad: The World Bank. 2001;
Thomson, E. Needs Assessment on Feeds, Livestock and Rangelands in Afghanistan. Syria: International Centre for Agricultural
Research in the Dry Areas. 2002; and TISA/IC, op cit.
20 Grace and Pain, op cit.
21 In 2002, mean household stock ownership was 1.2 cattle, 2.9 sheep and 2.4 goats (Maletta, op cit.).  NRVA data showed
diverse ownership of stock, with an average of 0.7 cows per household among its 11,000+ sample in 2003.
22 Alden Wily, 2004d, op cit.
23 Alden Wily, 2004a, op cit.
24 Refer to Alden Wily, 2003a, op cit. for a review of the land reforms.
Small animal stock is often the only capital
asset of the landless.
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neighbouring Pakistan and India, for example,
over half the rural population is entirely
landless.26 In Bangladesh 52 percent of rural
households, and in Nepal, 40 percent of
households, own less than 0.5 acre of land
(0.2 ha, or 1 jerib).27 Landlessness is much
lower in Iran and former Soviet Republics to
the north.28
Landlessness
In Afghanistan figures of landlessness have
numerous pitfalls in analysis, with an
extraordinary range of figures produced over
the years.29 These derive from factors listed
earlier, and in particular (i) striking regional
variations,30 (ii) complex distinctions between
land actually owned and land farmed, typical
of sharecropping and tenancy agro-economies,
(iii) the different ways in which irrigated and
rain-fed land tend to be owned and farmed,
and finally (iv) different sampling strategies.
Regional differences are particularly tangible.
Appendix B compares data on landlessness
by province in 1968, 2002 and 2003. The first
set derives from the registration exercise
and must be considered fairly reliable
especially given that all members of a
surveyed community were included. The
second and third derive from the Vulnerability
and Analysis Mapping (VAM) unit and NRVA
studies. The stark differences between even
these two sets illustrate the enormous
difficulties faced in securing the right
sampling, weighting and interpretation. The
only stable finding that emerges from the
diversity in results among the three large
scale studies is that regional difference is
very real. Although the figures presented
must be viewed with caution, landlessness
ranged from 9-80% in 1968, 4-64% in 2002
and 6-60% in 2003. Diversity within provinces
and indeed districts is just as stark, as
illustrated below in the case of 15 districts
of Badakhshan.  
Sampling even within a small locality is again
instructive; in the Faryab and Bamyan studies,
landlessness was overall pronounced where
25 Lastarria-Cornhiel and J. Melmed-Sanjak. Land Tenancy in Asia, Africa and Latin America: A Look to the Past and a View
to the Future. Working Paper No. 27 Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 1999; Dinechin, E. “Translating
Principles into Action. The Case of El Salvador” and Bernard, C. “Land in South Asia: A Major Instrument for Social and
Economic Transformation” in the World Bank, 2004a, op cit.
26 Around 85 million people in India are landless and 200 million people own less than half an acre of land, insufficient to
live on. In Pakistan 2% of rural households control more than 44% of the land area (Bernard, op cit).
27 Ibid.
28 Asian Productivity Organization. Islamic Republic of Iran’s Policy on Land Consolidation and Reforms of Farming Systems.
Impact of Land Utilization Systems on Agricultural Productivity Seminar, Iran, 2000; and Torhonen, M-P. Land Tenure in
Transition: Case Uzbekistan. FIG XXII International Congress, Washington. 2002.
29 From 10-88%; refer to Annex D in Alden Wily, 2003a, op cit.
30 Because of stark regional differences in its sample group and lack of weighting, the AREU Rural Livelihoods Survey correctly
eschewed producing an overall proportion of landlessness or concentration, other than to note that this was as predicted,
largely found in the poorest wealth groups, and in three of its seven provincial sites, respectively 48 %, 90% and 76% of
this group were landless (Grace and Pain, op cit.).
31 For example, 91% landless in Qala Shaikhi Mantiqa in Shirin Tagao District, Faryab Province and 76.8% in Nargas, Panjao
District, Bamyan (Alden Wily, 2004a and 2004b, op cit.).
32 For example, in Islama Qala Mantiqa in Shirin Tagao District, there were 100% landless households in one village and only
17% landless in another. In Khdak Takhta Mantiqa in Panjao District, one village comprised 92% landless and another no
landless. Still another comprised 53% landless when migrant labourers were included (Alden Wily 2004a and 2004d, op cit.).
Table 3: Summary of Findings of Land




% small owners 7-57
% medium owners 8-55
% large owners 1-35
Data Sources: SMU 2001.
mantiqa populations in their entirety were
considered.31 When single villages were
sampled outside that socio-spatial context,
rates of landlessness rose or fell sharply,
depending upon the nature of the village.32
Unfortunately, sample sizes of either set
were not sufficient to draw strong conclusions,
other than to reinforce the observation made
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villages as the basis of survey.
At this stage, perhaps the most reliable overall
indicator of landlessness is the NRVA 2003
data, given its sample of over 11,000
households in most provinces combined with
its effort to cover all wealth groups.33 When
its results are computed by itemised
consumption rates (not wealth indicators),
and then weighted accordingly, rural
households who are entirely landless represent
24 percent of all households (Table 4). This
figure should be held to be indicative (pending
further analysis of the data) and particularly
given the diversity by area. Data made
available immediately prior to publishing this
report suggest that new analysis of NRVA
(assumedly using new weighting procedures)
reduces the overall rate of landlessness to
21 percent (and which says as much about
the complexities of data analysis as the
situation). Neither figure of 21 or 24 percent
is in any event especially meaningful, given
the extreme regional range of landlessness
by area, and which could be further amended
should a different sampling frame be adopted
in the future.
This overall figure, however, does accord
well with the 18 percent of landless
households in the larger sample of 30,000
households surveyed in 1988-1989 by the
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, also in
most provinces34 — a period when many
landless families were outside Afghanistan.
UNHCR monitoring of returnees suggests that
the majority of refugees to Pakistan and Iran
were landless when they left and return today
landless (Table 5).35
33 NRVA data for 2002 with a much smaller sample put landlessness at 27% of the rural population with a range by provinces
of 8.4 - 77.8%. WFP/VAM. Afghanistan Countrywide Food Needs Assessment of Rural Settled Populations 2002-2003. Kabul:
WFP Vulnerability Analysis Mapping Unit and Partners. 2003.
34 SCA (Swedish Committee for Agriculture). The Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan. Sixth Report 1988 and 1989 Surveys.
Kabul: SCA. 1990.
35 It may be, however, that landowners tended to return earlier, before UNHCR records on returnee land ownership were
initiated.
36 Glukhoded, V. “Economy of Independent Afghanistan,” 1981 as cited by Gupta, B.S. Afghanistan. Politics, Economics and
Society. Revolution, Resistance, Intervention. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers). 1986.
Table 4: Rural Land Ownership in NRVA 2003
% with: Q1 Q5
(Lowest) Q2 Q3 Q4 (Highest) All Rural
Irrigated land owned 48 61 66 72 76 65
Rain-fed land owned 28 25 24 22 26 25
Either irrigated or rain-fed  60 74 78 83 85 76
land owned
Landless 40 26 22 17 15 24
Data Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by The World Bank, June 2004.
Table 5: Farm Land Ownership of Returning
Refugees 2002-2004





Data Source: UNHCR, 2004b.
The figures accord less well with those
produced by a Soviet researcher in 1981 based
upon 420,000 households; this showed that
26 percent of households were landless and
another 29 percent near-landless and in
urgent need of farmland.36 Exact figures from
arguably the most reliable source from that
era, the cadastral survey and registration
during 1964-1974 of around half the farmed
land area, have never been released, other
than the confusing data published in 1978
which showed that only 12 percent of rural
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that 44.4 percent of all cultivated land was
owned by 9.0 percent of rural households in
the same period.41 These suggest that large
estates/landlords still existed following the
reforms. In 2002 a survey among 5,000
landowners (i.e., excluding landless, unlike
any of the above) suggested that 50 percent
of the land area is owned by 19 percent of
farmers. The majority (63%) smallholders
share under 16 percent of the total land
area.42
Provisional analysis of NRVA 2003 data and
without any weighting for proportions in
each wealth group and limited cleaning, does
suggest that concentration will be found to
still abundantly exist
in 2004 (Table 6). At
one extreme only 3.7
percent of farmers
own more than 10
jeribs (2 ha) of irrigated land or rain-fed
land. At the other extreme, nearly 72 percent
households owned land and livestock,37 and
which led many to conclude that this means
that the vast majority own no land at all.38
Anticipated release of the data of that
important and most comprehensive of
survey/registration by the Cadastral and
Geodesy Department will provide highly useful
historical data.
Large estates
If landlessness is important at one extreme
for assessing distribution, so too is landlordism
at the other. The literature on Afghanistan
is replete with reference to the feudal or
semi-feudal rural economy of Afghanistan,
particularly among Hazara and Pashtun tribes.
While landlordism
certainly still exists in
abundance, social
relations today appear
to lack the beneficial
reciprocity between landlord and serf that
characterises conventional feudalism. What
remains is significant labour
exploitation.
The number and vast size of
large estates known to have
existed in the past have
certainly dwindled over the
last century, but how far this
has continued in recent
decades is unknown. The
official statistical Survey of
Progress for 1967 showed that
only 2.2 percent of farmers
owned 42 percent of the total
cultivated land area.39 In
1981, the above-mentioned
Soviet analysis concluded that
40 percent of all privately
held irrigated land was owned
by 4.3 percent of rural
37 The famous Table 23 of Afghan Agriculture in Figures in GoA. Afghan Agriculture in Figures. Kabul: CSO. 1978.
38 See for example Emadi, op cit.
39 GoA. Survey of Progress, Central Statistics Office. Kabul: GoA. 1968.
40 See footnote 36 above.
41 Mukherjee, S. 1981 as cited by Gupta, op cit.
42 Maletta, op cit.
43 Not weighted and largely unchecked base data provided in deliberately limited circulation by MRRD in February 2004.
Table 6: Distribution of Land Including Landless 2003
Size in  Irrigated % Rain-fed %
Jeribs land owned Farmers land owned Farmers
2003 2003
0 2973 35.2 6511 77.1
0-2.5 3078 36.5 587 6.9
2.6-5 1340 15.9 570 6.7
5.1-7.5 373 4.4 185 2.2
7.6-10 339 4.0 283 3.3
10.1-15 133 1.5 141 1.7
15.1-20 66 0.8 58 0.7
20.1-40 56 0.6 70 0.8
40.1-80 40 0.4 21 0.2
80.1-120 25 0.3 10 0.1
120.1-1000 14 0.1 1 0.01
Total 8,437 100 8,437 100
Data Source: NRVA 200343
Although conventional wisdom holds that large
estates are few, concentration of arable land in
the hands of a small number of people is significant.
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less. Eighty-four percent either own no rain-
fed land or 2.5 jeribs or less. With weighting
to ensure the correct proportion of rural poor
in the sample, distribution is likely to be
even more skewed in favour of relatively few
large owners. Table 7 strongly suggests this
to be the case. Although it does not include
landlessness, concentration among those who
do own land is significantly inequitable.
great, and the land market robust. It is
notable that (aside from water and
destruction factors closely tied to the 1999-
2001 drought and then floods) land purchases
outranked other factors in changes in land
availability over the year prior to the NRVA
2003 survey (Table 8) and a similar trend was
anticipated in the year following (Table 9).
Moreover, those who are buying land are the
“rich” while most of those selling are poor.
This is consistent with anecdotal findings of
the surveys which, as noted earlier, found
that land purchases were almost entirely by
those who already owned land and that those
selling land were very small landowners,
usually thereby finally entering landlessness
(distress sales). These are typical polarising
trends.
New arable land is also being acquired through
appropriation of commons and public land,
as shown in Section 4. Although often at nil
acquisition cost, the means to carry this
through is limited to elites (social, political,
economic and military). Commanders
frequently combine these attributes and
appear to lead the field in asset capture.
Poppy production, while lucrative for all, is
equally skewed in its benefits and helping to
Table 7: Concentration of Land Among
Landed 2003
Attribute Gini Coefficient44
Owns irrigated land 0.57
(excludes landless)
Owns rain-fed land 0.52
(excludes landless)
Owns any land 0.58
(excludes landless)
Data Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by The World Bank 2004.
Continuing polarisation
Many anecdotal indicators suggest that
concentration is continuing to occur in the
rural land market, adding to the difficulties
being faced by the small and poor farmer.
Farmland is scarce, prices high,45 competition
44 In which 0 = perfect equality and 1 = perfect inequality.
45 Many reports include information on land prices (see Alden Wily, 2003a, op cit.). As these are localised and prices regionally
various, it is difficult to know norms. In Faryab at the time of survey in 2003, per jerib prime irrigated land was going for
$600 in Khortepa mantiqa (but $1,000 in Qala Shaikhi), flood-fed land for $300 and rain-fed land for only $150. All were
much higher prices than years previously (Alden Wily, 2004d, op cit.).
Table 8: Reasons for Changes in Land Ownership in 2002 by Food Consumption Quintiles
Changes in land ownership  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All Rural
last year are due to: (%) (Lowest)  (Highest)
   Purchases 4 7 8 6 15 8
   Sales 8 7 7 4 5 6
   Rent in 2 1 2 1 2 1
   Rent out 1 2 2 1 2 1
   Mortgage in 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.1
   Mortgage out 0.3 1 1 0.8 0.8 1
   Destruction of land 10 8 12 12 9 10
   Water availability changed 63 68 62 72 65 66
   Land taken back by returnees 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2
   Other 11 5 7 4 3 6
Data Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by The World Bank, 2004.
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Afghanistan’s currently high urbanisation rate
(with around 30% of the population now
believed to be in towns and cities, up on an
earlier 20%) suggests that large numbers of
people lack either the land and/or means to
farm, among other drivers (security,
education, income, etc.). Outright land sales
by smaller farmers typically soar during great
droughts or other pressures.46 Those who
lose their land find it difficult to re-acquire
land and tend to end up in cities as unskilled
domestic or market labour.
Table 10 confirms the importance of land for
farming by poverty group, although suggests
that lack of tools are a much more important
constraint for the very poor; this could be
explained by an earlier recorded observation
from the two minor field studies that the
extreme poor do not believe that they will
ever have the means of status to acquire
farm land, and that therefore having the
means (tools) to improve their labour
contracts is more realistic.
In summary, all the evidence thus far suggests
that a very substantial proportion of the rural
community is landless and that that proportion
is probably rising.
46 Widely documented for the 1969-1972 drought as well as the 1999-2001 drought. For the former, refer to Male, B.
Revolutionary Afghanistan A Reappraisal. London and Canberra: Groom Helm. 1982.
Table 9: Anticipated Changes in Farm Land Ownership by Food Consumption Quintiles
Future changes in land ownership Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q4
next year will be due to: (%) (lowest) (highest) All Rural
   Purchases 8 8 8 7 11 9
   Sales 4 4 3 1 3 3
   Rent in 5 4 4 3 3 4
   Rent out 2 2 1 1 3 2
   Mortgage in 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.7 1
   Mortgage out 0.5 0 1 0.2 0 0.3
   Water availability changed 60 64 65 70 66 65
   Destruction of land 5 7 6 9 5 6
   Loss of land due to conflicts 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
   Land taken back by returnees 2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.5
   Other 13 11 12 8 8 10
Data Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by The World Bank, 2004.
Table 10: Farming Constraints by Good Consumption Quintiles
Farmers say farming is constrained  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All Rural
mainly by lack of these: (Lowest) (Highest)
Irrigation/access to water 24 31 33 35 29 31
Farming tools 37 27 24 20 23 26
Land: Farming land availability 19 18 21 16 15 18
Land: Access due to landmines 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Seed 8 10 13 19 20 14
Rainfall 4 5 3 5 6 5
Credit 4 4 2 1 2 3
Fertilisers 3 2 2 3 4 3
Labour 1 1 0 1 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Data Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by The World Bank, 2004.
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(see below). The main reason is almost
certainly different sampling frames, all but
the current NRVA 2003 survey applying to
extended households.
Access is complex
The NRVA deals well with the important





routes to land access
are renting land
belonging to others or
farming land
belonging to others on a sharecropping basis.
There are in addition those who farm as
labourers. However, because they are usually
paid in kind, the distinction with
sharecroppers is not as great as might be
assumed. Even the difference between renting
and sharecropping is limited given that tenants
may also pay for their land access in shares.
The real difference lies in the balance of
arrangements made, in the proportion of the
share which is agreed will be paid by the
owner to the tenant, sharecropper or
labourer. In Faryab field studies, shares
ranged from one-fifth to one half (Box 1) and
a similar picture was attained in Bamyan.
One determinant of the share level was as
expected: whether the land user would bring
more than labour to the arrangement — tools,
seeds, plough, oxen and sometimes fertiliser.
Another determinant (and which to an extent
correlated with the first) was whether the
land user needed to be provided
accommodation or not. This in turn correlated
with locals and strangers, most residents of
the village or locality (mantiqa) having access
to accommodation already. As elaborated
later, this renders strangers extra-vulnerable
to exploitation; without exception they
received the lowest shares. This was found
to be so even where some owned their own
tools.
2.1.3. Distinguishing between Land Access
and Ownership
Mean farm size
In smallholder economies the mean farm size
will tend to accord with the mean size of
land owned. Skewed distribution and corollary
hiring in of both labour and land by some





farm size and mean
size of land owned are
likely to diverge
strongly.
Perhaps the most reliable figure for land
owned is still the national mean of 3.5 ha
(17.5 jeribs)(irrigated and rain-fed). This
arose from the cadastral survey beginning in
1964 in which all plots held by each owner
were measured and all farms in each vicinity
were covered. Moreover, the area covered
in total represented 26 percent of total
cultivated land at the time (mainly 1964-
1968, but continued in some areas up to
1978).47
The 30,000 household survey conducted by
the Swedish Committee for Agriculture
produced a mean farm size area of five
hectares (25 jeribs) for 1988-1989.48 The
2002 survey of 5,000 farmers in 540 villages
raises this mean farm size to 6.79 ha (34
jeribs).49 It is not entirely clear how this last
sample was structured and it may be that a
disproportionate number of medium and large
farms were included. Or, the high figure may
be an accurate reflection of another trend
clearly underway and discussed later —
rampant land grabbing and cultivation of
pastureland that extend farm sizes for the
better-off especially, and raise the mean.
None of these figures accord well with those
of the NRVA, which suggest a mean farm size
of owned land of only 3.3 jeribs irrigated
47 Alden Wily, 2003a, op cit. and Safar, Y. Report on Land Administration. Kabul. 2004.
48 SCA, 1990, op cit.
49 Maletta, op cit.
Data on farm sizes have been so wildly
divergent in formal surveys since the 1960s
that real mean farm sizes cannot be
determined. It is unlikely that the mean farm
size of 17.5 jeribs in the 1970s has fallen to
around 5.0 jeribs today.
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To add to complications, it cannot be assumed
that all land users are landless. Land holdings
are generally so small for the majority that
they both farm these and sharecrop in other
lands. There is considerable anecdotal
evidence of intra-class and kin contracting
as well and landlord-labourer contracting. In
both Bamyan and Faryab, the high levels of
absenteeism made the former quite easy. In
the Eraq Valley villages of Shibar District in
Bamyan, for example, where no large
landlords exist, most land sharecropped in
belongs to families or neighbours who had
left their equally small fields in search of
work. In contrast, most sharecropped in land
in Panjao District villages belongs to
permanently absentee large landlords, mostly
Kuchis. In Shirin Tagao in Faryab,
sharecropping by smaller Uzbek landowners
or landless on Pashtun and Arab larger farms
is very common, the former also frequently
still absent.
Box 1: Land Classes in Faryab
Kambaghal (beggars/ Landless and homeless persons who survive by begging, including many
destitutes) elderly and disabled persons but also some of those who are unable to
earn enough from daily paid work to survive.
Mard-i kar/muzdakar Landless (and often homeless) daily paid workers, often from outside the
(labourer) area or even district. They spend their lives moving from village to village
in search of work, especially in spring and summer. Typical work includes
building walls, houses, digging channels. The mean wage in 2003 was $2
per day, mostly paid in cash; this is proving attractive to some better-
off landless farmers. These labourers may be able to get only a few days
of work a month however; known villagers, relatives, sharecroppers,
tenants preferred for paid labour.
Gharib kar/Charikar Landless (and often homeless) who attach themselves to a landlord
(sharecropper) as a sharecropper and accommodated by the landlord. Generally receive
20% of the product they plant and harvest. Often strangers, and moved
on by the landlord after one or two years. Insecure and exploited.
Baz kar (sharecropper) Also sharecroppers but distinguished by being usually a settled member
of the community and may own accommodation (often share with
relatives). Some have small gardens of their own. Work as farmers, often
for the same landlord for several years or longer. Receive 25% of the
total crop.
Khistmand (tenant) Sharecropper who receives up to 50% (or at times, more) of the crop in
return for providing all inputs (seed, plough, oxen and labour). Usually
farms the same plot each year. The tenant may own a small plot of his
own. Tenancy is largely confined to “middle peasants” who have the
inputs to negotiate the higher share and are better able to risk crop
failure; in tenancy the share is fixed irrespective of production (i.e., if
the crop fails, the “rent” is still due). Rents are often paid in kind (in
seers of wheat), not cash.
Nimcha bai  Middle-sized landowner able to employ a worker or sharecropper.
(half landlord) May rent in or sharecrop additional land himself.
Bai/beg/khan  Rich landowner (but may also mean rich merchant). Bai and beg are also
(landlord) synonymous terms for important personages. Rarely farms himself but
has his properties farmed by tenants and sharecroppers. Often absent,
often has businesses additional to farming (e.g., transport, shops).
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settlement.
However, there is also scope for the poor
who have no irrigated land to access rain-
fed land in especially the difficult remoter
areas, in their own right. These poor are
generally not the extreme poor but those
who have the means (labour time, tools,
seeds and usually oxen) to develop such land.
Patterns of tenure over irrigated and rain-
fed lands are accordingly different and best
distinguished.
This, the NRVA 2003 questionnaire does, with
interesting results, not yet fully analysed.
Table 11 lays out the size of farms that takes
account of both the
different ways land is
accessed (owning,
renting, share-
cropping) and by farm
type (irrigated and rain-fed). It also reviews
these by poverty groups in terms of food
consumption.
The picture presented is complex:
• Despite complicated access systems, at
the end of the day, the mean area of
land sharecropped in and especially rented
in is significantly less than the average
amount of land farmed that is directly
owned. This accords well with many (but
Use and tenure of irrigated and rain-fed
land differs significantly
Farm sizes may also be significantly skewed
given that many people farm either irrigated
land and/or rain-fed land. The two are not
like for like, different not just in productivity
and seed levels required (measured usually
in seers), but also tenurially. Irrigated farms
usually have fixed and clear perimeter
boundaries. Rain-fed farms rarely have fully
fixed boundaries; the remoter, higher and
drier the field, the more fluid its boundaries.
In many cases virtual shifting cultivation is
practised. This sometimes occurs within wider
boundaries of an “owned” area but often it





land runs into pasture
and/or has dual purpose. Such areas are
regarded usually as common land, which
members of the community have access to
and may develop for farming — if they have
the means to do so. This predisposes
development of rain-fed fields by those with
oxen and ploughs, seeds and labour (hired
or sharecropped). Over time private rights
have been established in such areas, but with
a good deal less precision (and
documentation) than those relating to nearer
rain-fed fields, and especially to irrigated or
The fluid nature of upland rain-fed farms,
shifting cultivation and communal tenure of
many rain-fed land areas complicates
assessment of real farm size owned.
Table 11: Farm Size by Access, Type and Wealth
Land accessed in jeribs (0.2 ha) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All Rural
(Lowest) (Highest)
   Irrigated land owned 2.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 4.7 3.3
   Irrigated land sharecropped 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
   Irrigated land rented in 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
   Irrigated land used for farming 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.5 3.6 2.2
   Rain-fed land owned 2.8 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.2
   Rain-fed land sharecropped 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
   Rain-fed land rented in 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
   Rain-fed land used for farming 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.6
Data Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by The World Bank, 2004.
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majority of rural households are owner-
operators. Figures published in 1970 and
1990 respectively found that 55.2 percent
and 78 percent of those who farmed were
owner-operators.50 These rates are much
higher than in many other Asian economies
where contractual farming by renting or
sharecropping is dominant.51
• Rain-fed land used for farming is
significantly less than irrigated land (a
mean of 1.6 jeribs compared to 2.2 jeribs
irrigated land). This is at first surprising
given national figures show 3.2 million
ha of irrigated land and 4.5 million ha of
rain-fed cultivated land.52 Moreover,
expansion in cultivation of rain-fed land
is known to have increased over the last
decade. The difference may reflect the
fact that rain-fed land is often used only
once every two or even three and four
years, due to low fertility. It is also likely
that the timing of NRVA skewed results:
the survey was undertaken in 2003 and
referred to the last farming season when
many farmers were still nervous of drought
continuing and reluctant to invest in
already risky rain-fed farming. Many also
had lost critical assets like oxen, ploughs
and seed with which to farm. Moreover,
as shown later, the normal rain-fed area
planted with cereals averages at the
higher level of 3.0 jeribs.
• The above does not show the total farm
size (rain-fed and irrigated) but it is
evident that these farm sizes overall will
be significantly less than the mean farm
size indicated earlier of 34 jeribs in the
2002 survey, 25 jeribs in 1988 or even
the 17.5 jeribs of 1978.53 Aside from
sampling and weighting issues and the
above factors in respect of rain-fed land,
another explanation may be that extended
households provided the basis of
calculation for earlier studies; this tends
to be confirmed by differences in mean
household sizes.54
• The differences between farm size
averages for land owned and land typically
cultivated are significant. While owned
irrigated land averages 3.3 jeribs, land
actually farmed falls to 2.2 jeribs per
farmer. Averagely owned and cultivated
rain-fed lands similarly diverge (2.2 jeribs
and 1.6 jeribs). These differences merely
confirm/illustrate the fact that some
people clearly own a good deal more land
than they use at one time, manifest in
shifting cultivation. It also confirms the
inevitable fact that in a largely non-
mechanised farm economy, resource
adjustments are made in relation to
available labour, water, traction and
seeds, thus helping to equalise access, if
not ownership.
• Other patterns of relative ownership and
access are evident, better presented in
the Table 12. While the poor are the ones
most using sharecropped in land not
belonging to themselves, those who are
renting in land are not the poorest, who
clearly do not have the assets on which
to negotiate a favourable fixed price (in
cash or kind) for use of the plot, or to
risk being out of pocket if the product is
bad due to drought or other exigencies.
50 GoA. Survey of Progress, Central Statistics Office. Kabul: GoA. 1970 and SCA, 1990, op cit.
51 For example, owner-occupiers in India make up only 15% of farmers, 14% of farmers in Indonesia and 40% of farmers in both
Thailand and Bangladesh (Lastarria-Cornhiel and Sanjak-Melmed, op cit.).
52 FAO/UNDP, op cit.
53 Unweighted analysis in February 2004 and on uncleaned and incomplete data showed that those with both irrigated and
rain-fed land had farms that ranged in average from 2.07 jeribs (very poor), to 3.56 (poor) to 6.29 jeribs (medium wealth
group) (MRRD 2004). These figures also suggest much lower mean farm sizes than previously recorded.
54 For NRVA 2003 this was 7.5 persons; in the SCA 1988-1989 survey households mainly fell within the 7-12 range but with
some households of more than 20 persons. The FAO 2002 survey recorded a mean household size of its respondents of 10-
11 persons.
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patterns and confirms the above. In addition,
usage by proportions of population is
indicated:
• Most people cultivate irrigated land (60%).
Only a quarter cultivate rain-fed fields
(23%).
• Most people own some irrigated land
(65%). Only a quarter own rain-fed land
(25%). Likely reasons are: the fact that
rain-fed land often requires ox-ploughing,
erratic returns, and risking investments;
the difficulties of sufficiently regular
access; the co-option of many rain-fed
areas by large landlords; and contrary
recognition in many others that rain-fed
land is communally, not individually,
owned.
• Land renting is limited; only three percent
rent in irrigated land and fewer rent in
rain-fed land (2%). The areas rented in
are respectively tiny, as noted above (0.1
jerib).
• Sharecropping in land is also limited,
largely reflecting the above-mentioned
dominance of owner-operators but also
the fact that many larger farms are
farmed by hired workers, not those
considered sharecroppers (even though
both generally gain their rewards in kind).
Only seven percent sharecrop in irrigated
land and four percent sharecrop in rain-
fed land. These are significant figures,
for there is a tendency to exaggerate the
role of sharecropping in Afghanistan.55
• Those who do sharecrop derive
predominantly from the poorest group
and likely come from that 24 percent of
households who are entirely landless.
• Differences in the tenure of irrigated and
rain-fed land again appear. While the
better off are visibly the main owners of
irrigated land, ownership of rain-fed land
is more or less equally shared among the
very poor and the wealthy (respectively
28% and 26% of the sample). Common
ownership of upland rain-fed areas may
also be a factor.
2.2. Labour Distribution
2.2.1. Landlordism
Not everyone involved in farming is a
“farmer.” At one extreme are many (and
perhaps most) large landlords who do not
Table 12: Rural Land Ownership in NRVA 2003
Land use and tenure (% with) Q1 Q5 All Rural
(Lowest) Q2 Q3 Q4 (Highest)
   Irrigated land owned 48 61 66 72 76 65
   Irrigated land sharecropped 11 9 7 5 4 7
   Irrigated land rented in 2 3 3 3 4 3
   Irrigated land used for farming 43 57 61 67 70 60
   Rain-fed land owned 28 25 24 22 26 25
   Rain-fed land sharecropped 8 5 3 2 3 4
   Rain-fed land rented in 1 2 2 1 2 2
   Rain-fed land used for farming 28 24 22 19 24 23
   Owns either irrigated or rain-fed 60 74 78 83 85 76
   Rain-fed jeribs planted cereals 3.7 2.9 2.4 2.5 3.3 3.0
Data Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by The World Bank, 2004.
55 And accordingly to underestimate owner-operator or owner-occupier rates; see GoA, 1970, op cit. and SCA, 1990, op cit.
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to farm for them and/or are absent from the
area, or were never permanently resident in
the area. Rent-seeking absentee landlordism
is significant. This is frequently the case with
Kuchi landlords who have purchased arable
lands in the course of visiting the area
seasonally. There are a growing number of
landlords who are businessmen, often with
warlord/commander backgrounds. There are
urban employed people (sometimes very well
employed) who visit their farms only to collect
the year’s wheat supply, or who do not visit,
but have this sent, in kind or cash equivalents.
There are those who own land but live outside
Afghanistan. Sometimes they have very little
land and sometimes larger lands. All these
categories of non-farming land-owners were
encountered in the village studies of Bamyan
and Faryab (Box 2).
2.2.2. The Low Value of Labour
The diversity in contractual labour relations
has been shown to be highly diverse, in terms
of who contracts who (kin and intra-class as
well as inter-class), in the foundations of the
arrangement (not just tools, seeds, ploughs
and oxen but skewed to those who own land
of their own and houses of their own), and
in the rewards (shares, payments).
Save perhaps for tenants/renters who in a
good year keep more than 50 percent of
wheat and other crops grown (and much less
than 50 percent with a poor harvest), the
normal share of labourers and sharecroppers
of one-fifth to one-third at most does not
produce enough wheat to survive on until
the next harvest. Bamyan and Faryab farmers
reported that the share allows the family to
feed itself for only four to seven months,
necessitating wheat acquisition to cover the
deficit.56 This wheat is begged or borrowed
in small amounts at a time, or purchased on
two monthly credit terms from local
shopkeepers. Landless labourers with sheep
tend to hold these to sell almost entirely to
buy wheat (alongside fewer purchases of
other subsistence items like paraffin and
tea), their small herds recovering just enough
to have the same number of stock next year,
thus inhibiting accumulation. Sales of non-
wheat shares (sesame, barley, melons, etc.)
are also made to purchase needed non-food
commodities. Some also have to sell off part
56 Alden Wily, 2004a and 2004d, op cit.
57 Eraq Valley, Shibar District, Bamyan Province (Alden Wily, 2004a, op cit.).
Box 2: Examples of Absentee Land Owners in One Community57
Kafandaz Village: A Canadian Afghan visits every two years to see his home place, mainly because
his parents are buried there and he feels connected to the area. His farm is small and he does
not collect his crop share from his sharecroppers, who are relatives, although “we feed him very
well and give him gifts” when he visits. He will never sell the land.
Ashoor Village: Two brothers are employed in Shibar and Bamyan and return to collect food
shares from two sharecroppers.
Khoshkak Village: Three Kuchi families own all the rain-fed farmland and used to visit annually
to collect 75-80 percent crop shares. They no longer visit and their tenure is disputed.
Khoshkak Village: Some others farm land now belonging to a wealthy businessman in the nearest
centre who bought up stock and land at cheap prices during the Taliban period from villagers
desperate to have family members released from prison in Kabul, to pay bribes to prevent more
family members being taken away, and to pay taxes and tithes. He has never visited his farms
but collects 75 percent shares and additional shares in repayment of still outstanding debts.
Neighbouring Kalo Valley: An ex-mujaheddin and current commander living in Khamard owns
large lands in Kalo, farmed by tenants and sharecroppers.
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debts or meet emergency or other important
cash purchasing needs, and then later in the
year, must beg wheat from others or borrow
funds to buy back in wheat (and at higher
prices) to feed themselves up until the next
harvest and their next in-kind share.58
This insufficiency of labour contracts is also
reflected in the finding of the AREU rural
livelihoods survey that only a quarter of 390






households. This clearly does not mean,
however, that the poor are necessarily
increasingly independent of the farming
sector. While they obviously try to access as
many odd jobs off-farm and aid-supported
food and cash for work opportunities as
possible, farming remains key — and not least
for the very poorest who need landlords to
access shelter.
A small exception exists which could signal
wider slight mobility in share terms in the
future. Absentee landlordism, seasonal or
otherwise, has long characterised rural
production in Afghanistan, even prior to the
war. Where absenteeism is now involuntary,
such as through instability or inter-ethnic
strife (currently most affecting Pashtuns in
central and northern regions), those
contracted to farm the properties are securing
higher shares than in the past even though
their inputs remain the same (labour rather
than seeds and traction). Male out-migration
for work is also a longstanding feature of
rural society, but is anecdotally described
by villagers as being much higher than prior
to 1978, partly because more farmers have
become used to being outside their villages
or country. Better-off refugees and IDPs
and/or those who have obtained stable jobs
outside the rural area are unlikely to return
permanently to farm. Labour shortages should
in theory help improve terms.
There are also tentative indications that
share tendency could be slowly following the
classical route towards conversion into cash
tenancy arrangements. With uncertainty as




2002 and 2003 tried to
secure cash
arrangements where they could — landlords
seeking cash rents rather than crop shares,
and sharecroppers seeking to be paid in cash,
both attempting to remove the uncertainty
of the harvest to their own benefit.60 Some
with little land also were offering their land
for cash rent (reverse tenancy). Daily paid
labour rates in rural areas are currently high,
at $2 in the off-farm sector, due partly to
flourishing aid-delivered cash for work
opportunities. Competition for labour in poppy
growing areas may also be assumed to
heighten cash arrangements. Typically
however it is likely to be predominantly those
with status or bargaining power who are able
to benefit; i.e., not landless, asset-less (seeds,
oxen, plough) farmers, not homeless
households, and in the case of poppy, not
those without resin harvesting skills.
Indebtedness in general is integral to contract
labour economies and is a constant condition
for the poor — and more optionally a condition
for the better off.61 Data collected by NRVA
in 2002 showed up to 92 percent and 57
percent of sample populations borrowing
58 Ibid.
59 Grace and Pain, op cit.
60 Alden Wily, 2003a, 2004a and 2004d, op cit.
61 WFP/VAM, op cit.
When full-time farm labouring does not meet
even subsistence food needs, then labour
must be seen to be seriously undervalued.
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show similar trends.62
The NRVA 2002 found only four percent of
households had some/all of their land under
mortgage in 2002 (range of 0-19% by
province).63 Provisional analysis of NRVA 2003
suggests similar relatively low rates. Although
translated as “mortgage,” graw is a form
that is to the full advantage of the creditor
and typically taken up out of desperation by
the poor, rather than for investment
purposes.64 Loans by the poor are for food
purchase or to cover health and other
emergency needs, while better off farmers
mortgage their land as an aid to asset
accumulation (vehicles, shop, goods to sell,
tickets overseas, etc.). In addition the former
tend to have to mortgage all their land while
the latter generally mortgage only one plot
of their farm.
There are anecdotal signs that land
mortgaging could begin to take on its more
typical investment purpose than has been
the case in the past. That is, only those who
are able to choose when they mortgage their
land and have a good chance to repay loans
in time (usually two years) will do so, and
for investment purposes. Smaller owners may
be decreasingly able to mortgage and forced
to sell their land outright and for low prices.
Respondents in the Bamyan and Faryab field
studies indicated that this had been the case
since Taliban times. Pressures to pay taxes
or tithes combined with drought gave them
no option but to sell their land outright to
traders or landlords rather than passing the
land over into what they hoped would be
temporary ownership. This has continued
well after the drought.65
2.2.3. The Hidden Reality of Rural
Homelessness
At the other extreme are those noted earlier
as only farm labourers, not considered as
(skilled) farmers per se. These families fall
into the poorest groups. As well as not owning
land, they often do not own homes. The NRVA
2003 suggests homelessness could amount to
15 percent of the rural population, as shown
in Table 13. In both field study areas it was
found that many house tenants are paying
“rent” as part of their contractual arrange-
ment with the landlord. It is this provision
of accommodation which reduces their share
from 25 to 20 percent (one-fourth to one-
fifth crop share). Particularly in the Bamyan
field study, cases were found where homeless
labourers were in effect paying for their
accommodation by being required to carry
out additional duties almost on demand by
the landlord, including periodically
transporting goods, being sent to collect
extra thorny bushes for winter fodder, or
62 Specifically, the AREU longitudinal rural livelihoods household survey (Grace and Pain, op cit.) and provisional analysis of
NRVA 2003.
63 WFP/VAM, op cit.
64 Mortgaging (graw) gives the creditor temporary ownership of the land and he usually re-employs the owner as a sharecropper
and thus takes up to two-thirds of the crop in lieu of interest. Should the owner default on repaying the cash loan in time,
foreclosure is automatic, depriving the debtor of the opportunity of selling the land on the open market. The value of the
loan is usually greatly less than the value of the land and the value of the crop share far exceeds normal interest rates.
65 Alden Wily, 2004d, op cit.
Table 13: House Ownership by Wealth Group
Home ownership (%) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All Rural
(Lowest) (Highest)
   Owned 74 84 86 89 91 85
   Rented 3 3 3 2 2 3
   Used without paying rent 19 10 6 4 3 8
   Nomadic or temporary dwelling 4 3 5 5 4 4
Data Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by The World Bank, 2004.
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was particularly so where they owned a few
sheep and were dependent upon the landlord
for permission to graze their animals along
with his herds.
Homelessness could be more important in
keeping the poor, poor, and downward
polarisation generally. Without a single room
of their own, rural labourers are placed at
acute disadvantage in negotiating crop shares,
and other farm and off-farm labour. It has
been many decades since reciprocal feudal-
type relations between landlords and peasants
have been obtained; the war years and
constrained conditions of the present appear
to have made landlords less responsible for
their workers. Anecdotally in the field study
areas, it was found that farm workers are
unable to get loans from landlords, unable
to get credit from shopkeepers, and were
being increasingly charged rent for their
rooms/byres more often through increased
extraction of their labour. Those with even
one room of their own, or accommodation
with relatives, reported being better able to
resist these demands.
Many of the homeless are itinerant, moving
from village to village in search of farm work
(and extra odd-jobbing for food or cash, if
they can get it). Itinerant workers are not
new to the Afghan rural economy, although
with relatively little acknowledgement. This
may be because there are suggestions in
survey findings that while their fathers and
grandfathers were also itinerant labourers,
those of this generation are remaining with
the same landlord for shorter periods, often
only one season. Landlords were also found
to typically delay agreeing to new work
contracts to their own benefit, the itinerants
faced with long winters without shelter and
therefore more compliant to unfavourable
terms. In interviews with itinerants in both
Bamyan and Faryab, the “shame” of being
itinerant was remarked, in both cases with
reference to wives and daughters being
sometimes forced to visit the landlord’s home
at night.
The real extent of homelessness (and related
landlessness) could be higher than indicated
in the NRVA survey above. This is because
itinerant labourers are very unevenly
considered part of the community and may
not have been represented in the poorest
groups sampled. There are other non-itinerant
homeless who also slip through the cracks in
village statistics. This includes the possibly
quite significant number of de jure poor
female-headed households that reside with
relatives or friends, and de facto female-
headed families left in the care of relatives
while their husbands and sons migrate for
work. Again, exploitation of all kinds was
anecdotally commented upon for these
groups, by both the women themselves and
others. Exploitation also occurs where the
male household heads are present; “rent” is
paid through their wives and daughters
providing cooking, cleaning and laundry
services, and their sons, herding duties.
UNHCR monitoring shows that up to 41
percent of returning refugees have no
accommodation to return to (Table 14).
There is, of course, a new emerging group
of itinerant labourers who are comparatively
advantaged. This is poppy harvesting
labourers, who increasingly move in groups,
under contract to larger poppy cultivators.
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Table 14: House Ownership of Returning Refugees
Period % Do Not  % Own House % Owned a house
Own House or Rooms but Destroyed
or Damaged
March-December 2002 21.0 79.0 46.4
January-December 2003 34.0 66.0 60.4
January-April 2004 41.0 59.0 67.0
Source: UNHCR, 2004b.Their earnings may be substantial given the
inflated labour rates paid.66 These men,
often younger and single, vary sharply from
the above groups in that they may have homes
from whence they come and return to, and
do not bring families with them. This group
also differs from the larger group of poppy
producers and harvesters who voluntarily or
otherwise cultivate poppy on part of their
small holdings, or as sharecroppers on the
land of other people; they garner less benefit
both in daily wages or shares and in that they
are usually already heavily indebted and
sometimes have no choice but to cultivate
poppy.67 With continuation, the pattern of
ownership and labour relations could alter
significantly, but largely along lines which
do not alter current class differentiation;
landless are benefiting much less than landed
and middle men (often with warlord/military
connections), and advantaged labour (homes,
or their own small farms) more than homeless
labour.68
2.2.4. Female Land Ownership
Conventional wisdom that Afghan women are
entirely landless is not correct. Certainly
custom, and Pashtun custom in particular,
does not admit women as equitable
landowners any more than it encourages them
to actively farm or herd livestock. Nonetheless
the Koran and the Koranic-based Civil Code
recognise women as entitled to own land in
their own right and directs at inheritance
that they are included — although inequitably
(see Box 3).  Moreover, women may inherit
from their fathers and their husbands.
Inheritance is the main means of land
transaction and for women virtually the only
route. Few purchase land outright. The field
studies found that most villagers acknowledge
these Shari’a principles and apply them —
but usually only in name. Daughters in
particular generally hand over their land to
their brothers, if not immediately, then after
Box 3: Women and the Law
SHARI’A LAW
From Chapter 4 of the Koran: The Women (Surah 4 – Al Nisa)
Section 2: Law of Inheritance
God (thus) directs you as regards your children’s inheritance: to the male, a portion equal to
that of two females: if only daughters, two or more, their share is two-thirds of the inheritance:
if only one, her share is a half. For parents, a sixth share of the inheritance to each, if the
deceased left children; if not children, and the parents are the (only) heirs, the mother has a
third; if the deceased left brothers (or sisters) the mother has a sixth. The distribution in all
cases is after the payment of legacies and debts. Ye know not whether your parents or your
children are nearest to you in benefit. These are settled portions ordained by God: and God is
All-knowing, All-wise [Art.11].
The Civil Code (1975)
The Civil Code (1975) largely draws on Islamic jurisprudence. Articles 1993-2102 of the Code
outline the procedures for inheritance. This includes precise provision of shares for all parties
(farz) including for widows and daughters (Article 2004). Widows are to receive one-eighth of
the property, or more (one-fourth) if they are childless. Where there is more than one wife, this
proportion is shared among them. Provision for widows is priority. Of the property that remains
after taking the due share for the widow(s) (one-eighth), and the share of the parents (one-
sixth), daughters will receive one-third of the remaining estate. Sons receive two-thirds.  Even
if there are five daughters they will receive only one-third of the estate in total. The Civil Law
is also clear that wives may inherit from both their husband and members of their natal family
(Article 2003).
66 Up to US$9.40 a day in central Afghanistan and country average of $6.77 for lancing and gum collection in 2003, and $2.69
for unskilled planting, tending labour. UNODC and GoA (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Counter Narcotics
Directorate, Government of Afghanistan). Afghanistan. Farmers’ Intentions Survey 2003/2004. Kabul. 2004.
67 Ibid.
68 Goodhand suggests family relations may also be changing with a growing generational divide. Goodhand, J. Frontiers and
Wars: A Study of the Opium Economy in Afghanistan. Draft. London: University of London. 2003.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 26
Synthesis Paper Seriesa respectable period, within which it is
established that the land does rightfully
belong to the daughter and should be regarded
as a generous gift. Brothers tend to reward
their kind sisters with presents at this point
and pledges to be always there for them.
Widows less routinely hand over their shares
to their sons. Instead her land share remains
within the family holding or where the widow
is not living with her sons, may remain more
definitively her own property.
Widows are in particular the core landholding
groups among women and even now are seen
to acquire land in their own right (particularly
in urban areas).69 Every village has numerous
widows following years of war and there is
always a handful of women who own houses
and farms. They rarely if ever farm these
directly although they may influence how
the plot is cultivated and by whom. NRVA
data tend to confirm that Afghan women do
own land, albeit in less measure than men.
Fifty-six percent of female-headed households
own land, significantly less than the mean
for farm ownership overall (75%). 
There is also the reality of family holdings
routinely encountered in the Bamyan and
Faryab studies. Many — and perhaps most in
many areas — rural households perceive the
family as landowner, not necessarily the male
household head. The AREU longitudinal
livelihoods survey echoes this reality, with
31 percent of its sample recording land sharing
with females. The notion of family holding
is quite widely reflected in the Books of
Integrated Ownership and Taxation compiled
in the 1970s, although by repute not in legal
documents of entitlement where these are
prepared or in cadastral records. Within this
land sharing context women are shareholders.
More about the effects of land laws and
policies are described in the next section.
69 See “The Widows of Maimana” in Alden Wily, 2004d, op cit.
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aside from its limited real application in
recent decades, it is too heavily founded
upon imported notions of tenure to
satisfactorily capture and support crucial
customary norms and opportunities,
beneficial to majority poor. Weak legal
recognition for common property is
particularly damaging to the interests of
those with little or no farmland. Rights are
being further threatened through a new wave
of elite capture which legal paradigms are
ill equipped to limit. Modern land
administration also falls short systemically
in ways that may support majority land
relations and follows old-fashioned centralist
norms that allow for zero landholder
participation in decision-making. Disputes
are rife and most dangerously so in respect
of remote rain-fed and pastureland resources,
where individual versus community, and
inter-ethnic interests clash.
3.1. Land Law
The ownership of real property (land and
fixed assets like buildings and houses) is
regulated by a complex of customary, religious
and statutory law. The last has derived as
often through dictatorial decree and edict
as through parliamentary enactments.70
Statutory law (or state law) comprises the
civil code, land subject laws and the
overriding supreme law, the national
constitution.
3.1.1. Customary Law
In practice most rural property is acquired,
sustained and transferred customarily, with
family holding dominant. Save Pashtunwali,
a Pashtun code of conduct, there is no written
customary law and each tribe and even



























70 Even where elected parliaments have existed (1964-1978) not all law derived from this source.
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independently. What is customary becomes
rule or law mainly only when a conflict arises.
As everywhere, customary “law” is
distinguished in Afghanistan by the fact that
it is upheld only through social and




may not have been
customary in 1960 and
what was customary in 1960 may not be
customary today. In Afghanistan, custom is
greatly influenced by Shari’a and the
distinction between religious and customary
law often difficult to identify.
3.1.2. Religious Law
Shari’a principles (Islamic law) are locally
interpreted when it comes to property matters
and widely referred to in both informal and
formal dispute resolution. Informal dispute
resolution operates at community and higher
levels and broadly centres upon shura (non-
Pashtun) or maraka (Pashtun). These are
public committees formed for the purpose
of dealing with a problem and generally
comprising elders.71 Formal dispute resolution
on rural land has traditionally proceeded
through district primary courts (mahkama-i-
ibtedaia) with appeal to provincial courts
(mahkama-i-morafa’a) and thence to the
high court (mahkama-i-tameez) but with a
special land court now in place (see below).
3.1.3. Civil Law
The written Civil Code supposedly embraces
common or customary law and is deeply
influenced by customary practice, itself
deeply influenced by religious law. The
written Civil Code was compiled in the early
1970s and given the status of statute (state
law). Its religious basis is arguably strongest.
In content it comprises more than 2,000
articles that draw tangibly upon mainly
Hannafi (Sunni) jurisprudence and its “books






mortgages. These subjects reflect the areas
where tenure conflicts have traditionally
existed and where rulings have accordingly
had to be devised. Many of the instructions
in the Civil Code are difficult to interpret.
The compilation serves as the main
sourcebook of courts of second instance
(provincial level) and higher. Consti-tutionally,
its provisions must apply before Shari’a law
is referred to.
3.1.4. Statutory Law
The Civil Law is in turn subject to state law.
Upwards of 70 rural land statutes exist. This
is a complicated body of law, with many
decrees simply reissued under a new
administration or reflecting amendments
without clear repeal of earlier versions. The
status of Taliban decrees is especially
uncertain and some are referred to by judges
as obsolete although they are still legally in
force where they comply with the principles
established by the Bonn Agreement and the
Constitutions of 1964 and now 2004. Each
standing law is supposedly under review by
the appropriate ministry, a process unevenly
underway.
The first real state law on land was passed
in 1935 under French and Turkish law
71 Among Pashtuns, maraka that extend to inter-clan and tribal levels and/or which deal with more serious offences or decision-
making are referred to as jirga. This term now has a more formal connotation as a selected and sometimes elected national
public forum for decision-making such as was formed to debate and approve the new provisional constitution of 2004. For
details on the justice system, refer to Wardak, A. Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan. Symposium on State
Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan, May-June 2004, Bonn. 2004.
72 Sunni Muslims comprise approximately 74% of the Afghan population, Shi’a 24% and Ismaili 2%. Shi’a jurisprudence is largely
of the Ja’afari school.
The distinctions between religious, customary
and common land law are blurred.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 29
Looking for Peace on the Pasturesinfluence and dealt with the important subject
of how the state may acquire private property
for public needs. A wave of reformist rural
land laws was introduced in the 1960s-1970s
mainly by President Daoud under the influence
of a USAID land survey, registration and titling
programme. These laws were starkly
refashioned after the communist revolution
of 1978 with the issue of the Land Reform
and Mortgage Decrees (1978). The Taliban
were particularly prolific in decree-making,
among which important new subjects
appeared such as relating to forestry and
classification of lands. Box 4 provides the
main subject areas of state property law.
Supreme law
The clearest source of law is constitutional
and within which property has been variously
addressed since 1923.73 The new Constitution
avoids addressing land issues beyond classical
supreme law limitations upon state
appropriation of property without payment
of compensation, unauthorised entry into
private properties, and freedom of settlement
anywhere in the country, etc.74 These
principles were already in place in 1964 or
earlier.75 Virtually the only innovation in
2004 is that foreigners may now lease land
(Article 41).
By virtue of omission, it is also of note that
only mines, underground resources and
archaeological artefacts are definitively made
properties of state (Articles 9 and 15). This
leaves the door open for clarification as to
workable distinctions between land
definitively owned by government in its own
right as service provider, land owned by the
nation, but vested in the government as
trustee (State Land, or Public Land), and
private land (owned either by individuals or
groups — common property). Such essential
distinctions are seriously blurred in Afghan
law, past and present. Legal distinctions
between private, public and religious land
have existed since the 1965 Land and Statistics
Law but to whom public land belongs
(government or the nation) is unclear. Nor
has there been any clear legal provision for
common property (land owned by groups,
such as villages).76 Like a number of other
emergent states this last century, the Afghan
administration has steadily accrued more and
more land to its own jurisdiction and tenure.
Box 4: Key Original Statutory Legislation on Rural Land
1. Acquisition for public purpose (1935, 2000)
2. Property taxation (1965, 1976)
3. Survey and registration (1965)
4. Distributive reform (1975, 1976, 1979)





10. Poppy production (2000)
11. Restitution (1992, 1999, 2000)
12. Classification of land classes (1965, 2000)
13. Land dispute resolution (2002, 2003)
14. Making land available for investment (2003)
15. Restitution of public lands (2004)
73 Refer to Alden Wily, 2003a, op cit. Annex G for texts.
74 Property articles include 9, 14-15, 38-41 and 137-154.
75 See footnote 73.
76 Article 5(f) of The Land Survey and Statistics Law 1965 does provide weakly for two or more persons to register land together
but this has not been used for this purpose.
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on how Public Land is defined (as owned by
the people or by the government), this could
render more than 85 percent of the country’s
land area as State Land/Government Land.
A final decree additionally renders to the
state any property under its control for more
than 37 years.81 That law also permits the
state to use properties “that neither the





1978 may be retained
by their occupants in certain conditions
(Article 11) while private properties acquired
by use of force or threat are to be punished
(Article 14). The law begs more questions
than it answers. It also repeals an important
Taliban Decree which provided a more
nuanced subdivision of property classes (see
below).82
3.1.6. The Current Utility of Law
Just how far modern statutory law matters
is moot. Even prior to 1978, Wardak observes
that the formal justice system through which
state laws were administered was “elitist,
corrupt and involved long delays and most
Afghans avoided contact with it.”83 Most
courts do not have access to statutes and
many primary courts do not even have copies
of the Civil Code 1975 (or the Criminal Code
1976). Most judges rule on the basis of
“common sense,” custom, and their
knowledge of Shari’a jurisprudence, usually
deeply permeated with customary norms.
The civil administration and the populace at
large are unaware of most formal law outside
critical dictates which they have felt the
3.1.5. New Legislation
Resolving refugee/IDP land disputes
Legal development in the land sphere has
been minor since the Bonn Agreement. Only
four new decrees have been issued. Two
relate to land disputes arising during the
absence of owners since 27 April 1978 (i.e.,
refugees and IDPs). The first established a
single Property
Disputes Resolution
Court in Kabul in
2002, now replaced
with a two tier system
providing for appeals. The second law also
provides two courts, one to deal with disputes
within Kabul Province and one for outside
Kabul.77 Cases where government is one of
the disputants may not be heard by these
courts. This is problematic where
government’s claim to lands (variously defined
as Public Land or Government Land) is
elemental to the issue at stake. The
performance of the Land Disputes Court is
widely criticised for having dealt mainly with
claims by wealthy returnees, arriving at
doubtful rulings and being unable to enforce
its decisions.78 Even the new ex-Kabul Court
appears so far to be dealing with house, shop
and business claims rather than those
affecting farms or group interests.79
Entrenching the state as majority land
owner
Another new decree is designed to facilitate
access to property by investors, providing for
the definition of surplus land belonging to
the state and its transfer and registration at
market rates to investors.80 This law declares
“all real property in the possession, custody
or use of ministries or other government
New land laws reflect concern about
continuing land conflicts and intentions to
secure as much land as possible to the state.
77 Decree 136 (19/6/1381) 2002 in Gazette 804, now replaced with Decree 89 (9/9/1382) 2003 regarding the creation of a
Special Property Disputes Resolution Court.
78 See Alden Wily, 2003a and 2003b, op cit.
79 Personal communication, UNHCR 2004.
80 Legal Decree for Transfer of Government Property (8/1382) 2003.
81 Article 2, Decree with Regard to Properties (undated).
82 Edict No. 26 About Land issued in Gazette 788 6/5/1420 (1999). For text see Alden Wily, 2003a, op cit., 123-126.
83 Wardak, op cit., 1.
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party to. Commonly encountered examples
are unawareness of the statutory illegality
of conversion of pasture to arable purposes,
and the assumption by pastoral users that
their access grants represent full private
ownership of the pasture (and a matter not
well articulated in the documents they
receive).
Enforcement of law is so weak that the value
of law is limited at this time. Even when
legal provisions are known, corruption in the
use and implementation of the law has
diminished its social legitimacy. Just as
important is widely evident unenforceability
of law; the state itself has been at times the
main culprit, such as itself converting
pastureland to arable use and issuing rights
to land without following the specified order
of eligible applicants.
3.2 Land Policy
Comprehensive land policy has not yet been






these commit to restitution of private
properties: a clear purpose of much of the
Taliban Edict of 2000 (of uncertain status)84
and reflected in Karzai’s more recent
commitment to help refugees regain “land,
houses, markets, shops, sarai, apartments,
etc.”85 and sought primarily through the
courts described above. Recovery of
government property is as visibly a prime
objective of the administration, although as
noted above, with insufficient clarity as to
how Government Land is defined.
Planning action around these and other
elements is weakly developed in the
reconstruction agenda but evolving. In the
first National Development Framework (2002)
this was mildly expressed as the need “to
produce a nationwide land registry and to
settle disputes between individuals and
groups over land” with the added observation
that “such a registry would allow for the use
of land as collateral for entrepreneurial
activities”86 — hardly the main concern of
the majority poor who borrow against their
limited land mainly to feed themselves, let
alone to the substantial sector of rural landless
and homeless.87
The recent Government/International Agency
Report prepared for the Berlin Conference
refers to property problems, as does the
Berlin Declaration (1 April 2004) and its
annexed Work Plan of the Afghan
Government. The thrust of objectives is again
on titling. The relevant annex declares that:
“The most basic need
is to develop a land
titling and cadastre
system that will start
to keep appropriate records of ownership.
This system needs to develop an
integrated approach, including land use
plans and mapping. Land titling will need
to take a systematic approach rather
than concentrating on technology. Such
a system should focus on addressing the
underlying issues of tenure security rather
than creating another set of records that
will be contested. In particular customary
Rural land policy development has been slight
since Bonn and what exists falls back on the
tired notion of titling as panacea to problems.
84 Law on Agricultural Land, under Decree No. 57 published in Gazette No. 795.
85 Decree on the Dignified Return of Refugees, No. 297, 13/3/1380 (2002).
86 GoA, 2002, op cit.
87 The subsequent National Development Budget (October 2002) and following Public Investment Programme (March 2003)
make fleeting reference to “inequalities in access to productive assets” but did give more emphasis to land conflict resolution
under the Rule of Law Programme (GoA, 2002 and 2003, op cit.).
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while recognising the limitations in terms
of both access to technology and human
capital in much of the country.”88
This has been confirmed recently in the
formalisation of land titling as key tasks in
the new list of National Priority Programmes
for both urban and rural areas (Ministry of
Finance, May 2004). This paper critiques this
approach in rural areas later.
Policies of the past
Meanwhile, current land relations definitively
do not escape the influences of past land
policies, irrespective of whether they were
posed as “policies” or not. Summarily, these
may be identified as five key strategies:89






not equitably available to other ethnic
groups (see Section 4).
2. The establishment of settlement
schemes, to open up dry areas for badly
needed new arable land, from the late
1940s. These included the landmark US-
funded Helmand Scheme of 1946-1979
which opened up 100,000 ha of land and
among whom Pashtuns were the favoured
“eligible applicants.”90
3. Use of property as a primary basis of
taxation, formally begun in 1931, sound
in principle especially in its progressive
tax structure from the 1960s but with
dues routinely passed onto tenants and
sharecroppers, and commons routinely
co-opted by those able to pay tax (see
below).
4. Rural land titling, formally launched in
1963 and through which the state sought
to bring all landholding more firmly under
its control for mainly taxation purposes.
This was encouraged and assisted by a
USAID funded cadastral survey and
registration programme begun in 1963.
Despite immense funding, staff and
vehicles, success was limited, with only
one-fifth of the land area and one-third
of owners of the time registered.91
Because of the cost, mapping quickly
gave way to a simple inventory survey
(survey aajel) which numbered but did
not map plots. Titling as a whole appears
to have not avoided pitfalls experienced
worldwide in the aid-driven titling mania
of the 1960s-1970s, such as the narrowing




owners and the state
itself through the process and the
jeopardising of communal rights.
Recording of transactions following first
registration has been limited to the
wealthy. Nor has the much-pronounced
sanctity of title deeds been sustained.
5. Redistributive land reform, begun in
1975 with efforts by the First Republic
to limit gross inequities in rural land
holding, through rigorously progressive
taxation on farm size. This took into
account the productivity of the hectarage,
with seven classes of arable land defined
in the Land Reform Law 1975 and Land
Tax Law 1976. Generous ceilings on land
holding were also imposed, above which
the state would compulsorily acquire the
Policies of the past and Pashtunisation in
particular have taken their toll on stable land
relations and remain a main source of conflict.
88 TISA/ IC 2004, op cit., Natural Resources Technical Annex, para. 100.
89 Alden Wily, 2003a, op cit., 39ff.
90 Majrooh, S.B. and S. Elmi (eds). The Sovietization of Afghanistan. Peshawar: Printing Corporation of Frontier Limited.1986;
Cullather, N. “Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State.” The Journal of American History. September 2002.
91 See Alden Wily, 2003a, op cit.
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households (including nomads). This
moderate land reform was abandoned by
the first Communist regime, which passed
the Revolutionary Land Decree in 1978.
This sharply lowered the ceiling, did away
with compensation and embarked upon
vigorous implementation.92 Resistance
to this and sister revolutionary decrees
in 1978 relating to limiting the ill-effects
of mortgage practice, abolishing dowry
and making primary education
compulsory, triggered gathering
conservative uprising, resulting in Soviet
occupation in 1979 to bolster the failing
Communist government.93 The land
reform was scaled back during the early
1980s with a growing focus again on
opening land claimed by government for
distribution and the development of large
scale commercial farms, employing
landless labour. In 1986 a new decree
restored the land ceiling to the level of
the 1975 law and was finally done away
with in 1991. In total around 700,000 ha
of land had been distributed, mainly
deriving from land under government
control, not private holdings.94 Benefits




The land administration system is ineffective
and centralised, and dominated by the courts.
No Ministry of Lands has ever been created
and administration has been broadly under
first, the Ministry of Finance and now
respectively MAAH (Amlak Department) and
municipal authorities. The main task of both
has been to manage government properties,
including distribution of rights to these,
including ambivalently-intended sales. In
rural areas, by default the Amlak Department
supposedly also deals with new registration,
undertaken by an inter-ministerial team of
verifiers as laid out in the original Survey and
Statistics Law of 1965. Amlak also retains
copies of the Books of Integrated Land Size
and Taxation but appears to do little with
these; they were in any event not prepared
for administration or regulation purposes but
as a basis for tax collection, not yet re-
launched, although incipiently intended.
The courts are also formal land administrators
to the extent that they carry out registration,
verification, signing and related tasks in
respect of formal land documents. Court
archives effectively serve as land registries.
Although fees are kept low, the real costs
are considerable and use of court procedures
limited to the educated, influential and/or
wealthy.
3.3.2. Sources of Evidence of Ownership
Sources of ownership are summarised in Box
5. The founding formal source is tax receipts,
used often in rural areas to establish
ownership over lands, rather than as
testimony of legitimate occupancy; that is,
receipt holders have frequently argued that
their lands must comprise x area because
this is the tax they have paid. Conversely,
those who have been unable to pay tax or
contribute tax to common properties have
generally lost tenure. Corruption in the tax
collection process on the ground has at times
been rife. All these features were observed
in the Bamyan and Faryab case study areas.96
92 Details in Alden Wily, 2003a, op cit., 42ff.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid, 47-49.
95 See Male, op cit.; Roy, O. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge Middle East Library. 1986;Rubin,
B. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Oxford University Press.
1995;  Usufi, M.Q. “Effects of the War on the Agricultural Situation in Afghanistan” In Majrooh and Elmi (eds). 1986; and
Alden Wily, 2003c and 2004a, op cit.
96 Alden Wily, 2004a and 2004b, op cit.
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the 1960s improved the system only to a
limited degree, especially in rural areas where
coverage was limited. Subsequent compilation
of books of ownership over wider areas
amounted to rapid appraisal, based upon
submissions by government-appointed leaders
in the community.
For larger, wealthier owners (landlords), legal
documentation of transactions is sought, and
for this sector, the courts serve as land deed
registries, with thousands of deeds archived.
The process is lengthy and expensive; it
requires completion of a number of forms,
securing no objections from up to five offices,
provision of ID documents, photographs and
witnesses, payment of tax at 5-6 percent of
the value of the land, etc. While the
primitiveness of document management is a
bureaucratic concern, the integrity of the
system is a greater concern, long considered
corruptible, and the records widely corrupted,
including widespread production of
counterfeit documents. Real adjudication is
rarely carried out, relying on selected
witnesses, often self selected.
At the community level, owners with medium-
sized lands tend to hold locally witnessed
evidence of transfers including distribution
at inheritance, variously referred to as
Box 5: Sources of Legally Accepted Evidence of Tenure
Customary Documents: (orfi) witnessed by relatives, neighbours or local leaders. Include bills
of sale and purchase, pawn agreements, wills, subdivision of plots, etc. Limited in description.
Legal Documents (Deeds): (Wasayeq Shari’ a) copies in Court Registries in the form of:
Qabalae Qatae:  Land Ownership Deeds
Qabalae Jayezi:  Warranty Deeds
Wakalat Khat:  Power of Attorney
Taraka Khat: Distribution of Inherited Property among Heirs
Hasre Werasat:  Identification of Legal Heir
Taqsim Khat:  Division of Property (during lifetime of owner)
Tamlik Khat:  Letter of Conveyance
Ejara Khat:  Lease Agreement
Wasayat Khat:  Last Will and Testament
Eslah Khat:  Mediation Finding
Firman: Land grants by kings and presidents in the form of decrees, legal letters, etc.
The Cadastre: Refers to only one-fifth of the cultivated land area and 30% of owners during 1960-
70s. The Register comprises cards indicating owner, how the land was acquired and plot size.
Most owners registered as “possible owners” because landlords were often absent or their
documents could not be confirmed. Copies in zonal and provincial offices (some destroyed) with
a base set in Central Archive in Kabul (Cadastral Department under Afghan Geodesy and Cartography
Department, Prime Minister’s Office).
The Books of Integrated Land Size and Progressive Taxation: Carried out between 1971-1978
with higher coverage (5,502 villages) but low accuracy, based upon self-reporting through
Declaration Forms (Ezharnama) filed by local leaders and landlords, compiled via Districts to
Provincial Land Offices under Ministry of Finance (Amlak, now under Ministry of Agriculture).
Records often exist at district level with another copy in the Amlak Department. These records
include details of grades of land and tax paid. Owners often listed as extended family name only.
Tax Receipts: Property taxation has existed from 1880s, with formalisation in 1930. Records for
1930-1958 are intact in Ministry of Finance archives, thereafter records held at provincial level.
These list the family owning the land, the area and tax due. From the outset the larger the land
area, the higher the tax paid, at a fixed rate per jerib (0.2 ha), with gradations by class of land
from 1960s. Annual tax collection ceased in 1978 but restarted briefly by the Taliban. There were
also grazing taxes on pasture, receipts of which have been often interpreted as evidence of
pastoral ownership, not access rights.
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rarely held by the majority land-poor
smallholders. Finally, there are a large
number of land grant deeds, many of which





from the 1880s until
the 1970s. The older
the document the more limited the land
description, with sometimes only the district
indicated and the size of the land area granted
indicated. In some areas these land grants
were renewed during the jihad period, such
as exampled in Box 6. Although the land area
granted is more specific, the nature of the
grant as recording purchase of a use right or
the land itself remains unclear.
Thus, while a relatively rich history of land
ownership documentation and registration
exists, its reliability and utility is questionable
— and save customary records (relatively
few) the documents themselves are frequently
highly contested. As registrars, the courts
cannot provide truly independent assessment.




issued the same title
deed three or more
times, either by will or coercion (e.g. from
warlords, corrupt officials).97 Ministers in the
current administration have also been
implicated.98
Nor do any of these sources generate tenure
security in their own right, the conventionally
attributed sanctity of court and cadastral
records notwithstanding. Roots of tenure
security currently include political and military
might, tribal affiliation and community
consensus and within which documentation
97 See Safar, op cit. and D’Hellencourt, N., Rajabov, S., Stanikza, A. and Salam, A. Preliminary Study of Land Tenure Related
Issues in Urban Afghanistan with Special Reference to Kabul City. Kabul: UN-HABITAT. March 2003 for urban examples and
Alden Wily, 2004a,c and 2004d, op cit. for rural examples.
98 For example, in a report by UN Envoy Kotari, September 2003.
Box 6: Example of Legal Documents Issued in Shiwa in 1983
Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan
The General Head Quarters of Mujaheddin in Badakhshan
Land and Pasture Qawwalla (Document)
In accordance with the land and pasture distribution in Shiwa and due to the decision of the
General Commander and the Head of High Military Council of Badakhshan Province (No. 7), land
which has the following boundaries –
On the east it meets Dargaw and the area above Dildar Beg’s house;
On the west it meets Abdul Wahid, son of Taghai Nasar and Dara-i-Abdar Kalan;
On the north it meets Tigh-i-Silsila Kohi Safid Khaki and Zanjir-I Kaaba; and
On the south it meets the farming land of Shabal Shah and Shah Jamal -
is offered to four Kuchi families from Cahrdara, Kunduz. The title is offered for 500,000 Afghanis,
which is the price of ailoq. The mentioned amount has been paid in the presence of the Shiwa
delegation.
The current document will be reviewed and approved by the Honorable General Commander of
Badakhshan.
Dated 28/4/1372 under signatures of the delegation of Maalim Ismail, Shah Anwar and Mullah
Saheb Nazar. Dated 1/6/1372 as correct and signed by Abdul Basir Khalid, General Commander,
Badakhshan.
Source: Patterson, 2004.
Written testimony as to land ownership is
well developed but vulnerable to corruption.
Thus, it holds little of the promised sanctity
assumed to arise from registration.
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insecurity today pierces private landholding
on these fronts:
• First, through land grabbing by
commanders, which does not necessarily
target the smallholder, although the poor
may be disproportionately affected and
least able to resist the effects;
• Second, documentation is all too easily
and readily fabricated, rendering
customary/community-based consensus
important; and
• Third, ethnicity has long been the prime
determinant of which properties are most
vulnerable. While in the past, vulnerability
was the fate of non-Pashtuns, currently
Pashtun lands are most vulnerable to
coerced sale or appropriation, following
widely assumed linkages of Taliban with
Pashtuns and rejection of past policies
associated with Pashtunisation. This is
despite the fact that many properties are
in fact the best and most multiply-
documented.
Moreover, should restoration of order permit
restitution of such properties, this will only
be lasting on the basis of community
consensus, not on the basis of documented
proof of ownership. This is because the most
important factor in legitimacy is not paper
entitlement but social entitlement. Properties
that are locally considered to have been
acquired through wrongful official grants,
coerced sale or unjust collection of debts
are unlikely to be safely restored without
community support, the evidence of records
notwithstanding. These findings have
important implications for strategic
approaches to improving tenure security
(Section 5).
3.4. Land Disputes
3.4.1. Widespread Dispute over Property
A great deal of property is under dispute,
although the exact dimensions are difficult
to gauge. Disputes sometimes spill over into
violence and represent a stumbling block to
peace. With the exception of relatively limited
religious lands (waqf), all classes of real
property are affected; from homes and shops
to farms and pastures. Claimants are wide
ranging, from widows to farmers to whole
communities. Immediate causes of dispute
are multiple, from conventional causes
(domestic disputes,99 farm boundary disputes,
rent and mortgage disputes) to a plethora of
cases concerning alleged wrongful occupation
of houses, farms and pastures and conflicting
rights over common and public lands.
3.4.2. Refugees and IDPs: A Prominent
Group of Disputants
Problems experienced by returning refugees
and IDPs in retrieving houses and farms have
been so numerous that as noted above an
early action of the Interim Administration
was to establish a special court to address
these, although with less than substantial
success (see below). UNHCR has become a
notable (although as yet only mildly effective)
champion of the need to deal with property
issues, besieged as it is with thousands of
refugees and IDPs who cannot return to their
home areas (mainly because of ethnic
problems but also because their houses have
been destroyed),100 or who do not have the
expertise, means or confidence to proceed
through the courts.101 Property matters are
the most common among the complaints they
record.102
99 For example, relating to inter vivos subdivision, inheritance and sale of land without consent of family members.
100Data collected by UNHCR shows that up to 69% of returnees find their homes damaged or destroyed. UNHCR. Data on Land
Ownership and Housing of Refugees Under Assisted Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan. Kabul. 2004.
101UNHCR. Briefing Notes on Refugees and IDPs in Bamyan Province. UNHCR Field Office Bamyan, 30 April 2003.
102Unfortunately UNHCR does not keep statistics on the nature of complaints submitted, shortly to be remedied.
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particularly active among a handful of NGOs
in dealing with refugee complaints.103 Most
submissions made to its Information and Legal
Aid Centres (ILACs) relate to property. For
example, 76 percent of the Pul-e-Khumri
ILAC cases presented in May 2004 were
property related. In Kabul this was 58 percent
for the same period, relating to houses,
apartments and shops.104
3.4.3. Farms and Pasture as the Focus of
Rural Land Dispute
In rural areas, farmland and pasture rather
than houses or other buildings (shops, mills)
are the focus of dispute. Among the property
cases presented to UNHCR in Faryab in
October/November 2003, 53 percent related
to pasture, 26 percent to arable farms and
only 10 percent to buildings.105 In the Pul-
103ILACs received well over 2,000 requests for assistance during 2003 and took up several hundred cases, but with only a 10%
resolution rate. The number of cases presented is rising; ILACs registered 207 new legal cases and 831 new information
cases in April-May 2004 alone (NRC passim).
104NRC. Report on Information and Legal Advice Project, Afghanistan. Kabul. May 2004.
105UNHCR, 2003a, op cit., and UNHCR. 2003b. Property Issues in Faryab. Maimana: UNHCR. October 2003.
Box 7: Example of Cases Handled by the Information and Legal Aid Centres (ILACs)
of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in May 2004
A community claim
In Balkh Province, NRC was approached by a group of clients representing 600 families or around
8,000 individuals whose land had been occupied by commanders of the 7th Army Division of
Northern Afghanistan led by General Atta Mohammad (of the Jamiat faction, but nominally also
part of the National Army). The clients claim to have been allocated the land during the 1980s
in the Anteazar Project. Some families received official title deeds while others received a letter
from the municipality. People began constructing houses but could not complete these because
of the war and instead became refugees in Pakistan or Iran or IDPs in other provinces of Afghanistan.
After the fall of the Taliban the people returned to Mazar but found the area occupied by
commanders connected to General Atta Mohammad. The returnees first complained unsuccessfully
to the Governor of Balkh Province and then requested legal aid from NRC. NRC held a mass
meeting with 5,000 of the returnees on 16 May 2004 at which their representatives threatened
to forcefully re-occupy the land and begin to reconstruct their homes.  NRC advised them not
to do this on safety grounds and to instead pursue a mediated solution. On the same day NRC’s
legal counselors met with General Saboor, Deputy Head of the 7th Army. In this meeting, it was
agreed that both sides would sit down a day later to discuss the case further. This meeting took
place with General Saboor and the commanders who have occupied the land. The latter showed
allocation documents. Both sides agreed to request the Governor to hold a special inquiry to
determine ownership of the land, involving several departments. On 18 May NRC sent a letter
to the Governor to request that an inquiry be established. This is expected to be implemented.
An individual claim
An individual client also claims that his land is occupied by three commanders of the 7th Army.
He claims his father bought 33 jeribs of land from the government in 1994. In 1999 he left for
Iran and returned to Mazar in 2003. A year later he claims that part of his land was seized by
the three commanders.  He unsuccessfully complained to a number of provincial bodies before
seeking help from NRC. NRC raised this case at the meeting with the Deputy Head of the 7th
Army, referred to above, and it was agreed to investigate the disputed claim over the land. Two
engineers were appointed to measure the size of the land in question and to report back to the
authorities.  This was agreed by both sides, but when the engineers went to measure the land
on 20 May the other party to the dispute failed to attend.
Sources: NRC May 2004 Reports
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cases concerned pastoral and arable farms;
only nine percent involved houses. Box 7
provides examples.
3.4.4. Formal Land Dispute Resolution
In its first six months of operation the
dedicated land court, the Land Disputes
Court, which only deals with refugee claims,
dealt with just over 300 cases.106 The court
operated only in Kabul and the cases
concerned Kabul properties, generally those
of wealthy returnees. Bias, corruption and
other ills were recorded.
There has allegedly been some improvement
in court procedure since, and with the right
of appeal helpfully now provided by the
revised legislation. Nonetheless, most of the
cases continue to refer to shops, homes and
to other buildings in urban areas in even the
second ex-Kabul Court. Data for the courts




of which only five
percent were solved.
Over half the remaining cases were either
rejected by the Court on unspecified grounds
or referred to the Ministry of Justice for
investigation.
The normal court system also handles land
cases where the claimants are not returnees
or IDPs. At the local level, District Primary
Courts in the study areas consider property
cases to comprise around half their case load.
In Yakawlang District in Bamyan Province,
many of those on file in June 2003 were
domestic in nature, alongside a number of
claims from returnees that they should receive
a share of the crop from those who had been
caring for their farms in their absence. Box
8 provides examples.
In Faryab, the Provincial Court reported that
three-quarters of its current caseload in
November 2003 were property cases. Eighty
percent of these had derived from District
Courts which had been unable to resolve the
cases and appeals had been lodged. The
Provincial Court’s own record of resolving
land cases was zero: “these days, no matter
how you rule, one side is not satisfied.”107
Among the cases listed, 61 percent concerned
illegal occupation of land; 16 percent involved
inheritance, seven percent concerned
mortgages and two percent involved land
claims made by widows.108
In 2002 only 16 percent of filed court cases






Another 28.5 percent involved conflicts over
water rights. Twelve percent related to rents
and mortgages. Three percent concerned
boundary disputes.110
In 2004 Supreme Court records for the period
March 2003 to March 2004 showed that 62.4
percent of all cases were land related. The
subjects of disputes are provided in Table
16.111
The Land Disputes Court is having trouble
solving cases or enforcing decisions, and even
the normal courts are clogged with land cases.
106Alden Wily, 2003a, op cit.
107Refer to Bamyan Report; Alden Wily, 2004a, op cit.
108Refer to Faryab Report; Alden Wily, 2004d, op cit.
109These numbered 725 resolved cases with another 132 pending for resolution in the Supreme Court for the period April-
October 2002 (Supreme Court 2002).
110Based on data supplied by the Supreme Court for the period March-October 2002.
111The records reflect land cases in the Primary and Provincial Courts, the Appeal Courts (Kabul Provinces) and the Supreme
Court.
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Case Subject Area Number %
1 Inheritance 2,499 25.8
2 Land Sales and Purchases  1,898 19.6
3 Wrongful Occupation 2,332 24.0
4 Inheritance (Moveable with Immoveable Property) 279 3.0
5 Houses/Building Sales and Purchases 431 4.4
6 Rents and Mortgages 541 5.6
7 Farm Water Rights (Irrigation) 690 7.1
8 Advance Payments Against Purchases and Sales 85 0.9
9 Awarding Possession 313 3.2
10 Pre-emption112  341 3.5
11 Custody over Lands 207 2.1
12 Boundary Disputes  66 0.7
Total 9,682 100
Source: Supreme Court, Kabul, June 2004.
Box 8: Examples of Cases in the Yakawlang Primary Court, Bamyan, June 2003
Battle Over the Ailoq
This battle began with the claim of one village community that its neighbour had entirely co-
opted their common land. This area was traditionally used as both pasture and for periodic rain-
fed cultivation. The accused village responded that it had bought the area and could turn it
entirely into rain-fed farms if it wished. The original village claimed that the payment only
referred to a fee for using the area for one year. Three other villages entered the dispute,
claiming that they too had traditional rights to use that ailoq, these were pasturage rights, but
as the other villages were now farming the land, they too should be given space to farm there.
Re-constructing a Legacy
A man had lodged a claim for a large area of land which his grandfather had sold. His own father
had been a tenant on the land. In the view of the court, the claimant had only brought the case
knowing that the current owner had lost the bill of sale when his house was destroyed by the
Taliban. He was claiming that his grandfather had never sold the land, just put it under pawn
and that he could redeem the outstanding debt. As he was unable to explain why his father had
never claimed the land or attempted to redeem the debt if that had been the case, the court
rejected his claim. The grandson was now taking his case to the provincial court.
A Family Affair
Two sisters had gifted their land to one brother and the brother has been cultivating and harvesting
the land. The sisters have died and their sons are trying to reclaim the land, on the grounds that
their mothers were forced to gift the land to their brother. The brother produced a customary
document, witnessed by the local mullah. The sons claim the mullah remains a close friend of
their uncle and his witnessing cannot be trusted. The court could not agree that the mullah was
not neutral and found that the mothers had signed the document, and ruled that the land must
remain with the brother.
The Landlord
A landlord had substantial land, both irrigated and rain-fed, and used this as collateral to take
out a loan to participate in a Ministry of Agriculture project. He failed to repay the loan and the
Ministry of Agriculture took over the land and put tenants on it. Four villagers in the area have
come to court claiming that the land in question was never the landlord’s to give and the ministry
has no right to take the land now. They claim that the landlord sold the land to them and have
produced documents of sale for both irrigated and rain-fed farms. The court has inspected the
documents and ruled in their favour.
112The right of purchasing property before or in preference to other persons.
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and Lack of Resolution
Formal court records do not, however, provide
a full picture of dispute levels, high though
they are. For reasons of fear, futility or lack
of means, many land disputes are never
brought to court. The poor and very poor do
not take their cases outside the community;
they do not possess the status, financial
means, documents or knowledge to pursue
the matter successfully. Even those with
means often see little purpose in taking their
problem to the court; they complain of ethnic
favouritism in decisions, and note the
inordinate time involved with the likelihood
of continuous challenge and upward appeal
to the Supreme Court. Pashtuns in the north




They are also aware
of the high failure
rates of the Primary or Provincial Courts to
resolve disputes and that even if they win
the case, the court and police are likely to
be impotent to enforce the decision. Another
reason for avoiding the courts is where
documentation issued by the court is at the
heart of the dispute and the claimant does
not believe he will gain a fair or honest
hearing. Complaints of court corruption in
the field study areas of Faryab and Bamyan
were common, and also noted in Human
Rights Watch Reports.114 Nor may a land
matter that involves Government Land (or
land claimed by government) be presented
to the courts but must be submitted to the
Ministry of Justice’s Hoquq Department,
which limits many pasture cases reaching
there.
Some seek to resolve their complaints locally
through shura or other local mediation means.
This is particularly so where the cases are of
a more traditional nature (i.e., domestic,
boundary, inheritance or mortgage disputes).
Others are too afraid of those against whom
they are disputing to attempt this; this is
quite common where warlords/commanders
or their supporters are involved. In Faryab
over half the land complaints submitted to
UNHCR in 2003 stemmed from actions of
commanders.115 This was similarly so with
complaints recorded by Human Rights
Watch.116 Complaints are also lodged with
UNAMA offices. The Faryab office estimated
that just under half
the written petitions
it received in 2003
were about land,
many with related
human rights abuses (theft of animals, burning
of houses, looting, murder, beatings and
rape).117
While commitment to building a new justice
system, ending impunity and reinstituting
the rule of law are urgent public concerns
on paper,118 change on the ground is limited.
Formalising more localised and alternative
dispute resolution seems inevitable.119
Cases involving individual properties such as
houses, shops, and farms, do seem potentially
more resolvable than those where communal
interests are involved. This was seen for
113UNHCR, 2004b, op cit. and Alden Wily, 2004d, op cit.
114Human Rights Watch passim; Safar, op cit.; HPCR (Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research). Afghan
Legal Reform: Challenges and Opportunities. Boston. 2003; and Mani, R. Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan.
Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. 2003.
115UNHCR, 2003a and 2003b, op cit.
116Human Rights Watch. Afghanistan. Paying for the Taliban’s Crimes: Abuses Against Ethnic Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan.
April 2002. 14(2c).
117Alden Wily, 2004d, op cit.
118GoA, 2002 and 2003, op cit; TISA/IA, op cit.; and Berlin Declaration. International Afghanistan Conference in Berlin, 31
March – 01 April 2004. 01 April 2004.
119Wardak, op cit.
Communal cases are the most complex and
need community-based resolution to be
lasting.
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Governor(s) have involved themselves.120
Even where there is no law and order (such
as currently in Faryab Province), and families
have fled and fear to return for as long as
ethnic tensions and warlordism remain, their
tenure over houses (often destroyed) and
farms appears respected, with current farmers
serving as sharecroppers in the interim,
sending or setting aside the owner’s share.121
The much more threatening cases concern
communal properties, and where inter-village,
government-people, and inter-ethnic conflict
conjoin, sometimes inflamed by warlords
who promote their own land access interests.
Pastures are indisputably at the centre of
this gathering storm.
3.4.6. Conflict Over Land May Be Rising
Two years after the fall of the Taliban,
property conflict may be increasing. Reasons
include:
• Refugee return and rising numbers of
persons seeking restitution of homes and
farms;
• Dissatisfaction among refugee landless
(up to 67%) and homeless (up to 41%)122
that the administration has been unable
to provide persons with homes, resulting
in widespread occupation of especially
urban public properties;
• Failure of rule of law has encouraged
rampant land grabbing and abuse of the
system, with commanders emboldened,
not chastened;
• The free for all environment has
accelerated rather than put a break on
arable expansion and has stimulated
rather than controlled domestic and intra-
village disputes;
• Ethnic cleansing of Pashtuns post-Taliban
has produced large numbers of IDPs, many
of whom still do not feel safe to return
to home farms;
• Strong resistance is being expressed to
Pashtun Kuchi hegemony over pastures;
and
• Courts are proving less rather than more
able to successfully resolve disputes not
least because their decisions cannot be
enforced.
Many of the above are elaborated in the next
chapter.
Analytically, in post-conflict situations it is
generally helpful to distinguish between
routine and new land disputes. It is also useful
to distinguish between those that have arisen
through pre-war conditions and those that
have arisen as a direct consequence of
instability. In Afghanistan, the latter
prominently manifest as wrongful occupation
of lands through appropriation or forced sales,
and corruption of records. While intra-family
tensions over land always exist, these tensions
have indisputably also been heightened. A
new avenue of disorder has been stimulated
by poppy production, tending to exaggerate
land grabbing and distortions in the land
market.123 Encroachment into public lands
such as pasture has been rife. Pre-conflict
factors typically include inter-ethnic
resentment arising from public policies of
land colonisation and Pashtunisation and
associated land capture. Although not
consciously framed in this manner, conflicts
generated from pre-war conditions also stem
from public policies relating to the definition
of public and private land, and again in rural
areas, are centred upon the pastures.
Thus in Afghanistan it is not always easy to
separate conflicts in pre- and post-war, given
120See Bamyan study; Alden Wily, 2004a, op cit.
121See Faryab study; Alden Wily, 2004d, op cit.
122UNHCR, 2004b, op cit.
123TISA/IA, op cit. and The World Bank, 2004, op cit.
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in bringing old grievances to the surface.  In
practice, pre- and post-war conditions are
tightly interwoven; even where the
warlords/commanders are involved and driven
by their own ambitions, they garner ethnic
support which in turn frequently builds upon
longstanding bitterness as to past treatment
of their customary land rights.
This is important, for strategic remedies
differ. The former suggests that restitution
of properties to owners as of 1978 is the
outstanding requirement. This includes the
state as owner of vast “public” areas. The
latter suggests that some measure of reform
in the way property (including contested
public property) is organised and accessed
may be necessary to secure sustained peace.
Both assume a fundamental requirement for
the restoration of order and rule of law.
Moving forward without that condition poses
additional demands; these may perhaps only
be met through incremental and community
based approaches, in which people themselves
play the major role in securing peace in their
land relations.
Finally, it is of note that field studies
underwriting this report demonstrated little
if any evidence that social inequities per se
are a driver to current land disputes and
conflicts; that is, landlessness, despite its
significant dimensions and the suffering and
disadvantage exploitation of landless labour
causes, does not appear to be a direct driver.
Current land conflicts are not class wars. This
is interesting given the role that land reform
initiatives played in catalysing discontent in
the rural areas during 1978-79. For example,
mass land invasions by the landless have not
occurred at any point since. Beneficiaries
still tend to be the better off or powerful. If
anything, the poor and landless are less
empowered than they were during that time.
This is not to say that this situation will
continue.
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pasture. These include the facts that
abundant pasture exists in an
environment of acute shortage of arable
land; that the definition of pasture is
ambivalent; and that tenure is deeply
tied up with a history of rampant land
grabbing by the state and related policies
of ethnic favouritism in allocation. In






interests; this has been difficult to
restrain where the legacy of feudal
landlordism remains vibrant and within
which the land access rights of the
majority have been easy to manipulate.
The lack of clear legal support for
common property rights and the
appropriation of such lands as effectively
Government Land (and uncertainties
related to the registration of pastureland
rights) have also played a part. Finally,
the chronic disorder of especially the
last decade has unleashed not only bitter
ethnic differences as to past land-related
injustices but abandonment of many
customary and statutory constraints as
to land use for environmental stability.
The consistent trigger has been increasing
cultivation of land previously denoted as
pasture, often led by military and
economic elites. This precipitates
conflicts that are complex, often with
overlapping arable-pastoral, settler-
nomad, inter-ethnic, intra and inter-
community, and people-government
interests at stake. In most cases, the
poor are losers.
4.1. Defining Pasture
Agro-ecologically, pasture is defined as
embracing 45 percent of Afghanistan’s land
area or 29 million hectares.124 Some of this
rangeland is also usable for rain-fed farming
and has been customarily used in this manner,
despite this being illegal under state law.
Pasture is also used for collection of thorny
plant material (khar), crucial for winter
fodder. Parts of land
classified as barren
land (37% of the total
land area) are also
usable as pasture on
a short basis in summer. This includes, for
example, some very high gullies which are
protected from winds and where fertile soils
have collected and which are spring-fed;
these are known as sarad (cold fields) in
Bamyan.
Legal definition of pasture is opaque and
potentially extends well beyond the core 45
percent of land area noted above. Pasture
was first described in the USAID-facilitated
land registration law of 1965 as “any land
used for grazing in the past and present”
(Law on Land Survey and Statistics, 1965,
Article 63). Provincial Governors were
enjoined to ensure pastures were delimited
and to supervise their use (Article 64). The
subsequent Law of Pasture Lands (1970) was
just as expansive in its capture of potential
pastoral areas. Pasture comprised:
“the plains, hills, mountains, the skirts
of the mountains, marshlands, the banks
of rivers and forest areas which are
covered with grass and other places that
grow wild and could be used as fodder
for cattle.” (Article 2)
4.  The Pasture Issue
124FAO and UNDP, op cit.
“Pasture” may be defined as comprising
anywhere from 45 to over 70 percent of the
total land area.
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potential fodder plants grow.
The above opportunistic definition of pasture
has been retained, both in an un-repealed
Taliban Law on Pasture (Law on Pasture and
Public Lands [2000] under the general Decree
57 on agricultural sector matters) and since,
in various proposals for its redraft, mainly
deriving from the Ministry of Frontier and
Tribal Affairs (and whose  constituency is
predominantly Kuchi). The current draft
(2004) remains effectively unchanged save
for a proposal to render all pasture more
definitively Government Land. Appendix D
provides the texts of key pasture legislation.
Of note is the fact that “conversion of pasture
to arable use” has consistently been
prohibited in all versions of the law.125
4.2. The Ownership of Pasture
The ownership of pasture is just as open-
ended — at least superficially. In the 1965
registration law, pasture was held to be un-
owned land, “open to the public,” available
for use on a licensing basis controlled by
government, and explicitly not permitted to
pass into private ownership (Article 65).
Moreover, pasture was noticeably excluded
from the description of Government Land in
that early law. The 1970 Pasture Law also
described pasture as “public property” (Article
3). President Daoud’s short-lived Constitution
(1977-1878) defined public property as lands
owned by the people but administered by
the state on their behalf (Article 13). This
was an important clarification of the lack of
practical distinction between
Government/State Land and Public Land. By
1987 this distinction had been abandoned;
pasture and forests became simply “State
Property” (1987 Constitution, Article 20).
Differences between Government/State and
National/Public Land fell away.
In tenure terms, a basic distinction between
land owned by government and land held by
government as only trustee for the nation
are important. The former permits
government to behave like a private owner
and includes the right of sale. Land that is
more definitively “National Land” or “Public
Land” limits the role and powers of the state
to fiduciary functions. It may not sell the
land outright, either to itself or its agents or
to private persons or communities. Many land
related problems throughout the developing
world have stemmed from governments
behaving as landlords in respect of property
that is more rightfully either a nationally
shared asset or the rightful property of local
communities, as local commons.126
Afghan constitutional law has done little to
elaborate the tenurial nature of pasture. The
notion of public property was first defined
only in the Fourth Constitution of February
1977. In this, a complex of assets from ports,
banks and forests were declared to be
“national property” and “their administration
shall belong to the State” (Article 13).
Notably, neither barren land nor pasture land
were included. The current Constitution
(2004) only designates mines and underground
resources as “properties of the state” (Article
9). In addition:
“Protection, use, management and mode
of utilisation of the public properties
shall be regulated by law.” (Article 9)
The latter would imply pasture remains as
Public Land but with a now confused
distinction between national and public
property. The meaning of State, National or
Public Lands is not provided.
125Articles 64, 65 and 67 of the 1965 Law, Articles 8-11 of the 1970 Law and Article 3 of 2000 Law.
126For the Sub-Saharan Africa case, see Alden Wily, L. and S. Mbaya. Land, people and forests in eastern & southern Africa
at the beginning of the 21st Century The impact of land relations of the role of communities in forest future. IUCN, Suisse.
2001.
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the first time
While the Taliban did not introduce a new
Constitution per se, they were prolific in
their issue of edicts. Three very important
laws affecting the status of pasture were
decreed. The earliest attempted to restore
to government lands that had been occupied
since 1978 and to reduce those lands that
had been allocated with documentation to
“public lease” (Law on Land 1996). Another
Law on Land under Decree 57 of 2000 revised
the 1965 Survey and Statistics Law that
defined public property as potentially
including pasture “owned by neither
individuals nor government” leaving an
opening for pasture to be owned legally by
communities or the nation as a whole (Article
84). The Law on Pasture and Public Lands
under the same general Decree 57 updated
the Law on Pasture 1970 and refined this
innovation, introducing a new distinction
between private and public pasture.
As described, private pasture in the Taliban
law does not gain status as individual private
property, but as local common property as
distinct from national common property
(Public Land) (Articles 2-4). That is, while
“public pasture may be used by anyone,”
private pasture in the Taliban law may be
used only “by residents of the adjacent
communities” (Article 3). Buying or selling
of pasture in either case remains prohibited
(Article 6). This Taliban innovation accorded
very well with local perceptions in most parts
of the country as to traditional status of
pastureland in their vicinity.
The current legal status of pasture
The important Karzai Decree with Regard to
Properties (2003) effectively if only indirectly
retracts the Taliban innovation through
rendering all properties which have been
under the control of the state for more than
37 years to be “state-related.” In 1966 all
In practice we need to return to the early
Survey and Statistics Law to see how easily
the distinction between public and
government property blurred. While as
recorded above, pasture was declared public
property, it was at the same time declared
that in addition to wasteland and charitable
gifted lands (moquofa) and lands “developed
by government” any land not registered as
private land would be registered as
Government Land (Article 54).
The government then proceeded from 1965
to survey and register as much land as it was
able. Although only eight percent of the total
land area of Afghanistan was actually formally
surveyed (just over five million ha) this
included one-third of the country’s arable
land, 20 percent of which was registered as
Government Land. Another 1.6 million ha of
pasture was registered as private or
Government Land.
The primary purpose of the registration law
was taxation and subsequently any land for
which tax was not paid fell automatically to
the state. By the same process, large landlords
were able to secure significant tracts of
pasture to themselves.
The question of who owns pastureland was
irrelevant for a short period following the
1978 Revolution, with the firm inclusion of
all pasture under the description of State
Property in 1979 (Article 20).  That is, any
private rights that had been established over
pasture were retracted. By 1992 this was
reversed to only include “unclaimed pastures”
(Article 67). This left many landlords as
pasture owners and pasture that had in the
past been regarded as local common property,
as Government/Public Land. At the same
time, from 1979 the use of pasture by nomads
was guaranteed (Article 24) and the 1990
Constitution provision permitted and
encouraged private investment on pastures
(Article 20).
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state/government, save those already
recognised as individually owned. The 2003
law makes these state properties available
for lease through auction and where already
occupied, the occupant shall have right of
first refusal. This means that those who have
established occupancy in pastures during the
last 37 years will be the rightful leaseholder
— if they can pay.
At the same time, the law provides that
private property will be recognised should
the occupant have valid Shari’a or legal
documents (Articles 2, 6, 7 and 9). As the
third case study later shows, many new
occupants of pastures have established legal
documents as to their tenure. Prior to 1978,
a great number of legal documents of various
origins had also been issued (e.g., land grants
from kings, allocations by MAAH). Once again,
customary common property interests over
pastures are not catered for.
Notably, a redraft of the Law on Pasture by
the Ministry of Frontier and Tribal Affairs
returns to blanket declaration introduced
formally during Soviet occupation (1987) that
pasture is the property of the state. Access
is to be limited to
use rights issued
by MAAH (Articles















rights are to be held as access or ownership
rights.
The upshot of all the above is that unclear
legal guidance is provided as to if and how
pasture is seen to be owned today (even
should the law be enforceable, not currently
widely the case). Outside the law, pastoral
policy is still in the process of being
formulated. In the TISA/IC annex on natural
resources prepared for the Berlin Conference
of March 30-April 1, 2004, MAAH recognises
that tenure issues are at stake and proposes
assessment of rangeland resources and tenure
arrangements as its short-term strategy, with
programmes to upgrade degraded rangeland
following in the medium term.127
Meanwhile, many and perhaps all pastures
fall under competing claims and may secure
support from one or other legal provision; as
land claimed by individuals, groups,
communities and government, or as “public
land” — owned by no one and available to
all through access rights. The ethnic colouring
of these competing claims intensifies disputes,
much sharpened by active warlordism, often
self-interested but also usually ethnically
defined.
127TISA/IC, op cit., Technical Annex on Natural Resources.
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y4.3. The History of Contested
Pastoral Rights
To understand pastoral rights one must look
at the inter-ethnic history of land relations.
Typically, these have inherent tensions,
particularly where land uses compete, most
clearly the case between settled farmers
needing arable land and pasture and
pastoralists, needing larger spheres of pasture
(uncultivated land). However it is also clear
that inter-ethnic tenure relations of today
have been very much shaped, or indeed even
engineered, by past public policy.
The roots of this lie in the creation of the
modern Afghan State, a difficult tribal and
territorial confederation in which the
dominance of its Pashtun creators has been
a source of contestation since.128 In cursory
outline, the modern state began to take
shape in the 18th century in the founding of
the Durrani Empire, an alliance of Pashtun
tribes south of the Hindu Kush mountain range
who appointed an Amir (king) to coordinate
their interests.129 Then and now Pashtun
clans broadly divide into Durrani and Ghilzai
tribes, with the former politically dominant.
A century later (1892) Amir Abdur al Rahman
of Kabul had conquered areas around and
beyond the Hindu Kush, broadly reflected in
the international boundaries of today.130 The
Iron Amir, as he was known, achieved this
only with great brutality and with the
encouragement and assistance of the British,
whose interests lay in the creation of a loyal
buffer between their Indian colony and
expansionist Tsarist Russia.131 Organised land
theft and land colonisation by Pashtuns were
to be important tools of the creation of the
buffer state.
With a brief Tajik interregnum (1929),
Afghanistan was to be ruled by Durrani
Pashtun kings up until the establishment of
the First Republic in July 1973.132 This was
established by Daoud Khan, himself a cousin
to the last king. Following his murder in April
1978, Communist Second and Third Republics
were instituted (1978-1992), initially sustained
by Soviet occupation (1979-1989). Resistance
flourished in the form of mainly ethnically
distinct groups (mujaheddin), often coloured
by religious fundamentalism.133 Following
Soviet departure, an alliance of resistance
leaders declared an Islamic State in 1992,
within months to be headed by a Tajik
religious scholar, Burhanuddin Rabbani.134
Rabbani remained in power until his ousting
from Kabul in September 1996 by the Taliban,
a largely Pashtun fundamentalist group
established in exile (Pakistan) and led by
Mullah Muhammad Omar.135 With help from
Pakistan and Arab fighters funded by Osama
bin Laden and other sources, the Taliban
eventually secured most of the country by
1998, the first to do so since 1978. 
The US-led coalition forces, assisted by
primarily non-Pashtun militia, defeated the
Taliban in November 2001. Following
128Or as Roy op cit. has noted, among many others: “There is no Afghan nation but there is an Afghan State.” Also see Allan,
N. “Defining People and Place in Afghanistan.” In Post-Soviet Geography and Economics. 2001; 42(8): 545-560 and “Rethinking
Governance in Afghanistan.” Journal of International Affairs. Spring 2003; 56 (1) for exploration of his thesis that “Afghanistan
is a space, not a place.”
129See Olesen, A. “Islam and Politics in Afghanistan.” Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Monograph Series. No. 67 Curzon Press.
1995 for pre-modern organisation and representation.
130Lee selects this date to mark the final collapse of the semi-autonomous Uzbek Balkh, for centuries previously the southern
appendage of the Chingizid Empire to the north. Lee, J. The ‘Ancient Supremacy’: Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle
for Balkh, 1731-1901. New York: Brill, Leiden. 1996.
131See Lee, 1996, op cit. and Shahrani,  M. “State Building and Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan.” In The State, Religion
and Ethnic Politics Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. A Banuazizi & M. Weiner (eds). Vanguard. 1987.
132See Gregorian, V. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946. California:
Stanford University Press. 1969; Rubin, op cit.; and Shahrani, op cit.
133See Roy, op cit. and Majrooh and Elmi, op cit. for the Soviet period.
134Who headed the Jamiat-i Islami Party (now the Hizb-i-Islami Party), most famed for its military commander, Ahmad Shah
Massoud.
135See Rashid, A. Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords. London: Pan Books. 2000 for rise of Taliban.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 48
Synthesis Paper Seriesagreement among key factions in Bonn, an
internationally-defined Interim Administration
was put in place, headed by Hamid Karzai,
a Pashtun. He leads a Cabinet that
prominently includes Panjshiri Tajik, Kohstani
Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara commanders. This
has given way as planned to a Transitional
Administration and democratic elections in
136Also see Glatzer, B. “Processes of Nomadization in West Afghanistan.” in P. C. Salzman (ed) Contemporary Nomadic and
Pastoral Peoples: Asia and the North. College of William and Mary, Williamsburg. 1981 and “War and Boundaries in
Afghanistan: Significance and Relativity of Local and Social Boundaries”. In Weld des Islams (Leiden). 2001; 41(3); Tapper,
N. “The advent of Pashtun maldars in north-western Afghanistan.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London. 1973; XXXVI: 55-79 and Bartered Brides, Politics and Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991; Pedersen, G. Afghan Nomads in Transition: A Century of Change among the
Zala Khan Khel. The Carlsberg Foundation’s Nomad Research Project. London: Thames and Hudson. 1994; Frederiksen, B.
Caravans and Trade in Afghanistan: The Changing Life of the Nomadic Nazarbuz. Thames and Hudson. 1995; Ferdinand,
K. Preliminary Notes on Hazara Culture. Historisk-filosofiske Meddeleser bind 37, Nr. 5, Copenhagen. 1959; and Canfield,
R.L. Faction and Conversion in a Plural Society: Religious Alignments in the Hindu Kush. The University of Michigan - Ann
Arbor: Anthropological Press. 1973 and “Ethnic, Regional and Sectarian Alignments in Afghanistan.” In The State, Religion
and Ethnic Politics Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner (eds) Vanguard. 1987.
Box 9: Who are the Kuchis?
Kuchis (meaning “to migrate”) own primarily sheep but also take baggage animals with them
(camels, horses, donkeys). The proportion of households in all ethnic groups who live primarily
by nomadic livestock-keeping has declined over the last century; by need or choice, many are
now settled farmers or urban dwellers, or live largely through mobile trading, a traditional
speciality of some Kuchi groups. Particularly among Pashtun Kuchis, even those who are now
settled may still see themselves and be locally seen as a culturally distinct group, from both
neighbouring ethnic groups and/or more traditionally settled peoples. Modern-day Kuchis include
those who are:
• Nomadic (without permanent homes, living in tents all year, rarely have fields, annually
migrate between winter and summer pastures);
• Semi-nomadic (may have houses, own farms, whole household moves in summer, in tents);
• Semi-sedentary (live in houses in winter, own farms, only part of household moves with
livestock); and
• Sedentary (live in villages year round, own stock and may hire shepherds to take stock to
summer pastures).
The proportion of Kuchis in the population today is unknown but guessed usually as between 1-
2 million persons, or up to eight percent of the population.
The larger majority of Kuchis are Pashtuns. Among Pashtun Kuchis there are distinctions between
the Ghilzai Pashtuns of eastern Afghanistan and the Durrani Pashtun nomads of western and
northern Afghanistan, often referred to as Kandahari (and who often refer to themselves as
powindahs). They speak different dialects of Pashto, use distinctive styles of black tents and
have different labour practices. Non-Pashtun Kuchi groups who also use black tents include the
Baluch and Brahui in the southwest, and Arabs in the east. Intermingled with the Durrani nomads
that have settled in northern Afghanistan over the past 120 years are a large number of Persian
speaking livestock raisers (maldars), most notably Aimaq and Arab clans. Although they engage
in long distance migration to summer pastures like Pashtuns, they do not use tents but establish
huts in the summer pastures. Turkish speaking pastoralists in the north (Uzbek, Turkmen and
Kirghiz) also have huts but do not make long distance migrations.
Seasonal Kuchi migrations tend to divide into longer range and short range movements. Long
range migrations are mainly made by Pashtun Kuchis and may take up to three months to reach
the summer pasture and three months to return to the winter pasture. The animals are thus
pastured in up to three different altitudes. Short range migrations may take one to three weeks
and are commonly practised by non-Pashtun Kuchis (Arab, Uzbek, Aimaq, Tajik, etc.) as well as
some Pashtuns.
Sources: Barfield 2004, de Weijer 2002.136
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new Constitution (2004), remarked above as
little different from the “new democracy”
Constitution promulgated by King Zahir Shah
40 years earlier.
Territorial interests classically collided among
different tribal and sub-tribal groups in the
Pashtun-led conquest of lands and creation
of modern Afghanistan and were to produce
classical battles over land access, much
heightened by what was perceived as
favouritism towards the socially, economically,
as well as politically, dominant Pashtuns.
However, a just as important element was
operating in the form of competing land use
interests. The nature of Afghanistan lends
itself to a natural dominance of pastoral
interests, with more or less all tribes depending
upon stock to one degree or another. Within
all ethnic groups, but most numerously among
Pashtuns, livestock-raising was a significant
and often dominant means of survival, and
achieved through varying degrees of nomadism.
Nomad owners (Kuchis) move seasonally to
take advantage of often very remote summer
pastures (Map 1). Main areas of winter and
summer pasturing are shown in Appendix E
(Table 1).
As the control of especially Pashtun “Kuchis”
steadily expanded with the help of state
support, the clash between pastoral and
arable interests became increasingly blurred
by ethnic allegiances. How far current battles
over pasture are ethnically or land use defined
has tended to become integrated. 
Below, three cases drawn from the field
studies are recounted.
4.4. The Bamyan Case
Bamyan Province is the heartland of the area
known as Hazarajat and peopled prominently
by Hazaras (see Map 2). Although Hazarajat
has never existed as a discretely ruled political
area or been permitted to have administrative
cohesion as a region, it is locally understood
to comprise all but two newly-added northern
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in six adjacent provinces.137 As well as having
linguistic consanguinity, the eight Hazara
tribes are Imami Shi’a, thus distinguishing
them from the majority Sunni. Hazarajat is
also the home of most of Afghanistan’s
minority Ismaili Shi’a.138
As will be exampled below in the case of
Panjao District in Bamyan Province, the rich
pastures of Hazarajat were dominated by
Pashtun Kuchi use. Rejection of this has been
widespread so that today, many local
populations of Hazarajat resist and reject
the return of Pashtun Kuchis to “their” areas.
In 2003, it was only in Nawur District in Ghazni
Province that some Pashtun Kuchis had
returned.139 Table 2 in Appendix E shows the
low use of pastures in 2003 by Kuchis
throughout the country, at the rate of 6.2
percent overall. Although stock numbers had
been reduced to around a third by the 1999-
2001 drought, this poses an enormous
constraint to pastoral use, at least by long-
distance seasonal users. As their stock recover
(already occurring), pressure to return to the
summer pastures mounts.
To understand the nature of disputes that
rage over Hazarajat pastures, it is necessary
to return to the 1880s and the above-
mentioned creation of the Afghan State. Up
until this period, Hazarajat was ruled by
fiercely autonomous local chieftains among
whom the Sheikh Ali Hazaras around Bamyan
were dominant. Outsiders had periodically
ruled or suppressed and oppressed them with
heavy taxation and slave raids.140
137Balkhab in Jowzjan Province, Dar-e-Suf in Samangan Province, Lal-o-Sari Jangal in Ghor Province, Dai Kundi and Sharistan
in Uruzgan Province, Malistan, Jaghori and Nawor in Ghazni Province and Behsud I and II in Wardak Province.
138The Shi’a or Shi’ites broke from the “orthodox” (Sunni) Muslim community after the death of the 4th Khalif, Ali. They
recognize Ali and his descendants, whom they call “Imams,” as the only legitimate descendants of the Prophet. They are
referred to as “twelvers” because they recognise 12 Imams. In contrast, the Ismaili branch of the Shi’a are called “seveners”
because they recognize only the first seven Imams and follow their own descent line thereafter, with the Agha Khan their
current Imam.
139As shown in analysis of District Question B4 of the NRVA 2003.
140Ferdinand, op cit. and Canfield, 1973, op cit.
Map 2. The Area of Hazarajat
Source: Mousavi, 1998.
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subordinated in the Iron Amir’s expansionism
(and Shi’ites as well), Hazaras faced ruthless
invasions and massacres, extortionate taxation
(16 taxes introduced in 1880-81 alone), mass
enslavement and exile.141 Although in remoter
areas like Panjao District, most arable valleys
were to prove only temporarily occupied,
the Amir handed over valuable pasture to
Ghilzai Pashtun Kuchis to reward them for
their role in suppressing the Hazaras.142 Prior
to that time Kuchis had only occasionally
ventured into the area and only with the aid
of modern rifles, first acquired only a decade
or so previously.143
The pastures of Panjao District
In Panjao, as elsewhere in Hazarajat, land
allocations to Kuchis were made in the form
of liberal land grant letters (firman) to clan
heads, who were delighted to extend the
reach of their summer migrations to these
new rich pastures.144 Initial attempts by
Hazara notables (begs) to prevent their seizure
resulted in death and destruction.145 In 1894
the Iron Amir issued a decree forbidding
Hazaras to henceforth use any pastures at
all.146 The pastures remained firmly closed
to Hazaras thereafter, a half-hearted attempt
in the mid 1920s by the reformist monarch
Amanullah to reverse this land theft
notwithstanding.147 Over time the Kuchis
were to subdivide their pastoral assets among
expanding numbers of clan heads and
eventually to trade these among
themselves.148
Some Kuchi clans were traders as well as
pastoralists and the unsophisticated Hazaras
(already profoundly exploited by their own
nobles and landlords) found themselves
steadily surrendering their stock and land as
repayment for debts, sometimes founded
upon purchase of a single wad of tobacco or
piece of cloth purchased from Kuchis two
seasons previously.149 Many hundreds of
families became the client sharecroppers of
absentee landlords on what had been their
own land. These landlords returned annually
to collect the rent or crop shares, uninterested
in farming themselves.
The elderly Panjao District Agricultural
Officer, himself a Hazara, recalls:
“Kuchis became very land-hungry during
the King’s time (1933-1973) and would
stop at nothing to get whatever land they
could. When it came to big Hazara
landowners, they paid for the land. But
it was more common for Kuchis to gain
the land by carrying goods (tea, ropes,
tobacco and cloth) with them. They would
sell these to the people on the promise
that they would pay later in seers of
wheat. They always checked whether the
person had animals or land before they
gave goods on credit. When they came
back at the end of harvest to ask for the
seers of wheat, the seers had grown more
valuable than early in the year or the
year before. This was their way of getting
interest. Most people could not pay the
full amount, and the Kuchis let them run
up the debt until the next year. The debt
would grow far, far beyond the value of
the piece of cloth they had bought in the
first place. After several years the Kuchis
would take the sheep belonging to the
debtor and if that was not enough, the
141Lee describes forced marches to Kabul in which possibly thousands died and those who arrived were sold in the slave markets
(Lee, 1996, op cit., 532).
142Mousavi, S. The Hazaras of Afghanistan. An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political History. Surrey: Curzon Press. 1998.
143Ferdinand, op cit., 19.
144Mousavi, op cit. and Pedersen, op cit.
145Mousavi, op cit., 83.
146Ibid, 133.
147Poullada, L. Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929. King Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society.
Ithaca, New York: Ithaca University Press. 1973.
148Pedersen, op cit.
149Pedersen, op cit. records how easy they found it to exploit the Hazaras; Kuchis were well armed, well supported by the
Pashtun-led government and as traders, had ample leverage “to bring local populations to their knees.”
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sublet plots to poorer people at one-fifth
crop-share (panj kot). The main tenant would
be responsible for collecting the crop-share
due, serving more as bailiff than farmer. By
1975 in addition to virtually the entire
pastureland of the district, four of 15 fertile
valleys in Panjao were largely owned by
absentee Kuchi landlords, and parts of several
other valleys.
All aspects of Kuchi-Hazara land relations in
Panjao were and remain contested: their
claim to the mountain tops and high pastures
which Hazaras accept are public, not private
pastures of the Kuchis; Kuchi appropriation
of lower hillside pastures, which Hazaras
claim as their own property and often
important reserved lands for rain-fed farming;
Kuchi acquisition of existing rain-fed and
irrigated fields through coerced payments
for debt, “intimidation and trickery;” and
the endless cycle of uncontrolled and
uncompensated crop damage by the many
thousands of stock introduced seasonally into
the area, and which Hazaras are convinced
was manipulated to encourage surrender of
(destroyed) fields to
themselves. Conflicts
during the 1970s were
particularly common
and delegations were
frequently sent to the
district to investigate disputes and violent
incidents between Kuchis and Hazaras.
The 1978 revolution came as a relief to the
Hazaras of Panjao in that Pashtun Kuchis
were not to return for some years. The jihad
period was to prove very empowering to
Hazaras generally who, perhaps for the first
time, began to find success challenging the
stereotype of themselves as primitive,
exploitable, slave-like persons, deeply
subordinate to and oppressed by others.152
Political organisation and solidarity among
Hazaras during this period grew by leaps and
land. The land was never valued on its
own, but was always assessed at the same
value of the debt, whatever it was. So,
in the end, people were selling their land
for a piece of cloth or a box of tea. This
made them angry. Some refused to give
up the land and the Kuchis would appeal
to the government. The government
always took the side of Kuchis and would
make the people give up the land and
would draw up a document, giving
ownership to the Kuchis.”
The numbers of Kuchis who came to Panjao
District is not known. Today farmers name
eight clans,150 of between 30 to 100
households as having come regularly to
Panjao. On average, each Kuchi family
brought 2-300 sheep, 5-10 cattle, 5-10 camels
and 8-10 donkeys.151
Generally, Kuchis returned annually to the
same upper pastures and their leaders were
known by name to people in the valley. Poorer
Kuchis tended to keep to the upper pastures.
Richer Kuchis roamed the valleys, trading
and making contracts with farmers to cultivate
the farms they now




abounded, as did claims that Kuchis had
stolen local cattle. Hazara interviewees
repeatedly expressed resentment of the
perceived bias of especially President Daoud
towards Kuchis.  When tensions rose during
the years of the Republic (1973-1978), Kuchis
felt emboldened by the support of his
administration. They claimed they had been
given all of the land that the Hazaras claimed
as their rain-fed farming areas and as private
or communal pastures.
A handful of richer Hazaras also benefited.
Kuchis would lease their accumulating lands
150Clans named include: Essa Khail, Bahran Khail, Gorgaka, Hassan Khail, Khwazak, Niazi, Murad Khail and especially Sia Poush.
151See Alden Wily, 2004a, op cit. for all details on the Panjao case.
152See Mousavi, op cit., Chapters 8 and 9.
Hazaras have taken the opportunity since
1979 to reclaim their pastures and refuse to
permit Kuchis to return.
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parties.153
While in Panjao Hazaras increasingly began
to feel they had retaken their pastures, they
were less confident in respect of the
farmlands. Arrange-ments were soon made,
however, for local Hazaras to collect the
crop shares due to the absentee landlords.
Farmers say most debts were paid up until
around the late 1980s. The departure of the
Soviets and the factional fighting that followed
meant that Kuchis continued to stay away
and Hazara tenants began to rebel against
paying crop-shares to these absentee
landlords, whose right to the farms they often
disputed anyway. Hazaras requested the new
government in Panjao District in 1990/91 to
legally restore their land to them. A council
of mullahs was created by the Akbari Governor
to hear each claim. In some cases, the
claimants had their lands restored and
received documents certifying this to be so.
The process was interrupted by the Taliban.
The Taliban did not establish their authority
in the area until October 1998, at which point
Pashtun Kuchis felt it safe to return.154 A
dominant Kuchi leader, Naim Koochi, was a
senior commander with the Taliban and
persuaded the leadership that he should be
sent to Panjao to disarm the Hazaras. He
arrived in May 1999 with a decree to this
effect, and an unspecified number of soldiers
(some claim 3,000). Valley by valley Naim
Koochi systematically disarmed the Hazaras
(often larger landlords). At the same time
he collected their livestock, crops and
documents and set about collecting
sharecropping debts of the past 12 years.
Those who had complained to the earlier
Council of Mullahs were especially targeted.
Their homes, farms and animals were
allegedly simply looted. Some were seriously
injured in the process. IOUs were forcibly
extracted, itemising the debts that were still
owed over and above the animals taken. More
land was signed over to the creditors:
“In some cases, even those who had no
relations with Kuchis and owed them
nothing had their animals taken. I had
animals on the common pasture which
the Kuchi soldiers said was their pasture,
so they took my animals as payment for
using their grass.”155
People complained bitterly to the Panjao
District Governor, by this time an Akbari
supporter working with the Taliban. He
reported the complaints to the Bamyan
Provincial Governor, who personally visited
Panjao to investigate. Naim Koochi was
ordered by Mullah Omar to leave the area
with his men within 24 hours. Sharecropping
debts were still outstanding from 1989 and
many farmers were uncertain of the status
of their land.
The Governor established a second
commission to hear each case. Those who
had paid substantial amounts in the form of
animals and cash felt sure they would be
permitted to retain their land. This
commission was still meeting when the
Taliban government fell in late 2001.
Since the Transitional Administration has
been in place, the Hazaras have applied to
have their cases again heard. No new council
has yet been established. One official
observed that “if the new government is fair,
it will support the people, for everyone knows
that many Hazaras have lost their land in a
wrong way.” Other Hazaras merely blame
themselves for their past weakness:
153And eventually the unified party of Hizb-i Wahdat, with its headquarters in Bamyan.
154The blockade preventing goods entering Panjao lasted from 1996 until October 1998. At that time, the Taliban entered
the town and some 30 people were killed. Oxfam staff had evacuated the area in advance, and the Taliban took over their
office. When they left, they destroyed or took with them the computers, vehicles and stores. On their return, Oxfam
launched a massive food distribution throughout the district. Oxfam was to evacuate the area again ahead of the January
2001 massacre of Yakawlang.
155Alden Wily, 2004a, op cit.
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we let the Kuchis exploit us. Who is wrong
— the Kuchis for exploiting us, or
ourselves for being foolish and ignorant?”
“We must never forget that some of the
land has been bought legally by the Kuchis







poor year after year. But I believe the
Kuchis exploit us no more than the large
landlords who have helped themselves
to our common pastures.”156
A further aspect of this conflict needs note.
Deep in the Hindu Kush, many districts are
characterised by narrow fertile valleys and
steep-sided slopes and mountains, whereupon
the pasture is located and where cold area
summer farming irrigated by mountain springs
(sarad) has been customarily practised, often
at extremely high altitudes. Rain-fed farming
(lalmi) has customarily been carried out on
the nearer reaches of valley slopes, but still
some hundreds of feet higher than the valley
farms. As the population has grown, and in
particular as Kuchis departed Panjao District
from 1979, rain-fed cultivation has steadily
crept upwards. Soil erosion (generating land
slides and avalanches in winter) is not
uncommon in Panjao District today. A range
of customary conserving practises are in some
areas being re-activated (with the
encouragement of Oxfam), including wider
spacing between rain-fed fields, restriction
upon collection of thorny bushes for winter
fuel in these bundles, and longer fallow
periods.
Farms and pastures for which Naim Koochi
and other Kuchis forcibly extracted rent in
1999 include these expansion areas. Kuchis
consider all uncultivated land in Panjao as
pasture, and all pasture as theirs by virtue
of historic grants. Local Hazaras first dispute
that just because an area is uncultivated,
that it may only be used as pasture. They
argue that such lands are dual purpose, and
have customarily been used from time to
time for rain-fed





tenure; they claim these as not just
territorially, “our land,” but that most of
the lower pastures have private owners. This
follows convention in the area that a farmer’s
property extends from valley bottom to the
highest visible ridge above it. Further, they
argue, just because they were unable in the
past to stop Kuchis grazing these areas, this
did not signal acceptance of their claims,
only impotence to deal with them.157
As if these were not challenges enough,
another layer of pastoral conflict exists, this
time among the Hazaras themselves. This
stems from the highly stratified (and originally
feudal) nature of society in Panjao, with each
valley originally owned by one noble family
and access to which was beneficially granted
to the poor as their tenants and sharecroppers
only.
Customarily, farmers have been able to gather
thorn bushes as fodder for what is frequently
their only capital asset — varying numbers
of karakul sheep. In addition, it is taken as
beneficial right to be able to pasture these
few animals along with the very large herds
of the landlord. While the poor in Panjao
today accept there is no common arable land,
they are less willing to accept the frequent
claim by landlords in the valleys that only
they have rights to the pastures. These are
156Ibid.
157Or, they say, the other way of knowing the extent of the estate is to note where the shadows fall at sunrise. All those areas
in shade are private properties.
Class war over pastureland also exists,
between landlords who claim the pasture as
their own and poorer people who hold pasture
to be common property.
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but which belong to everyone in the locality
(or mantiqa); in short, their common
property. Like land trustees in many parts of
the world, the weight of privatising trends,
aided and abetted by western notions of
tenure, has facilitated claims by landlords
that this land is solely their own. Where
landlord and peasant concur is that such
pastures belong neither to Kuchis nor to the
state; these are not, they say, the private
lands of nomads nor the public lands of the
government. They belong to “us.” Public land
pastures are limited, they argue, to the very
high mountain areas, well beyond the village
sphere.
For their part, Kuchi land owners and
pastoralists point to significant past
documentation as evidence of their
entitlement. They point out that the
grievances of the Hazaras were not originally
of their making, but stem from “policy” and
observe that they have locus standi as the
main users of the pasture for almost a century.
Not every pasture in Hazarajat or even Panjao
is equally disputed. Those which raise most
contestation are pastures which are unusually
large, rich, accessible, or which have potential
for both arable and pastoral use. The “green
lawn” of Ghor Ghori Valley is such a case and
the effects of which have spread to the entire
valley. This is elaborated in Box 10.
An alternative view
Kuchi perceptions as to land rights over Ghor
Ghori Valley predictably differ. As a member
of a research team in the 1970s, Gorm
Pedersen chose to study the Zala Khan Khel
clan, by then a well established trader nomad
group in Paktya. By chance, it was to this
Kuchi clan that the Iron Amir granted Ghor
Ghori as reward for their support in crushing
the Hazaras (1893).158 The Zala Khan Khel
leader in the 1880s was Qutb-Uddin and to
whom the original firman was given. This
allocation was a full 400 km from the clan’s
winter pastures in Paktya (Khost) and greatly
extended their summer migration.
During his lifetime, Qutb-Uddin sustained the
grazing land grant as the common property
of the clan, distributing its use annually to
Zala Khan Khel households. On his death, his
brother made a permanent distribution of
the firman grazing grounds “in such a way
that consideration was taken to where the
various households had their other land and
to where they normally had their summer
camp and grazing area.”159 It is not known
whether his brother issued documents of sub-
division at this time, but local Hazaras speak
of more than one firman being shown to them
as evidence of Kuchi tenure. Pedersen’s
account shows no evidence that Kuchis
consider the Ghor Ghori pasture was returned
to Hazaras by Habibullah or even the
reformer, Amanullah.
Pedersen’s account does, however, amply
support Hazara claims that they began to
lose more than the Ghor Ghori pasture to
Kuchis through other means. He records how
easy the Kuchis found it to exploit the
Hazaras. The Zala Khan Khel had arrived from
the outset with full government support,
were well organised and well armed, and
regarded the Hazaras as second-class persons
who deserved to be punished for opposing
Pashtun dominance. Then and later, lands
were often “taken by force and incorporated
into the nomads’ summer grazing areas...”160
Other areas were bought from settled
Hazaras. As traders, this particular group of
Kuchis had ample leverage to bring local
populations to their knees:
“When after a number of summers the
buyer was unable to pay the ever-
increasing sum and ended in bottomless
158Pedersen, op cit., 130.
159Ibid, 130-131.
160Ibid.
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The Upper and Lower Ghor Ghori Valleys include 38 hamlets and around 400 households. The
Upper Valley (Poshti-e-Ghor Ghori) is famous for a magnificent “lawn,” or valley bottom pasture,
up to 500 ha in size. Most of the lawn is not farmed due to its waterlogged nature in summer.
This lawn and the surrounding pastures and farms on higher ground are largely owned by Kuchis;
both irrigated and rain-fed farms in 22 of the 38 settlements are entirely owned by Kuchis (58
percent). Another six farming areas (16 percent) are partially Kuchi-owned. All Kuchi owners are
absentee landlords. Only 10 hamlets in the valley have some farms owned by Hazaras (26 percent).
In three randomly selected hamlets of 41 households, only 12 (29 percent) owned farmland. Five
of these had inherited land from their father who had acquired the land from a Kuchi in 1979
who wanted to off-load some of his land ahead of the revolutionary land redistribution. All 29
landless households farm for Kuchi absentee owners. Around half had once owned land, but all
lost this land through pawning or debts to Kuchis during either the 1950-1978 period or more
recently as a consequence of the visit of Naim Koochi and his Taliban soldiers. Some agree they
owed crop shares:
“If I had been given time I could have sold the land for a proper price but they came
demanding immediate payment.”
Many still owe money to Kuchis, both for crop shares they have been accumulating over the years
of Kuchi absence but more particularly where they have cultivated land which Kuchis consider
pasture and theirs by right.
 “What surprised us is that the Kuchis demanded we pay for the use of the pasture as
well as the grain we owed them. They claimed all the pasture was their land. If they saw
you had any animals, they made you pay. If you had cultivated rain-fed crops on the
pasture, they demanded compensation. They set the compensation at 1,000 seers of
wheat, even though that land was not theirs. We know where their pasture is; it is the
land which our forefathers sold to them and the hills they have always claimed were
given to them but not the lands they are claiming today.”
The focal point of disputes with Kuchis concerns the ownership of the valley lawn, which serves
as pasture for all the valley settlements. Most agree that Abdur al Rahman gave the lawn to
Kuchis in 1893. However, they claim that the valley lawn was returned by his son, King Habibullah
(1901-1919) as part of the restoration of valley lands to Hazaras freed from prison. They regard
the lawn as their common property, divided village by village, parts of which have, however,
been appropriated by private families. Some of the Hazara notables to whom land rights were
restored by Habibullah sold some parts of the valley lawn to Kuchis during Zahir Shah’s reign
(1933-1973).
Kuchis still claim the lawn and lease it to four Hazaras who pay 100 seers of wheat to the Kuchis
(around US$105) and, in turn, levy a fee of 500 Afghanis (US$10) per year for each animal grazing
the lawn. Many refuse to pay these fees. One of those who died defending his land in the valley
was the main owner in the hamlet of Rashak. Villagers recalled how one night in 1973 the Kuchis
pulled the man from his house, took him to their tents on the higher pastures and killed him.
The eldest daughter, two years old at the time, introduced herself thus:
“This is our land. The Kuchis still claim it but we will never surrender it. I live here with
my husband, my sister and her husband and two brothers. We only live to revenge our
father. We are waiting for the Kuchis who killed my father to return and we will kill
them.”
In 1999 they did return and Rashak was entirely looted and all their stock taken.
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his livestock and later his land. This land
would be leased out, in some cases to
the former owner, and the nomad would
thereafter receive a fixed proportion of
the yearly yield. Some of the nomads
became very large landowners. In addition
to the grazing grounds allotted to them
they now also possessed farmlands, which
gave a surplus both for consumption in
their own household and for further
trade. Zala Khan Khel’s economy was in
an ascending spiral.”161
For many Zala Khan Khel, trade developed
in Panjao and related areas of Hazarajat to
such an extent that livestock-rearing actually
became secondary during King Zahir Shah’s
reign. A further catalyst was the loss of part
of their winter pastures in Paktya with the
creation of Pakistan in 1947, rendering the
grazing in Ghor Ghori less valuable without
those winter pastures.
Nonetheless, Kuchis did not stop visiting
Panjao. Poorer Kuchi families, in particular,
continued to arrive in the summer and to
buy up sheep and goats to sell in Kabul for
slaughter.162 Some developed trading on a
small scale and gained a steady income from
the lands they had acquired and then leased
back to local Hazaras. Wealthier Kuchis were
fewer but powerful. They arrived without
stock, just to check their farm investments
and to collect rents. Some Zala Khan Khel
became very prosperous through this activity.
Some began to invest in trucks, forming a
transport association.163 Others focused on
land acquisition and increased their holdings.
Some began to buy up land even further
north.164
Pedersen records that in the 1970s, when he
was researching the clan, trading with Hazaras
declined as a result of both the 1971 drought
and loss of purchasing power and declining
support for their trading as government began
to establish permanent bazaars in town
centres. He also records that during the early
1980s, some Zala Khan Khel attempted to re-
enter Hazarajat, seeking to recover debts
from the Hazaras and to do a little trading.
They were halted by armed Hazaras who
demanded payment for passage and the use
of pastures.165 By 1986, Pedersen found
virtually the entire Zala Khan Khel clan in
exile in Pakistan, living at 12 different sites.166
None were raising livestock. Former truck-
owning Zala Khan Khel had brought so much
wealth into Pakistan that they were able to
invest in commerce and the local Peshawar
property market.167 Nonetheless, they were
still living in black tents and moving between
two sites in Pakistan, in a form of seasonal
migration. In 1986 their interest in re-
establishing their nomadism was high, but
they feared they would be taxed upon entry
in Hazarajat and that the Hazaras would not
acknowledge the old firmans of the Iron Amir,









4.5. The Faryab Case
Inter-ethnic land conflicts over most of the
north of the country stem from a similar
century-old history. However, whereas
suppression was the objective in Hazarajat,
land colonisation was the objective in the
north. This had two impeti; the Durrani Iron
Amir had been brought up in the north and
badly wanted it to be part of his kingdom.
He correctly saw the north as much more
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fertile than the south and dreamed of “a vast
cultivated and inhabited granary” that would
yield much wealth for the royal purse.169
British officials helpfully concurred.170 In
addition they contributed to the incorrect
notion that the northwest was terra nullus
following admittedly frequent Turkmen
attacks on local mainly Uzbek populations.171
Lee provides a detailed account of the
political to-ing and fro-ing from the British
as they steadily manoevered Abdur al-Rahman
towards their own interests.172 Their chance
came in 1885 when Aimaq, who had been
dispatched earlier to hold the border area,
had been unable to prevent the loss of several
thousand square miles of territory and which
brought the Russians and British close to
war.173 The British demanded that the Amir
replace the Aimaq with more loyal settlers
from his own tribe.
Formal Pashtun colonisation was launched
on 1 November 1885, largely planned and
funded by British advisers.174 Officially, it
was termed “Afghanisation” as Pashtuns were
known as Afghans at the time. Within three
years around 18,000 Pashtun families were
settled in the north.175 Volunteers were well
supported with free land, tools, tax
concessions on yields and travel expenses.176
The strongest were sent to Maimana but
colonies spread throughout “Afghan
Turkestan” with concentrations in Baghlan,
Balkh and Sar-i Pul.177 In the event, Durrani
Pashtuns were to be outnumbered by Ghilzai
Pashtuns as the Iron Amir saw the latter’s
dispatch to the north a means of dealing with
the recalcitrant Ghilzais in the south.178
Abdur al Rahman issued firman (letters of
land grant) to the new colonists, initially
over the expansive lands of the Khanate of
Maimana and of related nobles. Clashes with
the still many existing local residents arose,
especially as they were forced to build
shelters for the arrivals, help them with food
when drought hit (as it did in the first years)
and pay taxes to help cover the costs of the
assisted colonisation.179
Conditions settled during the 1890s. Pashtuns
who had no intention of cultivating also began
moving voluntarily into the north, at first
seasonally. These Kuchis were thrilled with
the potential wealth of the pastures compared
to those of their homeland and many
eventually remained in the north.180
Invaluable local karakul sheep were added
to their fat-tailed flocks, dramatically boosting
values.181 Leading Pashtun maldars (herd
owners) flourished and laid claim to ever-
increasing areas of pasture and arable
lands.182 Land disputes with local Uzbek and
Arab populations multiplied but with Pashtun
interests steadfastly supported; the Iron Amir
reminded settlers that one of their
responsibilities was to establish clearly that
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they were the dominant and superior ruling
race.183
Some Kuchis like the Hazarbuz were also
quick to take up trading opportunities,
encouraged by the expanding settlements
and by transit taxes kept low for their benefit.
They established “shops” at key points along
the Silk Route, like Andkhui and Maimana in
modern Faryab Province.184
“Afghanisation” or Pashtunisation of the north
differed in significant ways from the events
in Hazarajat. First, it was not marked by the
same genocidal intent in respect of the local
Uzbek (and fewer Tajik and Arab) populations
and indeed the Iron Amir cleverly used Uzbeks
to help suppress Ghilzai rebellions in the
south.185 Second, Pashtun Kuchi occupation
was not seasonal but designed to be
permanent. As well as retaining large herds,
the north became the home of many Kuchis,
living in settlements, still referred to today
as “Afghania.” Third, although some of the
settlers were Rahman supporters,186 many
among the 80,000 or so Ghilzai Pashtun
families sent to the north by 1900, did so
only under duress, and were, for example,
to be among those who unsuccessfully
attempted to overthrow the king in 1888.187
However, like Hazarajat, local Uzbek landlords
were impotent to stop the transfer of their
lands — in this case including both scarce
riverside farming sites as well as pasture. A
foundation for bitter inter-ethnic dispute was
laid.
Entrenchment of ethnic tensions over
property: 1901-1978
The death of Abdur al Rahman in 1901 did
not end Pashtun settlement into the north.
A report of 1907 records at least 11,000
Pashtun families of Durranis and 9,200 non-
Durrani Pashtun families in accessible
areas.188 At least 6,000 were in Faryab
Province.189 By this time, Pashtun ideas of
ethnic superiority were well established,
“reinforced by government support and by
the grant of both formal and informal
privileges over the other ethnic groups.”190
British foreign subsidy and weapons also
continued up until the First World War, with
the holding of the northern boundary a
sustained focus.191
Abdur al Rahman’s grandson, the reformist
King Amanullah (1919-1929), attempted to
limit the worst abuses, including bringing
allocation of land rights to settlers under
more scrutiny, but his efforts were not
lasting.192 Uzbeks and Tajiks rose in support
of the Tajik leader Bacha-i Saqau, who seized
the throne in Kabul in 1929 but was ousted
following the restoration of the Durrani
monarchy by Nadir Shah.193
Under Nadir Shah’s rule (1931-1933),
Afghanisation/Pashtunisation as a policy was
firmly revived and then sustained by his son,
King Zahir Shah thereafter.194 Many thousands
of new Pashtun settlers were encouraged to
move to Balkh and Faryab Provinces.195 The
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improvement of trading conditions from the
1920s further stimulated Pashtun Kuchi
expansion into the north, where they
established dominant rights over areas like
Dasht-i-Laili (and Shiwa in Badakhshan,
described later). As wealth and social change
advanced, many of these Pashtun Kuchis
invested in farm land, hiring poorer Uzbeks
as sharecroppers, much as was concurrently
the case in Hazarajat.196
Different notions of tenure
A crucial element of conflict not well
understood even today has been that, as in
Hazarajat, Pashtun notions and organisation
of space and “home area” (watan) did not
accord well with local paradigms; the latter
included a strong sense of local common
rights within neighbourhoods (mantiqa, or
mohallah among Uzbek). These operate in
respect to both immediate commons and also
more remote seasonal pastures, and were
accessible to new mantiqa residents, including
Pashtuns, where they settled. However, such
common property pastures were understood
(or wilfully interpreted) by the immigrants
as either within the generally unspecified
terms of land grants
or licences they had
received, or un-
owned lands ripe for
privatisation by
themselves. These
positions were supported by public policy,
particularly during the modernisation years
of the 1960-70s, which granted, licensed or
registered these lands as private pastures
accordingly. As noted earlier, no legal space
was made for common property. Outbreaks
of ethnic violence on the pasture were
common.
Related, as also in Hazarajat, a contributing
factor to Pashtun tenurial hegemony was the
mid-century emergence of “State Land.” This
secured millions of hectares of pasture to
the government, who then reallocated these
rights to those of their choice, often Pashtun
Kuchis. Although technically these
entitlements were use rights only, holders
treated them as evidence of their outright
and exclusive ownership.197 Grazing taxes
paid since the 1930s were another prime
indicator of tenure. Both these tax receipts
and use rights were embedded as sources of
tenure during the 1965-1971 registration
exercise in the north, rendering many
thousands of hectares of prime pasture in
Faryab (and elsewhere) to private individuals.
Mainly Pashtuns benefited alongside fewer
numbers of wealthy Uzbek and Arab khans.
Notions of community pasture were in the
process severely undercut.
In areas like Faryab where livestock-keeping
was as important as cultivation, and
transhumance traditionally practiced (by
early Arab and Uzbek stock owners as well
as by the later Pashtun maldar) competition
for pasture within and among ethnic groups
increased. This was only temporarily relieved
by the dramatic drought of 1970-72 and the
death of up to 80
percent of herds198
(to be repeated in
1999-2002). Inter-
ethnic tension over
land was never far
from the surface, and although already of
long standing, Pashtun claims were contested
right up until the time of the 1978 Revolution
and subsequent Russian occupation (1979-
1989).
In Faryab Province this was especially so in
the districts of Dawlatabad, Shirin Tagao and
Gurziwan, where settled Pashtun communities
were numerous and where Pashtun khans had
been the recipient of estates previously
Given the history of ethnic settlement
relations in the north, battles over the pasture
today are not surprising.
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owned by the Amirate of Maimana. One of
the first acts of Tajik and Uzbek mujaheddin
after the arrival of the Soviets was not to
attack Communist held Maimana but to expel
or execute a number of Pashtun landlords.199
As in Hazarajat, nomads were widely advised
by local mujaheddin not to return. Some of
the more violent warlords set about
appropriating Pashtun homes, lands and
livestock and one or two of the more notorious
“indulged in killing Pashtuns.”200
These events precipitated a cycle of inter-
ethnic hatred and violence, in which at
different times Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras
variously looted and destroyed every village
named Afghania and were then themselves
at the receiving end of this treatment under
the Taliban. A further cycle of revenge
followed the fall of the Taliban. Between
November 2001 and
March 2002, virtually
every village in the
north named Afghania
was looted and often
destroyed.201 In 2002, 42 percent of all
registered IDPs in Afghanistan were from the
north.202 Cases of wrongful appropriation of
homes and farms still exist, but because these
involve individuals rather than communities,
they have a fair chance of resolution, given
the right mediation and conditions.
Restoration of homes and farms is slowly
occurring voluntarily. Uzbek, Arab or other
farmers are cultivating Pashtun estates on
behalf of the absentee owners, much as they
did in the past but sometimes on better
terms.203
The pastures of Shirin Tagao District
The situation is a good deal more contested
in respect to pastures. A review of pastures
in Shirin Tagao District in Faryab Province
shows that every one is under heated dispute
save the remote, vast and infertile pasture
bordering Turkmenistan known as Charmagah
Chasma. This is largely accepted by Pashtuns,
Uzbeks and Arabs alike as Public Land, but
Pashtuns are currently not permitted to go
there by local populations.
The status of the equally large Dasht-i-Laili
desert (which falls into several districts) is
disputed. Local Uzbeks claim this was
wrongfully appropriated by the state and






the early 1990s, the Uzbek warlord Rasul
Pahlawan, whose base was nearby, took over
this land for himself and his relatives, forcing
some 1,500 people to labour there.205 His
inheritor, the current military leader in the
area, an ex-warlord recognised by the Ministry
of Defence as an official local commander,
has expanded this cultivation “to an area
that requires ten tractors to complete
ploughing.”206 A review by FAO in 2003
showed at least 15,600 ha of the desert under
cultivation, with loss of topsoil through wind
erosion apparent.207 Pashtun nomads are
forbidden entry by local populations.
The indisputable trigger to disputes is
expansion of cultivation into pastures.












Yes; both by villagers
claiming it as de facto
common property and by
Pashtuns claiming as
within their wider area.
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Yes; 400 jeribs and
expanding; the source of
dispute.
None
Yes; 120 jeribs by 3
households. The source
of dispute.






Yes; only one person
from Turco cultivating.
Yes; only one farmer has
“broken the rule.”
No; minor cultivation by
Pashtuns “far away.”
Yes; half cultivated, but
mainly before drought,
“long time ago.”
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Table 16: The Pastures of Turkul Baluch Mantiqa
208InterSoS. Data on Ethnicity and Livestock Ownership in Khwaja Musa, Khwaja Sabz Posh and Shirin Tagab Districts, Faryab
Province. Kabul: InterSoS. 2003.
209Names of pastures recorded phonetically.
Every smaller pasture is also under dispute.
The Turkul Baluch Ward in the north of Shirin
Tagao District serves as example.
Turkul Baluch Ward (mantiqa)
This mantiqa comprises just two large peri-
urban communities on the edge of Faizabad,
the district headquarters. Almost everyone
is Uzbek. Land holdings are small, with high
proportions of landlessness (estimated 80%).
Less than one percent of those who own land
are identified as large owners and their farms
are smaller than average in the district.
Livestock have always been important for
these villagers and Baluch was famed in the
past for its large herds. Stock losses were
dramatic during the drought, with sheep and
goats falling from 11,000 to 600.208 These
losses have helped precipitate the crisis over
pastures.
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Up until the Taliban period, Turkul Baluch
villagers had access to ten named pastures,
all located to the east of the community
extending towards and into Dasht-i Laili. They
broadly fall under the name Shai–i-Souf. The
status of each is shown in Table 16. Only two
are not under ownership dispute. Two are
under internal community dispute among
Uzbeks. Six are subject to conflicting Pashtun
and Uzbek claims that reach back decades.
Up until the 1980s Pashtuns dominated these
pastures, retracted largely during the 1986-
1996 period, briefly restored under the
Taliban, and now disputed again. Pashtuns
claim fully documented evidence of their
tenure. Whilst most prefer that the pastures
remain as pasture, some Pashtuns began to
cultivate these pastures during the Taliban
period, catalysing strong reaction.
There is also dispute among Uzbeks
themselves as to who owns the pastures and
how far it may be cultivated. Those wanting
to cultivate the pastures are not the
traditional landless (who have no means to
launch cultivation) but the somewhat better
off who had land but were forced to sell it
due to the drought or who have lost part of
their farms to flooding and erosion, itself a
likely result of expanding cultivation of the
hilly pastures. They also sold their stock
during the drought so their need for pasture
is currently diminished. Larger owners, those
who managed to keep some of their stock,
are the keenest to protect the pastures and
also feel their tenurial superiority is being
challenged by poorer farmers. The very poor
are peripheral to the dispute; some possessed
sheep in the past and hope to own animals
again but in the interim they need the labour
opportunities which expansion of arable
farming provides. There is general uneasiness,
however, that those who open up the pastures
for farming will claim the land as their own.
The environmental wisdom of permitting
arable conversion is not widely debated even
though villagers all along the Tagab River
complain bitterly of the effects of floods
caused by hillside erosion. Most regard the
pastures as naturally useful for both periodic
cultivation and seasonal grazing. Many of the
pastures are indeed comprised of the rich
soils of the loess dunes (chul), long used for
rain-fed cultivation. Most people within Turkul
Baluch also feel the arable needs of farmers
need to be balanced with those of wealthier
large livestock-keepers and that compromises
among themselves can be reached.
The Lihab pasture is a case in point. This has
fallen within the domain of the largest Uzbek
landlord in the community for over a century.
Like his Pashtun counterparts, his descendants
claim they hold legal evidence of tenure.
With the sharp decline of their herd since
the drought, the family has begun cultivating
half the area for wheat and melons, retaining
the remainder as pasture, and continuing to
allow this to be accessible to all members of
the community, as in the past. Those who
dispute the right of the owners to farm the
pasture query the meaning of their tenure.
They argue that although the owner, the
family has a customary obligation to share
pastures with the historically dependent
community — those small farmers, tenants,
sharecroppers and workers who live in its
shadow. They correctly detect curtailment
of these rights or opportunities through
conversion to agriculture. Some claim that
it is only because the landlord was the main
landowner that the pasture was registered
under his name in the first instance, during
the registration of the 1970s.
Sometimes whole communities along the
rivers of Faryab are set against their
neighbours in matters of pasture access.
Expansion of cultivation, environmental
degradation, land grabbing, ethnic
resentments and commanderism combine to
inflame disputes. Such a case exists some
miles south of Turkul Baluch between the
Arab mantiqa of Qala Shaikhi and the
neighbouring Uzbek mantiqa of Sara-i Qala.210
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Kalta Shour some miles to the west, until
several years past used relatively peaceably
by both communities. The leading Arab
landlord family of the first mantiqa claims
the pasture was Government Land granted
by King Amanullah to their grandfather. They
claim to have paid tax on the land up until
1978. Under the Taliban, this right was
endorsed and a new document issued. Some
believe the Arabs may have bribed the Taliban
to provide this endorsement. With the fall
of the Taliban, powerful Uzbek families from
the neighbouring mantiqa took their claim
for the pasture to the district court, which
ruled in its favour. Their interest was to
cultivate the pasture, now undertaken.
Whereas documents held by the Arab family
describe the area as Shour-i-Qarashaikhi, the
new document names the area Shour-i-Alaka-
i-Maimana. The Arabs dismiss the
documentation, claiming that Uzbek courts
will always support Uzbek claims. Several
members of their family have built huts in
the pasture to prevent expansion of more
farming.
“We will fight for this pasture even until
we are killed. We have no choice. We
cannot rely on government. Even if Karzai
himself came here he could do nothing
to the commanders. They have the guns
and the power over everyone. Junbesh
support the district military commander
and a leading Junbesh commander for all
Faryab is an Uzbek from that mantiqa.
We have no hope of getting anything
which the Junbesh Uzbeks do not want.”
They also claim that cultivation of the pasture
is ruining the rain-fed fields and even the
riverine flood-fed fields.
“The floods are getting worse and
destroying our farms in the valley. The
soils fall down the hills and the area is
made useless after several seasons. Even
the stock owners suffer, for no grasses
grow. The bushes get rooted up. When
people cultivate the hills we lose the
hills and the valley lalmi as the big floods
wash our fields away with the soil. Arabs
who own a lot of stock are against the
hills being cultivated. Uzbeks are the
ones extending cultivation. The extension
began when we began to sell land to
Uzbeks.”
Abuses have occurred (lootings, beatings,
and burning of huts on the pasture). In this
and many other cases, courts are trusted to
rule fairly. As the Governor of Shirin Tagao
observed, “How may a case be ended when
warlords supported by the central
administration control the decisions,
documents are fabricated, officials are
bribed, and the case is to be decided by a
judge who was the very one who issued the
fake documents in the first place? We cannot
help people reach agreement when
documents are in the way.”
4.6. The Badakhshan Case
The third and final example comes from
Badakhshan Province and concerns the Shiwa
upper pastures (ailoqs) which lie in the
extreme north-east of the province. These
pastures fall partly in Baharak District and
partly in Sheghnan District.
Patterson provides a detailed picture of the
complex changes in tenure over the Shiwa
upper pastures since 1978.  These number
around 200 in 34 distinct areas. The area is
the home place of the Shiwachi, a distinct
ethnic Shughni speaking Ismaili group with
no direct links with Uzbeks, Tajiks, Arabs,
Pashtuns or Larkhabis. Their environment is
difficult and they are able to cultivate only
one crop annually. They spend much of the
summer growing and collecting fodder and
fuel plants for the long, harsh winter. These
conditions generally compare unfavourably
with those of the summer visitors to the
pastures, who in addition to owning large
flocks of sheep, are able to cultivate two
crops annually in their home areas. The
Shiwachi themselves traditionally own small
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been important to them for rain-fed
cultivation as well as grazing and wild plant
collection.
In many respects, the changing status of
Shiwachi rights over the Shiwa pastures has
been comparable to that of the Hazara and
Uzbek populations in the previous two case
study areas. In other aspects it is quite
different. These will become apparent in the
historical summary below.
1900-1978
Between 1900 and 1978, the Shiwa ailoqs
were used for summer grazing mainly by
nomads from all four north-eastern provinces,
alongside the much fewer stock of the Shiwa






amounting to 150,000 sheep. Tajiks and
Uzbeks from adjoining areas also use Shiwa
for summer grazing, some of whom date their
usage back to the 1900s.
It may be assumed that prior to 1880, the
Shiwa upper pastures (ailoqs) were the de
facto common property of the Shiwachi if
only because they were the main (and possibly
only) permanent residents of the wider
Shughni area. The period when they
themselves arrived in the north-east is not
known; it could have been as late as the 19th
century. Up until the 20th century Shiwa is
known to have been lightly populated. Much
of the first settlement and even seasonal use
of the area began as a consequence of the
disturbances caused by nation-making in the
1880s, as described earlier. Usually those
who arrived in the area were displaced from
other areas in the north by Kabul-promoted
Pashtun occupation. They were of mixed
Arab, Larkhabi, Tajik and Uzbek descent.
During the reign of Nadir Shah (1929-1933)
a new wave of Pashtun immigration into the
Kunduz area prompted the Kabul
administration to formally allocate the Shiwa
pastures to individual Pashtun Kuchis as well
as to Kunduz Arabs. These allocations were
expressed in hand-written documents referred
to locally as Qawwallas. A second wave of
allocations throughout the north-east occurred
during the 1940s-1950s, this time by the local
Badakhshan Governor.
Although they were not the only recipients
of documented allocations, Pashtuns received
both the largest and best ailoqs, often forcibly
displacing non-Pashtun customary users.
Occupation was entrenched during the 1950s
through the reissue of allocations in more
formal Qawwallas by the Property Section of
the Ministry of Finance (Amlak). These deeds
described the boundaries of the named
pasture, to whom it
was allocated and the
numbers of stock
which were permitted
to graze the pasture.
The term “given a pasture” is used. Legal
developments at the time as outlined earlier
favouring the treatment of pasture as
Government Land, suggest what was being
given was access rights, not outright private
ownership. On the ground, ownership was
assumed. Conflicts between especially
Pashtun Kuchis and local Shiwachi were
frequent during the 1950s, and despite local
administrative support for Shiwachi, some
pastures and arable lands remained
inaccessible to them.
This continued up until 1978, during which
period Pashtun Kuchis exerted considerable
economic and political superiority in the
Shiwa area, benefiting from the support of
the Durrani King Zahir Shah and then his
cousin, President Daoud. Local Shiwachi
resentment as to restriction upon their arable
farming, damage caused to their crops by
Kuchi livestock, and their dependence upon
Kuchis for goods and loans, and as a market
for their own products (wool, local cloth,
Pashtun expansion in the north affected the
north-east in similar ways to the north-west
but with less severity.
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non-Kuchi relations in a similar manner as
elsewhere. In a word, the Shiwachi, like their
counterparts in Bamyan and Faryab, felt
exploited and subordinated. Patterson records
that intra-Kuchi tensions also flourished, with
troops periodically necessarily deployed to
keep the peace between Arab and Pashtun
Kuchis.
1978-1992
During the jihad period (1978-1992) Shiwa
came under the stable control of a single
dominant Tajik mujaheddin leader from Yaftal
District to the north-west of Shiwa. While
not unfavourable to Kuchi use of the pastures,
given the revenue it could generate in taxes,
the Kuchis themselves began to experience
difficulties reaching the Shiwa pastures. They
had to pass through numerous spheres of
influence, variously exercised by government
and different mujaheddin commanders, all
of whom heavily taxed them. Pashtuns from
Baghlan had the longest route of four weeks
or more and suffered most as well as enduring
losses through government-mujaheddin
conflicts in their home area, Baghlan. The
number of Baghlan Pashtun Kuchis arriving
in Shiwa sharply fell. Kunduz Arabs, who
normally took 20 days to reach Shiwa, began
to take longer by going through less risky
routes, but largely continued to summer in
Shiwa right up until 1997. Many Pashtun ailoqs
fell vacant. Some of those belonging to Arabs
and Uzbeks fell vacant for the same reasons
but were quickly occupied by “new Kuchis”
to the area: Arabs, Badakhshis and other
Pashtuns (e.g., Mohmand Pashtuns).
Whereas the pre-1978 era is remembered as
determinedly pro-Kuchi, the jihad
administration in the area attempted to be
neutral in its formal allocation of rights to
nomads, while also trying to accommodate
the “just demands” of local Shiwachi for
farmland. A local Land Commission was
formed to deal with land distribution and
use, and this included Shiwachi
representatives. Compromises were
encouraged. Previously disallowed cultivation
of some ailoqs was specifically permitted.
Prices for ailoqs were high for the poor
Shiwachi, and payments were made in
instalments. In some cases, Pashtun Kuchis
conceded that Shiwachi should be allowed
to cultivate small areas of the pastures,
knowing they could no longer count upon
central government support of their interests.
For their part, Shiwachi took the opportunity
to expand farming into not just the few Kuchi
ailoqs they were allocated but also into ailoqs
and other commons they had managed to
keep for themselves and which had not
previously been farmed. Formal allocations
were made in well-elaborated documents,
and issued by the jihad administration with
assurance that these superceded all earlier
entitlements.
Some Kuchis also took out new Qawwallas
for their traditional ailoqs as well as for
vacant ailoqs into which they had expanded,
in order to secure these with more modern
documentation. Arab Kuchis who had been
displaced from the ailoqs of northern
Badakhshan also took some new ailoqs. Taxes
continued to be levied on all grazing rights.
1992-1997
The post-jihad period (1992-1997) saw the
Tajik mujaheddin leader and others move to
Kabul and the emergence of numerous small
commanders, more interested in enriching
themselves than governing. In Kunduz and
Takhar, the winter quarters of many of the
Kuchis, conflict between the dominant Jamiat
and Jumbesh factions and sometimes Hizb-
i-Islami frequently descended into open war.
Lawlessness reigned, including stock theft.
The number of Pashtun Kuchis visiting Shiwa
in summer continued to decline. Dormant
Shiwachi-Pashtun conflicts resurfaced, with
ailoqs taken or retaken by force, by usually
new Kuchis or non-local agricultural Tajiks.
Even ailoqs which Shiwachi had regained
from absent Kuchis (particularly Pashtuns)
were now appropriated by others, including
mainly Tajiks looking for farmland. Absent
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 67
Looking for Peace on the PasturesBox 11: Examples of Land Conflict in Shiwa
The Pillaw Pasture: Conflict in Land Use
Pillaw in Shiwa-i Kalan mantiqa is a relatively flat and well-watered area useful for both agriculture
and pasture and has a history of dispute accordingly. Farming Shiwachi also see it as an example
of what they perceive as the inequity of their treatment by Kuchis in the past, and the economic
development which is possible if they have access to land. In 1942-1943 an elder from Sheghnan
was authorised to settle people in Pillaw and went with at least seven ostensibly landless families.
The area was reportedly previously uninhabited. They farmed the area until 1946/1947 when
Pashtun Kuchis from Kunduz occupied the area and forcibly expelled them. They petitioned the
authorities who ruled in their favour. They attempted to reoccupy the area. The elder was killed
and the Pillaw villagers abandoned the area. The area remained under the control of Kunduz
Pashtun Kuchis. In the early 1980s landless Shiwachi petitioned the mujaheddin for land and
between 1981 and 1985 the jihad administration sold land to around 30 landless families there.
This process occurred while the Kuchis were present, though seemingly in reduced numbers.
There were conflicts between the Shiwachi and Kuchis in 1985 and 1986 though both shared the
use of the ailoq. The Kuchis remained in the area until the late 1980s, when they withdrew. By
2003, 38 Shiwachi families were cultivating 1874 seers of land in Pillaw, around one-third of all
Shiwachi cultivation. In 2002 the Pashtun Kuchis returned. Relations are tense but co-existent.
Nalbar Pasture: Conflicts among Kuchi Users
In the pre-war period, Nalbar ailoq was traditionally used by Uzbeks from Takhar and Gortepa
Pashtuns and Arabs. The Gortepa Pashtuns claim to still have pre-war documents for part of the
area but their authenticity is questioned. Local Shiwachi maintain that the oldest Kuchi users
were Uzbeks, followed by Kunduz Arabs and then Gortepa Pashtuns. Uzbeks stopped coming to
the pasture relatively early in the jihad, as subsequently did numbers of Pashtuns and Arabs.
The Arabs claim the ailoq was usurped by Jurmis and their access blocked. Other groups of
Pashtuns from Kunduz moved in, as did Shughnis. In the late 1990s, and certainly by 1998 and
quite conceivably before, Ali Moghuls from Baharak bought the ailoq and were present until 2002.
In 2001 the Arab who had used the ailoq in the early war years returned and staked a claim to
the ailoq against the Ali Moghuls and a group of Baharak Uzbeks also in the area. Haji Ismail also
returned in 2002 and raised his claim against the Ali Moghuls. By 2003 the Ali Moghuls had moved
on and both the Pashtuns and the Arabs were in possession of the ailoq. The exact relationship
between the two is unclear, though the situation has been returned to the pre-war one, to some
degree.
Tenure has thus been held by at least six groups — Shughnis, Takhar Uzbeks, Arabs, Pashtuns,
Malang Abis and Baharak Uzbeks. The Arabs themselves admit that they are not the original user,
and concur with the Shiwachi that the earliest Kuchis were Uzbeks, but maintain that they are
the oldest in the present line of (Kuchi) claimants.
Source: Patterson, 2004.
long-distance Kuchis were often now co-
opted by more local non-Pashtun Kuchis,
primarily Tajiks. Expansion of agriculture
thrived. Shiwachi found themselves squeezed
by both nomads and other cultivators.
1997-2001
The Taliban established uncertain control of
Kunduz and part of Takhar during 1997.
Pashtun vs. non-Pashtun relations deteriorated
sharply in Shiwa. This coincided with a
deterioration of stability in the area. Many
in the local Shiwachi elite were murdered.
Ailoqs were lost, and cultivation reduced,
due to onerous taxation or instability. In
Takhar, the Taliban adopted a scorched earth
policy resulting in widespread destruction
and large numbers of people were displaced.
The drought of 1999-2001 exacerbated the
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Uzbek and Larkhabi Kuchis continued to
summer in the Shiwa pastures, this was with
difficulty. Ironically it was Pashtun Kuchis
who were least able to return to the pastures,
feeling uneasy about crossing opposition
territory to reach the
ailoqs. Most Pashtun
ailoqs (other than
those belonging to the
Imam Sahib and
Takhar Pashtuns) fell vacant. Some of these
were taken over and sometimes cultivated
by mainly Badakshi Kuchis. Some Shiwachi
ailoqs were also taken by Badakhshis. Once
again local Shiwachi felt squeezed.
2002-2004
The post-Taliban period, beginning in the
summer of 2002, has seen something of a
return to the situation of the jihad period,
with rising numbers of Kuchis of all ethnic
groups returning to the pastures. Although
not in the area since 2003, Patterson found
up until then no cases of newly returning
Kuchis displacing Shiwachi, or of returnees
being blocked entry.
Some ailoqs have passed through as many as
six different Kuchi owners since 1978 or
oscillated between Shiwachi, Kuchi and Tajik
agriculturalists. A number of Shiwachi and
lesser numbers of Kuchis are now taking their
documents to Faizabad to have them
revalidated so as to formalise and defend
their tenure.
The situation is not entirely stable. Many
claims and counterclaims exist, with
traditional rights, pre-war titles, jihadi and
post-jihadi titles at stake. Those ailoqs where
users have remained fairly stable are mainly
where Kuchis were able to continue coming
to the pasture throughout the war. Active,
potentially violent disputes existed in around
12 of 200 pastures in 2003. Other disputes
are simmering, contestants biding their time,
rendering what is superficially agreement
and compromise, fragile. This is the case
mainly where Shiwachi feel they have been
most dispossessed and/or where Kuchis are
seen to be promoting their own interests
more out of principle than real need, and
which cannot be matched with the land needs






existed between Shiwachi and Pashtun Kuchis,
returnee claims are most contested.
Levels of new cultivation in Shiwa are high;
Patterson calculates the net increase to have
been around 300 ha or 22 percent above the
area of land cultivated in 1978. Not all of
this expansion was in pastures held by Kuchis;
some of it is in local Shiwachi commons.
Patterson suggests that arable expansion
could have been much higher but was not,
due to these factors:
• Kuchi withdrawal was only partial;
• The local population did not gain political
control;
• Access to vacated ailoqs was through
quasi-legal means and payment, not by
appropriation or seizure;
• Local Shiwachi faced competition for
arable land from politically stronger
neighbouring groups; and
• Many of the vacated ailoqs were simply
too high and poor in soils to be cultivable.
A complete return of mainly the long-distance
Kuchis (largely Pashtuns) is not anticipated,
as many have abandoned the lifestyle over
the war years. In addition, as Patterson
observes, the era of Kuchi hegemony has
passed. As also seen in the earlier cases,
local and semi-local populations are unlikely
to accept again a less equitable distribution
of resources that currently pertains. Local
Shiwachi requests for arable land is seen to
stem more from need than greed. Patterson
urges that their quasi-legal entitlement to
pastures be confirmed, and that the dual
The Badakhshan case demonstrates that
disputants can arrive at compromise if enabled
to do so.
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cultivable and seasonally pastured be better
recognised.
4.7. Comparing the Cases
Some of the differences between the Shiwa
and previous cases from Panjao and Shirin
Tagao may be pointed out:
• Involved Kuchis are not only Pashtuns,
but from other ethnic groups (Arabs,
Tajiks, Uzbeks, Larkhabis);
• The local population did not gain the
political clout needed during the jihad
period to retake the pastures in their
locality, as broadly occurred in the first
two cases, albeit often into the hands of
local commanders and elites;
• Quasi-legal allocatory mechanisms have
featured throughout the war years;
• The arable expansion now occurring
appears to have been mainly by poor
Shiwachi, not local warlords or elites;
and
• While relations between local and
seasonal groups are as poor in respects
to elsewhere, Pashtun Kuchis are not
being denied land access in Shiwa, and
compromises are being worked out among
the disputants themselves. More isolated
cases of this are occurring in Shirin Tagao,
but not Bamyan.
In other respects, the Shiwa case illustrates
similar characteristics with the Panjao and
Shirin Tagao cases, that is:
• 19th century customary ownership of the
pastures was overridden by the strategies
of state-making from the 1880s and
sanctified with “legal” documents
particularly from the 1950s-1970s;
• This appropriation was largely to the
benefit of non-local persons and especially
to the favoured Pashtun tribe;
• The main thread of contested rights is
between local cultivator and non-local
seasonal pastoral users;
• Although the focus of resulting tensions
is the pastures, the effects spread more
widely into arable farmer-pastoralist
relations;
• The ethnic aspects of contested land
rights are strong and particularly between
Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns; and
• Cultivation of lands which pastoralists
and the supporting state have designed
solely available for pasture have triggered
most disputes and remain an important
challenge to policy and practical decision-
making.
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5.  Finding a Way Forward
Attending to disorder in land relations is
becoming more crucial with each passing
year. Stable, and of necessity, fair land
relations are pivotal to securing peace. Land
relations are highly inequitable, but classical
redistribution is not immediately a viable
option. Attention to the housing needs of
the extreme poor could offer an important
avenue for improving their opportunities.
Nor will new farm-based entitlement
programmes meet current needs; registration
may entrench contested allocations on
especially rain-fed and pasture lands.
Registration may also entrench unsatisfactory
legal norms and decision-making systems.
Shared land resources (and especially
pastures) rather than individually owned
homes and farms should be the first target
of attention. Pasture rights are in heated
dispute in most areas. Recognition of the
limits of rule of law, lack of confidence in
systems and documentation is needed in
devising strategies. Resolution of pastoral
conflicts is unlikely to be achieved through
more national dictates, laws, or force at this
point. There is considerable potential for
progress through launching an approach which
enables each pasture to be considered
individually and with competing users and
claimants directly involved. Pilots towards
this should be a priority. In the process,
much needed new paradigms for recognising
and ordering rights, recording these and
providing for their sustained and localised
management will be obtainable. The interests
of the poor will also be able to be better
and more practically attended to. Such a
grounded approach accords well with the
more general need for new policy and law
to be founded upon empirical experience
and through genuinely participatory
mechanisms. This incremental approach to
policy development will be more effective
and lasting. It will also provide stronger
opportunities to devise more localised and
sustainable mechanisms for rural tenure
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Synthesis Paper Series
211For example, Fitzpatrick, D. Land Policy in Post-Conflict Circumstances: Some Lessons from East Timor. Australian National
University. 2001 for East Timor, Dinechin, op cit. for El Salvador, and Zimmerman, W. and S. Sovann. “Cambodia: Approaching
Land Issues in a Post-Conflict Setting” in The World Bank 2004a for Cambodia.
5.1. General Implications
Many concerns arise from the conditions
described in the preceding chapters. Not the
least of these is that contested land relations
appear to have had a much more profound
role in the generation of civil conflict over
the last quarter century than international
agreements or early planning by the
administration appears to acknowledge. More
worrying is that slow
and uncertain effort
to tackle these is
helping to sustain
conflict. State policies of the past towards
land distribution now also appear less benign
than construed. The history of conflicts cannot
be ignored if resolution is to be lasting.
Strategic implications come to light. It seems
the case, for example, that it will be
necessary to pay attention to that upper
dimension of land relations beyond private
rights — territory  — at least as it occurs at
the local rather than tribal level. By territory
at the local level is meant communal rather
than private land relations, those interests
that stem from community membership, and
raise notions of “our land” or “our place.”
These are probably the most contentious at
this time, and most active in relation to
pasture. Achieving local level reconciliation
in this area could significantly remove one
of the stepping stones to wider strife.
Returning to the pre-war status quo will
not be effective
The limitations of classical responses to post-
conflict land matters are suggested. The
standard post-conflict strategy is simply to
restore land ownership to those patterns that
existed prior to the conflict, using existing
land records and conducting confirmatory
new registration.211 Current policy intentions
in Afghanistan concur with this, with titling
indicated as the main proposed action in both
rural and urban spheres. Inherent in this is
a concern to restore Government Land to its
owner (government). But the notion of what
constitutes government property is neither
clear not acceptable on the ground to the
extent that responsible ministries hope or
assume and is indeed part of the problem.
This interlocks with opaque conceptions as
to how pastureland
may be best used.
Pasture is
predominantly
conceived of as a shared land asset — owned
or ownable by either the national community
in general (Public Land) or by a specific local
community (common property). Land law in
Afghanistan offers a muddled notion of such
shared land assets, providing minimally for
local common property and conflating
Government Land and Public/National Land.
A more nuanced approach to such shared
land assets is badly needed for moving
forward.
Registration is neither neutral nor useful
in these conditions
Retreat into new formal registration processes
will not render the relief needed. Ideas that
land order may be restored simply through
consolidating and modernising the plethora
of documents relating to rights is not realistic,
and not just because some of these have
been corrupted, duplicated or otherwise
manipulated over recent years. The very idea
of restoring order in this arena raises alarm;
it forgets the deep seated resentment as to
that order and how they were among the
catalysts to the long years of war and civil
war. The history of land rights recordation
to date in Afghanistan painfully illustrates
that far from being neutral, registration may
create rather than record reality, and not
Conflict over land has helped drive and sustain
disorder and is preventing real peace.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 73
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necessarily with justice or fair practice. While
recordation is fundamental to modern land
administration, what is recorded and how
needs fresh appraisal. Concerns of social
justice arise. Restoration of social justice is
perhaps only just beginning to be recognised
as a precondition to lasting peace, not a
luxury that may be attended to at a later
date.212
New law, not enforcement of old law, is
needed
Nor is it clear that instruments conventionally
used to bring order will have much or good
effect. The need for new paradigms and
policy and legal instruments is not in doubt.
As currently posed, these depend upon an
effective reach of bureaucracy for application,
integrity of courts to uphold their terms and
operational rule of law to enforce decisions.
To move forward with success in their absence
requires alternative approaches. Nor will it
prove fruitful to persevere doggedly with old
paradigms without thoughtful assessment of
what constitutes sound governance of land
relations, and how this may be achieved.
Suggestions for constructively moving forward
are listed below.
5.2. Major Areas for Moving
Forward
5.2.1. Acute Disadvantage in the
Landholding Sector Needs Reduction
Difficulties with identifying real levels of
landlessness were explored in Section 2. It
is fair to conclude that landlessness is
significant. The fact that landless people
perceive an impassable barrier between
themselves and the landed is also instructive;
this is likely both a prejudice borne of many
generations of embedded stratification and
a frank appraisal of reality. The poor are
generally unable to compete with better off
farmers to acquire land in a flourishing land
market and where arable land is profoundly
scarce. Where land is potentially available
(such as in remote rain-fed/pasture areas),
the ability to secure and develop those lands
is proportionately limited, for socio-political
as well as economic reasons. Polarisation
shows signs of continuing within a rural
economy where it has been already marked.
Without fixed capital assets like land and
homes, the very poor lose an important
bargaining platform in social and economic
terms, not least in labour relations. Moreover,
this spills over into off-farm opportunities.
Landlessness remains a singular separator of
the truly poor from the rest of the community.
Redistribution of private lands
Would land redistribution ameliorate this
situation? In current conditions, the answer
seems to be “no.” Past reforms, both
moderate and revolutionary, failed to be
lasting or to make a difference, and instead,
helped provoke rebellion among elites.
Current weakness in central authority and
rule of law do not avail the necessary
environment for classical redistributive reform
to be seen through. The insufficient extent
to which private land is available for
redistribution has been moot since the 1980s
and will likely be confirmed with final analysis
of NRVA 2003 data and subsequent surveys.
Bountiful government land, in the form of
currently defunct settlement schemes, does,
however, exist.
Past experiences showed that provision of
land on its own was not enough; reasonable
assistance with tools, seeds, oxen and ploughs
was needed. Where these benefits were
provided as part of resettlement packages,
such as in some of the earlier dam-related
schemes on Government Land, the benefit
was significant, although eventually truncated
due to political reasons. How far such schemes
included the genuinely landless or those most
212Mani, op cit.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 74
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interested in making a go of arable expansion,
is debatable.213 In due course, pursuit of
carefully planned settlement scheme
opportunities founded upon new or
rehabilitated water development could prove
an effective strategy. Mine clearance,
clarification of tenure and a host of other
changes are required first. In the meantime,
commitment and steady pursuit of the
conditions to allow the re-launch of
settlement schemes would be desirably kept
on the political and development planning
agenda.
Improving labour shares
The Bamyan and Faryab studies suggested
that improving labour terms could be effective
for many. In theory
the conditions for this
are possibly more
favourable than in the
past. This is because
of suspected likely
gradual movement of sharecropping
arrangements slowly towards cash contracts,
including wider use of daily paid labour on
farms and already rising labour payments in
the poppy sector. However, it is far from
clear that the truly poor will benefit; they
are already less able to negotiate the cash
contracts already being taken advantage of
by those with better leverage. Levers that
are relevant and which suggest correlation
with slightly better off small farmers include
recognised membership of the community as
residents, homes of their own (shared or
otherwise), kin relations with landlords,
possession of tools, oxen and ploughs, or best
of all, a small plot of land of their own. For
those in the last category, regulation of
mortgage conditions could also be helpful,
although as this paper suggests, mortgaging
is not significant in the rural economy.
Moreover, in-kind contracts are conventionally
safer for sharecroppers, as landlords normally
share the risk of a bad harvest, although not
necessarily equitably.
In any event, the state faces problems in
enforcing labour reforms, and to an even
greater degree than was experienced with
the mortgage reform of 1978, given already
two decades of instability and weak authority.
Finding housing for the extreme poor
An important conclusion of previous chapters
has related to rural housing and the evidence
that a significant group of households lack
shelter of their own. This is not simply a
humanitarian consideration. Lacking a room






accumulate income and capital assets, that
is less certainly the fate of other rural poor.
This group is probably not as small as even
recent surveys suggest, given that many
homeless itinerants tend to fall between the
cracks as non-permanent family members.
Nor has conventional focus upon productive
landholding allowed the existence and
implications of homelessness to be widely
acknowledged.
Help with rural housing could potentially go
far in helping this group towards more level
ground with other rural farm landless people;
entry into formal communities alone could
open significant social and economic
opportunities — attendance at school, access
to food for work and cash for work labour
opportunities, assistance with housing
materials from UNHCR and NGOs, etc.
Redistribution of private lands has little
potential at this point. Allocation of
government land with support services does.
213Hazaras interviewed who had been beneficiaries of schemes in the north in the 1970s were not landless (Alden Wily, 2004a,
op cit.). In respect to the massive early schemes in the south (e.g., Helmand), bias in allocation appears to have been
towards Pashtuns, the landless among whom were often pastoralists (Kuchi) Pashtun Kuchis, and less interested in farming
than arable counterparts. Their involvement was less to meet their demands for land than to encourage sedentisation of
nomads. Refer to Cullather, op cit., Majrooh, op cit., and Usurfi, op cit. Soviet and later schemes tended to offer labour
opportunities only, not tenure.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 75
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Assessments would need to be made by
agencies to gauge just how far provision of
housing is a priority for the homeless.
5.2.2. Land Conflicts Need More Attention
A main finding of this synthesis is the
centrality of land disputes and the fact that
these so readily spill over into violent conflict.
This observation was made by AREU in its
first land assessment and field studies
reviewed in this paper consistently suggest
that land conflict is hampering peace.
Warlords as catalysts to disputes
A crucial element of conflict is the role that
has been, and is still being, played by
warlords/commanders. All too many land
disputes have been prompted, led or
exacerbated by their role in land grabbing,
terrorising or exploitation of farmers. Although
their motives appear increasingly to stem
from personal economic interest, they tend
to garner ethnic support and the effects are





grievances as to land
access. Because of this land history,
warlords/commanders may be as much
instrument as cause. In either case, limiting
commander-led land conquest needs to be
higher on the securitisation agenda than
currently the case.
Resolving land disputes is a priority
Understanding what is disputed helps identify
what institutionally, legally or otherwise needs
to be changed. Resolving disputes is also
obviously the priority action. It seems logical
to target those that pose most threat to stable
land relations overall and to peace. Those
that are most dangerous have been found to
have a communal and/or ethnic character,
affecting whole groups of persons. The land
most affected is obviously pastureland.
This is not to say that disputes and conflict
over individually held homes, shops and farms
in rural areas are not important to resolve;
rather, they are less inflammatory and
potentially more easily handled through
existing judicial and administrative processes;
that is, through existing institutions (courts
and administrators) and by reference to
records. Mediation among individuals is also
obviously easier than where whole groups of
persons with different stakes in the disputed
land are involved.
An important finding of this review is that
rain-fed farms are less securely tenured and
documented than valley lands and/or irrigated
and flood-fed farms. Boundaries are less
defined and the nature of the user’s right
over the land more fluid. This is especially
the case where shifting cultivation is
practised, such as in the drier, steeper and
remoter areas, which cannot sustain more
than one or two years of cultivation. In such
instances, tenure is much less precisely
individualised and may more accurately be
interpreted as no more than the right to use
the land which is




the area is considered public land, by the
state. While those who make most use of the
remote rain-fed lands are not the poor but
the better off who have means (tools,
tractors, seeds, labour), such use does not
necessarily constitute establishment of
ownership. Over sustained periods, this may
come about, but such claims are by no means
always recognised by the wider community
body — one source of conflict.
Resources like pasture and forests are equally
uncertainly tenured and contested. It has
been shown that rights to these are disputed
among several overlapping sets of persons:
settled people and nomads, state, community
and khans). Even the nature of rights allocated
is unclear, and legal supports ambivalent, as
shortly elaborated.
The disputes that need most immediate
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Synthesis Paper Series
The ethnic dimension
The ethnic colouring of conflicts is visible.
The central contestation is self-evidently
between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. This is
underlaid by competing land use systems in
terms of (long distance) nomad vs. settled
arable farmer tensions. Class dimensions are
also involved; Pashtun Kuchis in particular
have enjoyed longstanding institutional and
economic advantages, which have placed
them in superior socio-economic positions,
currently being challenged through essentially
socio-political means. It is no coincidence
that Hazaras, Uzbeks and Shiwachi in the
case study areas reported upon are often the
labourers of Pashtuns in their home areas.
In the Faryab case, where many Arab families
are also large landlords, it is not surprising
that many Uzbeks emphasise the alliances of
Arabs with Pashtuns. Large landlords among
Uzbeks themselves largely, but not entirely,
escape challenge. To a very real degree,
ethnic, land use and class elements in
especially pastoral conflicts converge.
It has been remarked, however, that land
dispute as a whole in the study areas cannot






people have not, for example, been either
the leaders or beneficiaries of land
appropriation, whether of houses, irrigated
land, rain-fed land, or commons and pastures.
Although elements of this appear in the Shiwa
pastures in which local poor Shiwachi helped
fill the vacuum at different times left by
departing Kuchis, beneficiaries were the poor
only in comparison to the more advantaged
outsiders; this is suggested by the fact that
these were people able to procure land,
albeit by staggered payments. The truly poor
among them — the landless and homeless —
were probably few.
Although difficult to digest, it does have to
be concluded that ethnic identity and history
has much more to do with current
contestation over and competition for land,
than class. This is not to say that the poor
and very poor are not being ill-affected, as
examined shortly. Understanding of the nature
and origins of inter-ethnic tension are
meanwhile important. Of necessity, strategic
planning must account for these histories if
the difficulties they have engendered are to
be finally set aside.
Why is pasture so contested?
The reasons why pasture attracts most conflict
are not difficult to find. In the first instance,
cultivable land is scarce in Afghanistan. Fertile
land has long ago been brought under private
tenure and the nature of pasture as often
potentially useable for at least occasional
cultivation leads logically to encroachment,
especially in an unregulated or chaotic
environment such as remains the case today.
Second, as variously attributed “Public
Lands,” pastures represent a form of open
access property. Not un-typically, as soon as





Third, dry pastures are not natural individual
properties (unlike fertile and smaller
paddocks) and tend to be natural arenas for
shared access, by groups or communities. In
situations of land shortage, competition for
these resources may help dismantle social
group cohesion or break down along wealth
or ethnic lines.
Fourth, pastures have also been the domain
where historical inter-ethnic bitterness has
had most power over the last half century.
Resentment as to the way in which Pashtuns
in particular were granted valuable pasture
Land conflicts are more coloured by inter-
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is all too evident. This was compounded by
further resentment that they were able to
use their toehold on the pastures to extend
their reach into acquisition of scarce irrigated
land. That this took place often through
involuntary indebtedness, not on a willing
seller willing buyer basis, adds to tensions.
Still, where Pashtun farmers have lived in
the community (such as in Faryab), this has
had a tempering effect. In addition, on the
whole, Pashtun rights over farmland in the
first two case study areas were “grudgingly
accepted” by those who farm the land for
them. This has not been the case with
pastures.
Related and fifth, this is because most
pastureland has been seen as the property
of specific local communities, or with respect
to higher, remote pastures in the area, the
domain of the broader but still local
community (such as the population of a whole
valley). The strength of identification of
pastures as common properties diminishes
as the pastures become more remote and
less used. Pastures which are not used at all
and include barren mountain tops, where
even collectable thorny shrubs do not grow,
are the only areas fairly consistently regarded
at the local level as “un-owned” land, or as
“No Man’s Land.” It is only these areas which
are unconditionally accepted locally as part
of the state’s denotation of Public Land.
It is not surprising then, that when asked,
villagers in both Bamyan and Faryab (and by
implication echoed in Shiwa) construe
pastures as less everyone’s public land than
their public land — in short, their common
property. The fact that the state has
appropriated these commons and then, to
add insult to injury, reallocated them to
outsiders is a predictably a source of
discontent. To forbid expansion of farming
particularly into those pastures considered
as less definitively pasture than as potential
reserved land that may one day be farmed,
has served as a further irritant. While there
is little that is unique in the appropriative
behaviour of the Afghan State, acute
shortages of farmland in dry Afghanistan,
rebellion against a long history of tribal
subordination, and socio-political anarchy,
have made capture or recapture of the
pastures an almost inevitable event.
Tenure norms affecting pasture are poorly
constructed and under challenge
At all levels it has been shown that the exact
meaning of pastoral ownership is unclear.
Statutory law is not known locally. It is in
any event ambivalent as to the meaning of
granted rights as endowing ownership or as
endowing an access right only. While the
balance of legal meaning is on the latter,
the balance of actual practice has been on
the former. This has been compounded by
official payment to government or other
distributors, suggesting land purchase. Most
people in the three study areas who hold
formal rights over pastureland, assume this
means that they are owners of the pasture.
This is reinforced by the failure of transfer
documents to specify either the term of the
right or the conditions upon which it is issued,
normal attributes of licences or leases.
There are other unclarities. One is the extent
to which formal allocations respect customary
rights, as the law suggests should be the
case. It has been shown above that aside
from the pronouncements of the Taliban,
virtually no legal account at all has been
given to commonhold tenure. National law
has simply not sufficiently recognised or given
legal support to traditional customary
common property rights.
Another is the question as to whether
government or the national community are
the real owner of Public Lands. As the past
decade has painfully shown, an acute
disadvantage of such uncertainty is that when
government authority breaks down, its claims
to ownership are weakened. Millions of
hectares of property which the administration
considers to be its land are now underAfghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 78
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occupation, pastures prominently included.214
It is the recapture of these lands which so
preoccupies land law formulation at this time.
While force and restoration of order could
lead to this result and confirm the de facto
lack of distinction between Public Lands and
Government Lands, the problem remains that
this continues to ride roughshod over the
customary rights of local communities.
Polarisation of rights over pasture is also
occurring
An added complexity concerns relative rights
among community members to local pastures
and how far these are more accurately private
pastures or genuinely shared common
properties. In the field surveys three positions
were encountered:
• The first acknowledges the pasture as
being owned by a local landlord family,
as part of the domain carved out by the
ancestor/s who first settled the area, or
as granted to the family by the Iron Amir
or his successors. This accepts the named
pasture as private property in the
conventional individualised sense. Most
livestock-rich landlords take this position.
Peasant farmers who accept this consider
their own access to such pastures to be
more privilege than right, born out of the
kindness of the landlord, although visibly
also paid for in the exploitative labour
contract arrangements they are bound to
accept at the same time. Much less
countenance is given to the claimed
private rights of outsiders (nomads) who
have been recipient of state grants of
pasture at various times, particularly up
until 1978. Often this tenure is
acknowledged as “legal” but
“illegitimate.”
• The second position holds that while the
landlord may indeed be the recorded and
referred to owner, his tenure does not
exist solely upon his own account but as
trustee for the entire community which
he heads. He is bound to permit all
members of the community, from his own
relatives to sharecroppers and workers,
to share the use and benefit of local
pastures. Holders of this view (and they
are many) consider that when
khans/begs/landlords had their names
recorded as owners of local pastures they
were securing these not just for
themselves but for their communities.
Local access is thus a common right, not
a privilege.
• The third position holds that local pastures
were never privately owned but were the
property of the community as a whole,
and any landlord or other person who has
through registration or other legal
processes had these placed under his own
name, has done so wrongfully. While
landlords have the power (and duty) to
defend those pastures against outsiders,
villagers say that this should not be
interpreted as meaning their rights are
superior to those of other members of
the community. In addition, it was made
clear (particularly in the valleys of Bamyan
Province) that this common ownership
embraces the weaker and poorer members
of the community, including those who
may not have the means to use the
pasture (livestock).
Pastures in this respect are but an extension
of the conditions that exist in respect of
uncultivated or erratically cultivated rain-
fed areas. Any member of the community
may also in principle access those lands by
arrangement. In practice, only those with
means — ploughs, seed, labour, do so — and
through sustained usage establish stronger
rights and set in motion inevitable
privatisation. It is this transition which is now
214For example, in Faryab, MAAH reported that 28,831 ha of government pasture has been invaded. Attempts to recover the
forests had been rebuffed, with officials beaten.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 79
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so apparently occurring in pasturelands. The
precedent for privatisation is abundant, in
the direct granting of private rights over
pasture by administrations since 1884.
Landlords and other interested parties have
also gone out of their way (often during the
1960-1970s registration period and especially
since) to secure documented claim to these
lands.
The customary and changing use of
pastureland needs closer examination
The role which cultivation of pasture has
played in triggering disputes has been
frequently remarked. The risk of this occurring
is far from new, as evidenced in the firm
exhortations in legislation since 1965 that
such actions are prohibited. There is little
doubt that loss of social and political controls
over land use conventions has provided a real
excuse and/or opportunity for challenging
ethnic and private hegemony over pastures.
This loss of control has not only been from
the side of government. All three case studies
suggest that communities too have allowed
or enabled local conventions against




farming area that has
resulted and quite
widely echoed in
community shura opinions collected by the
NRVA 2003 (as shown in Tables 3 and 4 of
Appendix E).
Quite aside from who are beneficiaries, rich
or poor, Pashtuns, Uzbeks or others, there
are frequently negative environmental
effects. Customary and/or legal restrictions
against farming steep pastures have had
rational basis; the disturbance to top soils
from cultivation may be seen today to be
destroying not just the utility of the land in
the future as pasture (and in remarkably few
years) but to be impacting negatively upon
generally lower arable lands. In the Panjao
case this was visible as bare slopes caused
by landslides and from which it will take
centuries for those areas to recover.  In Shirin
Tagao the loosening of hillside soils is being
delivered in excessive flooding of riverine
floodplains and irrecoverable loss of precious
soils down the river. Loss of soils through
wind erosion in flatter areas like Dasht-i-Laili
was also recorded.
It is important not to over-exaggerate the
extent of these effects. Even in the brief
survey periods there were as many stable
new cultivation areas visible on less steep
hillsides as not. Chul soils in the north have
long been used for rain-fed cultivation and
some expansion to remoter areas may well
be environmentally viable. The speedy
adoption of new local rules to control the
worse excesses was also noted in the Panjao
case. Scattering cultivation more widely than
in the past could be sufficient to limit damage
in many cases.
Pastures have multi-use potential
More important, the distinction between
potential rain-fed lands and pasture is in
many instances an artificial construct and
ignores customary
flexibility towards




in the legislation as effectively any land
where animals graze. While this is unhelpful
as guidance in itself and offers enormous
scope for land capture by livestock graziers,
it proves equally unhelpful in the associated
implication that a rigid distinction needs to
be drawn between rain-fed and pasture lands.
It was shown earlier how this was given legal
force in 1965 through outright prohibition of
cultivation in pasture, i.e., in any area which
has grazing use (or even potential), a
prohibition that has remained in place since.
Three observations on this need to be made:
first, that the dominance of pastoral over
arable interests in this construction is unlikely
Only by default do some communities retain
group ownership over pastures; the law does
not recognise common property as group-
owned private property.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 80
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to be coincidental with the times, a period
much dominated by Pashtun demands.
Second, nor is it likely coincidental with the
introduction of imported land use planning
norms integral to the foreign aid driven
programmes, and led to the new land laws
of this period as well as to mass registration.
Third, it remains a fact that for all practical
purposes, it is ultimately members of each
local community, and not the state or its
law, who are in the best position to determine
where the most environmentally sound and
productively sensible distinction should be
drawn between rain-fed cultivation and
exclusive pastoral use in their vicinity. Simply
to outlaw cultivation on any land which could
be used for animals or where plants grow
that are useful to animals, is unhelpful at
best. Empowering locals to do so will prove
effective quite aside from ultimately
necessary.
5.2.3. Land Administration Needs Reform
Numerous shortfalls in land administration
were noted or implied in previous chapters.
These have ranged, for example, from the
difficulties inherent in having judges serve
as their own juries in matters of malfeasance
relating to legal documentation, to the
loopholes for wrongful land capture by the
already wealthy, where tax receipts are used
as sole evidence of ownership, to the absence
of public adjudication and accountability in
registration (largely self-reported) and where
transactions may be legalised on the basis of
concordance by a handful of (self-selected)
witnesses. Less tangible is the absence of
accessible formal local level land
administration and the effective
disempowerment of customary systems of
regulation and administration in face of
stronger “legal” systems. While typical of
the paradigms of 20th century land
administration stridently introduced by the
aid community from the 1960s, the
disadvantages of overriding, rather than
building upon locally exercised mechanisms,
have been all too evident with the breakdown
in the centralised norms established. One
certainty in administrative reform will be
the need to provide for localised
administration. This will be essential not just
for ease of access to the majority but to
enhance accountability to landholders.
Reassessing the purpose and means of
rights recordation
The central function of land administration
systems is to record land transactions. For
this to work, first registration of owners has
been classically pursued, such as was the
purpose of the USAID-funded programme
during the 1960-70s. Despite that programme
achieving very limited success in rural areas
over a decade (and at immense cost), the
current administration has returned (again
with the encouragement of some donors) to
classical registration as the way forward.
There is little doubt that recordation of rights
in a modern world is ultimately essential,
but how these rights are recorded and by
whom, and how land rights are defined in
the first instance, need a good deal more
work than the current administration appears
to have devoted to the subject.
As noted earlier, the main justification is as
classical: the idea that registration and issue
of title deeds (never in fact achieved) will
allow landholders to secure formal mortgages.
While this works magnificently in developed
countries, there is a good deal less evidence
that collateralisation follows registration and
entitlement in most of the world.215 More
specifically there is evidence to suggest that
majority smallholders and those with small
and poor homes are rarely able to secure
loans from banks, and generally fare better
through micro-credit shared accountability
schemes. That is, collateralisation is
extremely important for the wealthy and the
215Refer to Bruce, J. and Migot-Adholla, S. (eds). Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa. Iowa. 1994; Deininger, 2003,
op cit.; Alden Wily, 2004e, op cit.; FAO, 2003, op cit. and Toulmin & Quan, op cit.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 81
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commercial sector, but of less utility to the
majority rural poor. Part of the shortfall for
the poor is that they are unable to meet the
other requirements of bank loans (e.g., sound
business plans). Other reasons include the
reality that few financial institutions are
willing to make loans to households which
could be easily made homeless and destitute
at foreclosure. The rapid expansion of micro-
credit schemes based upon group
responsibility for repayment appears to
respond more satisfactorily to their
requirements for loans.
There are also practical structural issues
surrounding the process of recordation and
sustenance of recordation. These relate
primarily to locale. Centralised regimes have
been shown all too frequently to be
unsustainable, unreliable and more than
normally vulnerable to corruption.
Three main sets of problems beset a classical
titling approach:
• First, in the matter of workability and
cost-effectiveness — both Afghanistan’s
own experiences in rural titling and those
of most other developing states proved
simply too expensive and time-consuming
to put in place, and too expensive and
time-consuming to operate and sustain.
Many titling regimes have fallen apart,
fallen into disuse with limited numbers
of transactions after first registration
recorded, or fallen into general disuse
other than by elites.
• Second, the need is not only to develop
a new system but one that mirrors and
supports an order in land relations that
is accepted. Simply launching mass
registration (re-registration) in a
desperate hope that this time it will work
misses the reality that the order it reflects
is frequently ill-aligned with local reality
or customary norms. This is particularly
so in reference to remote rain-fed land
and pastures. Trust in paper entitlement
systems is paramount. The capacity of a
system to be corrupted clearly limits trust
in it or its utility. Trust is even more
dramatically limited where the system
itself reflects an unaccepted order.
Restoring trust in a system involves more
than making the records accurate and
difficult to fabricate or alter. It relies
more importantly upon the grounds upon
which rights are issues having social
legitimacy and held to be just and fair.
• Third, mass registration (or re-
registration) programmes focusing on
private house and farm properties is not
the priority. Much more important is to
bring order (and an accepted order) to
off-farm lands and the pastures in
particular. This is not least in order to
limit rapidly proceeding dispossession of
common rights, so important to the poor,
over this last useable land sphere. This
focus requires development of new norms
through which rights over pasture land
are defined and administered. These must
include new constructs to enable
customary distinctions between local
common and national public tenure to be
admitted into national law, and for the
meaning of common property to be also
so reconstructed. A route through which
appropriate norms may be safely arrived
is provided below.
5.2.4. Lessons Can Be Learnt From
Elsewhere
As the 21st century opens, upwards of 50
agrarian states around the world are re-
examining the means through which rights
in land are defined, regulated and especially,
administered day to day.216 Many lessons
useful for Afghanistan may be learnt. The
common approach of these reforms has been
for central government to develop a new
national policy (with varying degrees of
consultation), then a new supporting land
216The World Bank, 2004a, op cit.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 82
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law, and then to be concerned with its
implementation. Problems have arisen with
this process, visible in the reality that all too
many new national land policies and land
laws lie unimplemented — even where strong
rule of law and central government authority
abundantly exists.217 While political will is
important, so too, it is being found, is local,
popular will. Systems that have been
developed without direct involvement of
client landholders tend to be institutionally
over-expensive, out of reach in their
bureaucracy, and largely irrelevant to the
greater body of interest holders. That is, the
importance of sound process in designing
reforms is becoming more and more crucial
and not met by conventional centralised
planning procedures. This has direct bearing
on how rural tenure problems should be
addressed in Afghanistan.
A second main thrust of currently emergent
reforms in tenure administration in particular
similarly deserves brief comment. This relates
to increasingly common recognition that for
modern rural land administration to work
and in ways that consider majority rather
than only elite
interests, it is crucial
that these are
established at far
more local levels that has been the case in
the past, and ideally, at the community level.
In addition, to limit costs and heighten
participation and the necessary sense of local
“ownership” over processes, this means
founding new administrative systems upon
existing community mechanisms where they
exist, and building norms within the capacity
of communities at the periphery to exercise
and uphold.218 This on its own suggests
significant simplification of increasingly
complicated recordation procedures. It also
suggests the need to devise mechanisms
which greatly increase public participation
at the local level and through more
definitively democratic norms where these
do not customarily exist — broadly the case
in rural Afghanistan.
It also suggests that ultimately, rural land
rights would be administered through a mosaic
of multiple micro land administrations. In
Afghanistan this would amount to a series of
sub-district (or even mantiqa committees),
designated as Local Land Bodies, each elected
and accountable to community constituents
to perform agreed recordation and regulation
tasks, only some of which (if any) would
require formal deeds registration. These
bodies would be serviced by a Local Land
Administrator, appointed and funded (through
minor transaction fees) by the community.
In many respects, such institutions would
formalise, but also improve and democratise,
already widely existing shuras, dedicated in
this instance to land administration.
Such developments would presuppose the
definition of the respective discrete Land
Administration Area over which the Local
Land Body has authority. It goes without
saying that these Community Land
Administration Areas
would include both
spheres of private and
shared common
property, and even potentially, administration
of defined adjacent National Lands, on behalf
of the state.
The whole would need to be regulated by
supportive legislation, and the various Local
Land Administration Bodies technically
assisted by District Land Officers. Appeal on
decisions could proceed through more
formally constituted Village Land Courts and
District Land Courts, into the normal court
system. The Land Register for each area
would exist at the local level and be sustained
at the local level. Back-up copies as necessary
could be forwarded to a District Register,
217Palmer, R. “Lessons from Recent Policy and Implementation Processes” Chapter 14 in Toulmin and Quan (eds). 2000 and
Deininger, op cit.
218Toulmin and Quan, op cit.; Deininger, op cit.; and Alden Wily, 2003c and 2004e, op cit.
Only local people can decide the right dividing
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itself established outside the courts. Having
been relieved of their duties towards land
deeds registration, judges would be better
able to serve as neutral arbiters in appeals.
The advantages of this ideal (and likely
distant) devolved approach in Afghanistan
would ultimately be myriad, in that it would:
• Put in place a land administration system
that is fully inclusive of all right holders
and rights in the vicinity and on an equal
basis — not as currently the case where
elites hold legal entitlement and
documentation and the majority, weaker
evidence, if any;
• Integrate customary/informal and formal
regimes into a single and non-conflictual
system;
• Provide a framework within which
decision-making and procedures could
become more fully inclusive of community
members (women included);
• Enhance relevance of decisions through
being at the immediately local level;
• Operate at very low cost;
• Operate largely through self-reliant (but
monitored) systems, improving
sustainability;
• Enable land use planning (especially
critical in regard to rain-fed farming and
pasture issues) to be natural elements of
tenure administration, rather than
contradictory elements, as currently is
the case;
• Enable regulatory procedures to sustain
agreed norms and entitlements to be
implemented locally, and at very low
cost;
• Allow local level land administration to
be sustained in conditions where some
parts of the country, province or even
district are unsettled; and
• Provide a crucial foundation for furthering
the longer-term objectives of the
administration towards decentralised
governance.
Reaching this ideal appears at this point all
too distant but would in due course be
achievable on an incremental basis, beginning
in more secure areas. More immediately,
there is one important building block in its
own right, which could help lay a much-
needed foundation towards more
decentralised and improved land governance
trends.
5.3. Adopting a Strategy
Three basic strategies are suggested by the
foregoing:
First — and of most immediate relevance to
the newly formed Land Commission —there
is an essential need to adopt an investigatory
and “learning by doing” approach to new
policy and legal development. The temptation
to issue big policy statements or new law
founded upon the deliberations of central
policy makers only is best avoided. While
consultative processes with opinion leaders
and district and provincial officials will widen
policy debate and inputs, it will not yield the
extent of fresh and practical innovation
needed to properly see through the current
crises in land relations. Only on-the-ground
piloting, finding practical ways forward with
selected communities and in relation to
concrete concerns, will provide this.
Therefore it is recommended that the process
adopted by the Land Commission be firmly
towards incremental evolution of new national
rural land policy over the coming three to
five years. Support funding from the
international community should be structured
to allow exploratory pilots to be fielded in
support of this.
Second — and of most immediate relevance
to agencies like UNHCR, UN-HABITAT and
supporting NGOs already committed to
improving shelter for returning refugees and
IDPs — it seems timely to look more concretelyAfghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 84
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into rural housing development initiatives,
and in addition, to extend the reach of these
to non-refugee/IDP homeless.219 Findings in
the field suggest that gaining permanent
shelter may well make a significant difference
to homeless landless, both returnees and
others. Finding out more precisely if such
people share this view is a logical first step.
For the moment it is anticipated that aside
from social benefits, home ownership will
provide a stepping stone to asset
accumulation. Public land areas for housing
purposes should be more easily found than
for farming needs, and the productive benefit
from which requires more complex support.
Small rural towns or large villages with
residual common or public land will probably
provide most viable sites. Large landowners
may also be able and willing to provide sites,
as necessary compensation for the land. Such
schemes could indirectly contribute to asset
redistribution. Where the displaced have
means, facilitated willing buyer-willing seller
arrangements could be sufficient. Where
genuinely poor and homeless are targeted,
more supportive arrangements will need to
be made.
Third — and of most immediate relevance
to MAAH and supporting agencies, as well as
to policy development — departure from the
conventional starting point of the family farm
needs to be made. Everything about disorder
in land relations in practice and about the
structural supports for land relations suggest
that new Afghan rural policy and strategy
should begin, not end with the commons —
that is, the pastures. The reasons for this
have been incrementally elaborated
throughout this paper. Below, in summary,
they are brought together.
5.3.1. Prioritisation: Beginning, not Ending,
with the Commons
• Pastureland is the focal arena for serious
disputes (and sometimes armed conflict)
over rural land at this time — this is
because they involve and affect more
people than conflicts over houses and
farms, inflame ethnic problems and cross-
cut unresolved conflicting arable and
pastoral land needs.
• This dispute includes the most intractable
inter-ethnic land dispute, that between
the rights of settled and nomadic peoples
and which is aligned to a significant extent
by a Pashtuns—non-Pashtuns divide.
• Resolution of pasture issues is urgent.
Pressure is already mounting as animal
stock numbers recover post-drought and
as Kuchis become impatient at widespread
refusal to allow them return to many
summer pastures.
• Pastures present the most complex tenure
planning demands, particularly as relating
to: the definition and implications of
Public Land; inchoate, unclear or legally
unsupported distinctions between private,
public and common property; uncertainty
as to the nature of pasture rights allocated
or purchased; inconsistent or unfair
criteria upon which these are allocated;
and insufficient nuance in the way in
which “pasture” is denoted and viably
used.
• In some cases, anarchic expansion of
cultivation into the pastures is wrecking
environmental damage to pastures and
valley lands that needs to be promptly
addressed.
• Tackling pastures (and commons in
general) holds most promise for building
paradigms through which tenure may be
better and more sustainably managed.
This is because it is of concern to whole
communities and opens routes to shared
decision-making and formalisation and
improvement of localised land
management and regulation systems. In
short, it may serve as a stepping stone
to wider community participation.
219This will require agencies or projects whose mandate does not restrict them to serving returnees or IDPs to become involved.
However, already some itinerant homeless have argued that they are in effect IDPs because they are unable to live in their
chosen or home area, for lack of accommodation, if not because of strife.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 85
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• “Pasture” is the last land asset in which
the very poor (landless) have a residual
right or stake to protect. This deserves
support and will also be an important
route to their stronger inclusion in land
use and tenure related decision-making.
• Tackling common property issues as a
matter of priority will also be helpful in
facilitating community participation in
the management and regulation of local
level tenure generally.
5.3.2. Implementation: Adopting an
Empirical Approach
In taking action on the ground, the first
mentioned necessity towards “learning by
doing” in order to arrive at fresh and relevant
decision-making and administration norms
needs to be taken to heart. Again, to bring
together the arguments made throughout
this paper:
• Assisting the relevant branches of the
administration with practical
development through empirical
processes must be a priority. Neither
pasture disputes nor disorder in land
relations can generally be resolved in safe
and lasting ways through force, even if
the state has the means to widely effect
this. Nor are either courts or
administration well equipped at this stage
to satisfactorily resolve pasture disputes.
As well as lacking public confidence and
capacity, judges are bound to rule on the
basis of legal documentation (but which
is heatedly disputed) and through legal
norms that are not accepted. Nor are
national declarations such as embedded
in policy statements or even new decrees
likely to have effect. The administration
does not have the innovative policy
instruments through which it may make
a difference and is in a poor position to
formulate these without practical
development through empirical processes.
• To be relevant and lasting,
participatory processes are required
for conflicts to be founded upon
accepted resolution and reconciliation
of interests. That is, resolution cannot
be achieved or adhered to without being
grounded in localised agreement by
involved disputants. Working at the local
level, and initially on a pasture by pasture
basis, provides an ideal opportunity for
compromises to be worked out in trial
areas, thence providing a body of
experience upon which new strategies
may be safely based and replication
pursued on the ground.
• Addressing Kuchi pasture issues at the
local level can be useful. In particular,
the Kuchi pasture access issue has not
yet been able to be resolved at the
national level and is unlikely to be; the
stakes at the national level are simply
too high. This is not necessarily the case
at the local level. A willingness to
negotiate with Kuchis known to settled
farmers as seasonal users often exists and
are in some circumstances already being
devised. With careful facilitation, weaker
interests can brought equitably to the
table, and face to face agreements
reached.
• Simple but tangible land use planning
decisions are integral to resolving many
of the issues facing pasture use. This
includes, for example, being able to draw
up boundaries on the ground between
multipurpose, dual purpose
(arable/seasonal pastoral use) and single
purpose zones (definitively pasture). To
be rational, meet with agreement, and
to hold, such decisions need to be made
on a real case by case basis, at least until
such time as satisfactorily flexible models
may be drawn up, for other communities
to consider and adopt. Developing
mechanisms for ensuring that these
decisions are sustained and procedures
for dealing with breaches devised may
logically be defined and put in place by
the same actors.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 86
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• Initiatives which seek to have the poor
included rarely work where this is not
engineered. Because pasture assets do
concern the poor, either as small stock
owners or as shareholders in common
rights, an ideal opportunity is provided
to consciously seek and secure their
participation, and consideration of their
interests. Means towards this will again
be best evolved empirically, in due course
given the weight of policy and legal
procedure.
• For rural people, good governance of
land resources is a primary concern.
Making this real is more difficult. Good
governance suggests evolutionary
development towards more localised land
tenure administration and regulation.
This stems from: the wider demands of
democratic and locally inclusive
governance; the benefits that derive from
“local ownership” of decision-making as
compared to coerced obedience to remote
directives from centralised administration;
the need for government departments to
move towards technical advisory and
watchdog functions rather than
operational roles where they are able;
and the need to develop systems of land
governance that have high user levels
and adherence by being socially
legitimate, readily accessible, and cheap
to operate, use and sustain. The upshot
in a growing number of nations is a steady
shift towards development of community-
based regimes of land governance in
especially rural areas.
In sum, strategically, the handling of pasture
interests in localised ways responds to key
current demands in tenure governance,
bringing together needs related to:
• The management and regulation of land
use;
• The development of sound and sustainable
systems for administering land tenure;
• The need to develop more effective and
locally legitimate systems for land dispute
resolution than are currently available in
an environment where the capacity of
the courts is limited, confidence in the
courts is low, and the rule of formal law
is weak;
• Recognition that an already over-stretched
administration has limited capacity to
sponsor meaningful widespread action
programmes such as affecting pasture
access and use; and
• That development of new paradigms for
this will be most soundly arrived at
through localised, on the ground “learning
by doing” initiatives, from which workable
models may be evolved. This will offer
the administration practical models to
consider for wider application.
The key advantages of a localised approach
are that it allows for:
• Those directly affected to be as directly
involved;
• Conflict resolution and decision-making
towards policy development to be
integrated;
• Decisions to be immediately applied;
• Pasture management decisions (including
conservation measures) and use regulation
to be integrated;
• The local institutions and procedures for
sustaining the agreed rules to be put in
place; and
• The community itself to become the
operational regulator (self-regulation).
In short, the need is not only for conflict
resolution, but new rules and a new system
for those rules to applied and sustained. Such
a strategy represents an integrated
reconciliation and pasture development
approach. In practice, particular care will
be needed to avoid co-option of the process
by local elites, and for appropriately thorough
examination of all claims to be made. This
is likely to be time-consuming.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 87
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5.3.3. Getting “Learning by Doing” off the
Ground
Box 12 provides an outline of pilot procedure.
This would be against a background in which
a cluster of pastures or district(s) are
identified as suitable starting points to
develop and test community-based pasture
management planning and reconciliation. An
appropriately small facilitation team,
prominently including a MAAH representative,
should be formed as pilot implementers.
Following preliminary rapid appraisal of
pastures, their associated communities, users
and disputants, systematic reconciliation and
planning procedure could be launched. This
would proceed on a pasture by pasture, case
by case basis. In each case, the various
relevant actors or their representatives would
be brought together. The exercise would
logically begin and be founded upon shared
assessment of the pasture and problem
identification. The perimeter of the pasture
should be agreed, and its past and current
uses recorded. As far as possible, contested
documents and events should be set aside,
at least for the duration of assessment. A
provisional plan of action could be drawn up,
including agreed or alternative choices of
boundaries between different zones, and in
particular, the limits of cultivation. Debate
and negotiation as to access could then
proceed. Agreement as to who owns the
pasture may need to be set aside in favour
of consensus among participants as to the
access regime; how and when the pasture
will be accessed, by whom, through which
local reporting procedures and on what
conditions. Procedures for handling crop
damage claims and fee paying by seasonal
users could be among a range of workable
points of compromise agreed. Distinctions
and agreement on the ground between public
and local pasture and between local and
private pasture and the meanings of each
will be more easily teased out and agreed
once such use decisions have been agreed
upon.
What in effect would be a pasture
management plan for each pasture would be
developed, the rules subjected to community-
wide approval and public record, and this
agreement written and registered with the
District Governor’s Office and the court.
Creation by participants of a Pasture
Management Committee or land shura would
be a natural institutional corollary.
Representation, means of selection, duties
and accountability procedures would need
to be rigorously worked through, laid out,
agreed and signed for. On grounds of
proximity, residence and practicality of
management action and regulation, these
bodies should be primarily comprised of
settled members of the community but with
seasonal users represented as relevant.
By laying a practical foundation of agreement
as to the pattern of acceptable access use
and thence rights in the locality, this process
offers more than conflict resolution. It
attempts to lay the basis for reform in the
way in which land rights are articulated,
recorded, protected and managed, and
crucially, through empowering landholders
themselves. Pilot areas could be usefully
chosen with corollary demilitarisation efforts
in mind. Ideally, administrative and court
reforms in at least the posting of untainted
staff would also concur. Success would hardly
be uniform, but a gathering number of working
cases would offer powerful examples.
Just as important, such piloting will also avail
the administration with concrete experience
as to how far local traditional procedures are
able to respond to democratic restructuring,
and be put to use as the foundation for
locally-managed pasture land administration
and land use regulation. This is turn should
contribute to more broadly based community-
based institution building and operations in
rural land management generally, such as
development of community-based
adjudication, registration and certification
of house and farm entitlement, an emerging
innovative norm in many agrarian societies.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 88
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Box 12:  Outline of an Approach to Pasture-Centred Dispute Resolution
and Management Planning
Step #1: Provincial Level: Starting Up
Establishing the Facilitation Team, Selection of districts and scheduling
Information collection (maps, registration information, conflicts, etc.)
Finalisation of approach (development of checklists for each stage of the process, participatory
methodology, recording responsibilities, etc.)
Step #2: District Level: Establishing the Context
Collect further information on pastures within the District (type, users, conflicts etc.)
Potentially add knowledgeable district person to Team
Rapid reconnaissance visit of selected pastures, via village leaders
Selection of first pasture area for piloting
Step #3: Community Level:  Launching the First Pilot
Visit all villages/hamlets adjacent to the pasture; broad understanding of interests and problems
Select starter village/mantiqa
Meet separately with interest groups and leaders
Call community meeting to explain purpose and process
Assist community meeting to elect/appoint Local Planning Team to investigate the issues with
the Facilitation Team and to report back recommendations
Make arrangements for non-local interest groups to send representatives
Step #4: On Site Review
Jointly with Local Planning Team visit the pasture and review claimed boundaries, conditions,
problems, evidence of cultivation, access and tenure history, grazing use patterns, etc.
Draw up action list for follow up contacts needed (e.g., neighbour communities), information
to collect and issues to pursue
Step #5: Meeting with Contestants
Visit neighbour settled communities with shared or competing interests and land access histories
Meet with nomad representatives
Add representatives as appropriate to Local Planning Team
Step #6: Planning Action
Guide Local Planning Team in identifying the problems and options and facilitate in-Team
agreement
Draft basic terms of optimal agreement(s) as working reference for debate, including relating
to (1) access rights of different interest groups; (2) rules of access and use of the pasture; (3)
system for monitoring and regulating agreed rights and rules and (4) system for handling disputes
arising
Step #7: Community Meetings
Local Planning Team presents it findings and suggestions individually to each participant local
community/stakeholder
Step #8: Agreement(s) Drafted
Facilitation Team with Local Planning Team draft Agreement(s) (Pasture Access Agreement,
Pasture Rules Agreement, Committee Powers, Dispute Resolution Procedure, etc.)
Consistency of English and Dari/Pashto versions checked. Disseminated to all disputing parties
and/or stakeholders
Step #9: Joint Meeting
Provisional Agreement(s) presented by Local Planning Team with assistance of F. Team
Debate facilitated and Agreement(s) reached
Pasture Management Committee elected/appointed and first meeting scheduled
Step #10: Signing Ceremony
Pasture Management Committee responsible for inviting District and Provincial Governors and
Court Judges to witness signing of Agreement(s) (likely provisional for five years)
Monitoring roles of government agreedAfghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 89
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220This refers to the estimated total households of the valley, the subject of discussion with 35 representatives. However,
the information ascertained was very general, and not backed up with on-site visits to any villages in the valley, and the
number is therefore placed in parentheses.
Table 2: Source Base of Faryab Minor Field Study
District Mantiqa Villages Dominant Total  Persons
Ethnicity Households Directly
Surveyed Interviewed
Khwaja Musa Ortepa Takhta Bazaar Arab 99 10
Arlan Arab 11 5
Khwaja Sabz  Afghaniya Kamoozayi Pashtun 30 2
Posh
Qala-yi  Elbegi Qala-yi Arab 49 +100 10
Shaikhi Shaikhi Arab relatives 30
Qeshlaq Uzbek 11
Shirin Tagao Islam Qala Islam Qala Uzbek 10 16
Khoja Charkhi Pashtun 24 10
IDPs Pashtun 24 6
Turkul Baluch Uzbek 23 16
Baluch Turkul Uzbek
Gurzad Gurzad Uzbek and 30 20
Arab
Maimana City Uzbek 27 27
Total 6 11 6 Uzbek 237 163
5 Arab (+ 100
3 Pashtun relatives)
Table 1: Source Base of Bamyan Minor Field Study
District Valley and/or  Villages Total Persons
Mantiqa  Households Directly
Surveyed Surveyed Interviewed
Bamyan Folady  Siya Khar Bolaq 78 12
Alibeg 126 10
Borghaso 100 11
Bamyan Dasht-i-Borsinas 100 15
Shibar Kalo - (1,200)220 35
Eraq Kafshandaz 42 6
Ashoor 22 4
Khoshkak 20 11
Panjab  Nargas Sara-e-Nargas  16 5
Akbar 55 6
Gudar Doni Nayab 30 16
Khdak Takhta Deh Pioetab 83 13
Kachari 16 15
Ghor Ghori Bazaar 12 12
Joi Hawdz 11 16
Rashak 18 11
Total 8 15 729 198
(+1,200)
Appendices
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221The author is grateful to Andrew Pinney for extracting original information from the VAM survey.
Appendix B: Landlessness by Region, Debts and Mortgaging
Table 1: Comparing Landlessness in 1967/68, 2002, 2003
Province Registration Survey NRVA 2002 NRVA 2003
1967/68
Faryab 53.1 42 24
Hilmand 72.5 34 9
Jawzjan 58.1 30 38
Balkh 50.1 29 23
Nimroz 81.4 29 60
Kandahar 51.5 28 42
Ghor 60.9 27 16
Hirat 9.8 27 22
Sari Pul No data 26 19
Takhar 59.7 26 9
Baghlan 57.4 25 16
Paktika No data 24 20
Badakhshan 47.9 24 10
Farah 76.0 21 6
Bamyan 72.9 21 16
Parwan 36.3 18 19
Laghman 70.0 17 6
Samangan 53.0 16 23
Logar 65.1 16 30
Nangarhar 22.2 16 10
Paktiya 20.6 13 31
Kabul 54.5 13 27
Kapisa 50.2 13 27
Wardak 70.5 12 20
Zabul 80.3 12 39
Ghazni 34.1 12 40
Uruzgan No data 11 12
Nuristan No data 10 8
Badghis 61.6 10 25
Kunar 69.3 10 6
Kunduz 47.9 6 17
Khost No 4 6
Sources: Compiled from data given in Table 23, CSO 1978, Annex 8 of WFP 2003,221 and most recent of several analyses of
the NRVA 2003 data provided by MRRD.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 91
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Table 2: Average Values of Food and Cash Debts Owed, 2003
Province Average cash debt Average food

































National average 6367.30 161.88
Source: AREU Analysis of NRVA 2003.
NOTES:
Data derives from Male Wealth Groups under NRVA 2003.
Data only analysed and averaged where responses given.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 92
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NOTE:
Data derives from community shuras in NRVA 2002.
Table 3: Mean and Medium Percentages of Households
Who Had Land Under Mortgage in 2002
Province Mean HHs with Median HHs with

































Source: Data from WFP/VAM 2003.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 93
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 94
Synthesis Paper Series
1 LAND SURVEY AND STATISTICS LAW 31
JAWSA 1344 (1965)
This first real land law comprised 70
Articles with the aim to “acquire land
statistics of the country, to maintain land
register and to organize tax affairs.”  This
was primarily to be through the issue and
completion of tax declaration forms.
These were to be distributed free to all
landowners, and completed in
quadruplicate, attested by witnesses and
by the chief of the village, returned to
the declaration office which would issue
a receipt. In addition, cadastral survey
and registration of farms was fully
provided for. Pasture among other
subjects is also covered in Chapter Seven.
CHAPTER SEVEN: PASTURE LANDS
(GRAZING FIELDS)
Article 63:
Lands situated on hills or in valleys or
deserts etc which have been grazing fields
in the past will remain pasture land.
Provincial governors shall direct the
delimitation and survey of pastureland
within their respective jurisdictions after
which survey returns shall be forwarded
to the provincial land offices and a copy
thereof will be forwarded to the Ministry
of Finance. Provincial governors are
enjoined to administer and to supervise
pasturelands.
Article 64:
The conversion of pasture land for
agricultural purposes is prohibited under
penalty of law. Ö Converted areas shall
be forfeited to the Sate.
Article 65:
Pasture lands are open to the public,
provided, however that pasture land
allocations from governmental agencies
heretofore granted shall be recognised
and respected. No pastureland shall pass
into private ownership. Grazing rights
(licences) are not transferable by the
licensees. Pastureland shall not be utilised
other than for grazing purposes.
Article 66:
All disputes arising around grazing rights
shall be decided by the legal courts
according to the provisions of the law.
Article 67:
Government departments are not
authorised to permit the tillage of pasture
land for revenue purposes or to convert
the same into agricultural land.
2 LAW OF PASTURE LANDS, 19 HOOT 1349
(10 March 1970)
(1) General Regulations
Article 1: The law has been enacted to
protect the pastures and make better use
of them.
Article 2: The word “pasture” includes
the plains, hills, mountains, the skirts of
the mountains, marshlands, the banks of
rivers and forest areas which are covered
with grass and other plants that grow
wild and could be used as grazing areas.
Article 3: The pastures are public property
and the people can use them in
accordance with the rules of this law.
Article 4: The pasturelands are defined
and demarcated by an official team. The
Government is required to appoint such
a team in every province two months
after the promulgation of this law.
Article 5: The disputes arising in
connection with the pastures shall be
settled according to the rules of the Land
and Statistics Law, the Law of Organisation
and authorities of the Courts.
(2) Maintenance of Pastures
Article 6: Purchase and sale, as well as
farm lease, of pasturelands are forbidden.
Appendix D: Pasture LegislationAfghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 95
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Article 7: The pastures cannot be sold or
leased for agricultural expansion or
commercial purposes. Public projects for
development are an exception to this
rule.
Article 8: The burning of pasturelands is
forbidden. In case there is a fire in a
pasture, it will be the duty of the
neighboring people and government
officials to extinguish it.
Article 9: Nobody is allowed to encroach
upon the pastures or convert them into
cultivable land. If it is proved that
someone has converted a pasture into
cultivable land before the enforcement
of this law, it will be sequestered and
recognized as pasture.
Article 10: No one is allowed to destroy
the tracks, pens, fords or springs used by
grazing animals or utilise them for another
purpose.
Article 11: The tracks and pens used by
grazing animals but later done away with
or utilised for another purpose before
the enforcement of this law shall be
rehabilitated.
Article 12: The Government will take
necessary measures for the protection
and enhancement of the pastures.
Article 13: The Government has the right
to expropriate the water rights or private
springs inside or on the fringes of the
pastures in order to protect and enhance
the pastures within the framework of the
laws.
(3) Use of Pastures
Article 14: Use rights to pasturelands are
restricted to the grazing of animals.
Article 15: Persons will have the right to
graze animals on the pastures if they
possess official documents or used the
pasture traditionally before the
enforcement of this law.
Article 16: New use rights to pasturelands
may be granted by the permission of the
administrative commission of the province
and the Ministry of Agriculture.
Article 17: The right to use pasturelands
may not be bought or sold.
Article 18: It is prohibited to graze goats
and camels in forest areas.
(4) Punishments
Article 19: Any person who buys and sells
the pasture areas must not only return
the land to the Government with the
crops thereof, but will also undergo the
following punishments per jerib (1/5
hectare):
1. Imprisonment of 10 to 20 days
2. Fines of 500 to 1,000 Afghanis
Article 20: Any official who sells or leases
a pasture shall be punished according to
the law.
Article 21: Any person who encroaches
upon pastures or converts them into
cultivable land will return the land with
the crops thereof to the Government and
undergo the following two punishments
for each jerib occupied:
1. Imprisonment of 20 to 40 days
2. Fines of 1,000 to 2,000 Afghanis
Article 22: Any person who destroys animal
pens or uses these for other purposes
shall return the crops thus obtained to
the Government as well as be treated
accordingly to Article 11 of this law. He
will also undergo the following two
punishments:
1. Imprisonment of 20 to 40 days
2. Fines of 1,000 to 2,000 Afghanis
Article 23: Any person who destroys animal
migration trails or uses them for otherAfghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 96
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purposes, will return the crops thus
obtained and be treated according to
Article 11. He will also undergo the
following two punishments:
1. Imprisonment of 1 to 6 months
2. Fine of 3,000 to 6,000 Afghanis
Article 24: Any person who sets the
pasture on fire intentionally will undergo
the following two punishments:
1. Imprisonment of 2 to 5 years
2. Fine of 5,000 to 15,000 Afghanis
Article 25: Any person who grazes his
goats or camels in the forest areas will
be sentenced to a fine of 50 Afghanis for
each animal for the first offence and for
each subsequent offence the penalty shall
be doubled.
(5) Miscellaneous Rules
Article 26: The Government is required
to create the necessary organisations in
order to survey, map, protect and develop
pasturelands. The Government will
provide enforcement for the
implementation of the articles of this
law.
Article 27: Matters not clarified in this
law shall be dealt with according to the
regulations of the Land Survey and
Statistics Law.
Article 28: This law shall be effective
after publication in the Official Gazette.
3 DECREE NO. 182 OF 02.08.1373 (1993)
REGARDING THE CESSATION OF
CONVERTING PASTURE LANDS TO
AGRICULTURE LANDS
The following clauses are approved for
making better use of pastures, in order
to feed and cherish animals and
developing the quality and quantity of
animal production that is one of the basic
elements of the country’s national
economy:
(1) No one can convert areas of pasture
to farmland for his personal use.
(2) Violators of this order will be dealt
with and punished.
(3) Governors of the provinces and
especially the governor of Kunduz are
responsible to secure and look after
pastures in accordance with this law.
(4) This edict is in effect after being
signed and must be published in the
official Gazette and other print media.
(5) After this decree comes into effect,
all documents contrary to this decree
are cancelled.
Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani
President of the Islamic State of
Afghanistan.
4 LAW ON LAND UNDER DECREE NO. 57
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Ministry
of Justice Issue No. 795, 2000
This law is presented along with other
agricultural sector laws under a single
Decree No. 57 of 2000, issued in Gazette
Number 795. Chapter Nine is relevant to
pasture.
CHAPTER NINE
Area of Maraa and Waqf Land
Article 84
Maraa is publicly owned property. Neither
an individual nor government may occupy
this land but rights to its use may be
obtained through Shariat provisions.
Maraa is kept unoccupied for public
requirements such as pasture graveyards,
dumps etc.
Article 85
Where a person has occupied maraa, even
if the occupation is of longstanding, if it
is proven to be maraa, then the land will
be taken from him.
Article 86
The property or land that becomes waqfi
is no longer recognised as private
property.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 97
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Selling, gifting, giving for occupation or
inheriting of waqfi property or land is not
permitted.
A property which has been given for waqfi
for a specific purpose must be used only
for that purpose.
5 LAW ON PASTURE AND MARAA Under




(1) All types of land including hills,
deserts, mountains, riverbeds, forests
that have places where grass grows
and supports animals are known as
pasture.
(2) Pasture falls into two classes: (a)
private pasture, which includes maraa
(local public land)
(b) public pasture, including barren lands
(mawaat), in accordance with sub
Article 9 of Article 2 of Law of Land
Regulation, and land on the edges of
cities and villages.
Article 3:
(1) Pasture may only be used for feeding
animals.
(2) Private pasture may be used by
residents of the adjacent
communities.
(3) Public pasture may be used by anyone.
Chapter Two: About Private Pasture
Article 4:
(1) If a person or government is unable
to prove ownership over a private
pasture, they may not occupy it as
an owner.
(2) Residents of an area may use the
pasture for feeding their animals in
accordance with this law.
(3) The right of using pasture cannot be
bought or sold.
Article 5:
(1) The area of pasture must be specified,
marked and registered, based on
Shariat by a Commission.
(2) If the pasture area had not been
previously described before this law
comes into effect, then the council
of ministers must appoint a
commission for implementing sub-
article 1 of this article in every
province.
Article 6:
Buying, selling and leasing pasture is
prohibited.
Article 7:
Areas of private pasture are not to be
sold or leased for expansion of agricultural
activities or any other purposes.
Government development projects for
public utility are exempted from this
order.
Article 8:
The Council of Ministers may pay
compensation for farmlands, private
springs, channels that are located in or
around pasture which is useful for public
purpose.
Chapter Three Public Pasture
Article 9:
The mawaat pasture is for public use,
and its purchase, sale, or lease may only
be undertaken with the permission of the
supreme leader.
Article 10:
The grazing of goats and camels in pasture
found within forests is prohibited in the
public interest.
Article 11:
The Council of Ministers may take
necessary actions in order to secure and
improve the pasture.
Chapter Four Miscellaneous (not translated).Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 98
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NOTES:
Data derives from District Level Survey only.
Only provinces with recorded data presented.
Table 1: Identification of Pastures by Province, NRVA 2003
Number of Pastures Indicated % by Type
Province Summer Winter Recent Total Summer Winter Recent
Permanent Permanent
Badghis 0 11 1 12 0.0 91.7 8.3
Farah 5 0 0 5 100.0 0.0 0.0
Faryab 0 0 6 6 0.0 0.0 100.0
Ghazni 32 2 7 41 78.0 4.9 17.1
Ghor 11 5 0 16 68.8 31.3 0.0
Helmand 0 5 9 14 0.0 35.7 64.3
Hirat 6 0 11 17 35.3 0.0 64.7
Kabul 23 0 0 23 100.0 0.0 0.0
Kandahar 0 0 12 12 0.0 0.0 100.0
Kapisa 5 0 0 5 100.0 0.0 0.0
Kunduz 0 5 0 5 0.0 100.0 0.0
Logar 12 0 0 12 100.0 0.0 0.0
Midan 5 0 0 5 100.0 0.0 0.0
Nanagarhar 0 1 0 1 0.0 100.0 0.0
Nangarhar 0 3 0 3 0.0 100.0 0.0
Nimroz 0 0 11 11 0.0 0.0 100.0
Paktika 25 0 3 28 89.3 0.0 10.7
Paktiya 12 0 0 12 100.0 0.0 0.0
Paktya 3 0 0 3 100.0 0.0 0.0
Parwan 7 0 0 7 100.0 0.0 0.0
Saripul 0 0 5 5 0.0 0.0 100.0
Wardak 1 0 0 1 100.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 147 32 65 244
 PERCENT 60.2 13.1 26.6
Sources: NRVA 2003 as analysed by AREU.
Appendix E: Data on Access to Pastures from NRVA 2003Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 99
Looking for Peace on the Pastures
Table 2: Proportion of Kuchi Groups Using Summer Pastures, 2003
Province No. of Kuchi Groups Usual No. of Kuchi % Using Pastures
Using Zone 5  Groups Using Zone 2003
(Pastures) 5 (Pastures)
NATIONAL 38 614 6.2
Badakhshan 0 30 0.0
Badghis 1 18 5.6
Baghlan 3 33 9.1
Balkh 0 23 0.0
Bamyan 0 9 0.0
Farah 0 12 0.0
Faryab 1 29 3.4
Ghazni 8 45 17.8
Ghor 3 15 20.0
Hilmand 0 15 0.0
Hirat 1 35 2.9
Jawzjan 3 17 17.6
Kabul 3 27 11.1
Kandahar 0 17 0.0
Kapisa 1 11 9.1
Khost 0 19 0.0
Kunar 0 14 0.0
Kunduz 0 17 0.0
Laghman 0 6 0.0
Logar 2 16 12.5
Nangarhar 0 22 0.0
Nimroz 0 6 0.0
Nuristan 0 8 0.0
Paktika 5 33 15.2
Paktya 4 28 14.3
Parwan 0 16 0.0
Samangan 0 10 0.0
Sari Pul 0 15 0.0
Takhar 3 38 7.9
Uruzgan 0 7 0.0
Wardak 0 14 0.0
Zabul 0 8 0.0
Sources: NRVA 2003 as analysed by AREU.
NOTE:
Data derives from District Level Survey only.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 100
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Table 3: Community Opinions as to Change in Access to Pasture Since 1978
Province Increased Same Decreased Not applicable
National % 21.3 37.1 21.7 19.9
National  394 688 402 369
Badakhshan 14.1 62.4 15.3 8.2
Badghis 14.8 33.3 51.9 0.0
Baghlan 18.5 55.4 6.2 20.0
Balkh 15.5 29.8 21.4 33.3
Bamyan 17.2 27.6 51.7 3.4
Farah 46.0 14.0 10.0 30.0
Faryab 28.0 41.3 8.0 22.7
Ghazni 49.2 32.8 2.5 15.6
Ghor 16.7 27.1 56.3 0.0
Hilmand 32.1 9.0 19.2 39.7
Hirat 14.9 9.6 67.0 8.5
Jawzjan 40.0 15.0 2.5 42.5
Kabul 19.7 52.6 15.8 11.8
Kandahar 6.8 20.3 6.8 66.2
Kapisa 3.3 36.7 26.7 33.3
Khost 8.9 57.1 26.8 7.1
Kunar 17.2 51.7 17.2 13.8
Kunduz 23.5 52.9 5.9 17.6
Laghman 0.0 87.9 12.1 0.0
Logar 18.4 36.8 31.6 13.2
Nangarhar 14.3 20.0 20.0 45.7
Nimroz 0.0 37.1 14.3 48.6
Nuristan 3.8 23.1 73.1 0.0
Paktika 12.9 34.1 45.9 7.1
Paktya 7.2 56.5 26.1 10.1
Parwan 19.7 53.5 7.0 19.7
Samangan 41.7 33.3 2.8 22.2
Sari Pul 50.0 19.0 11.9 19.0
Takhar 36.5 48.1 13.5 1.9
Uruzgan 30.4 56.5 8.7 4.3
Wardak 24.5 55.1 12.2 8.2
Zabul 14.7 38.2 23.5 23.5
Sources: NRVA 2003 as analysed by AREU.
NOTES:
Data is from 1,853 NRVA male shura surveys 2003.
although the question referred to “King Zahir Shah’s time” (1973-1978) it is likely that most shuras interpreted
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Table 4: Community Opinions as to Changes in Access to Pasture over the Last Year
(2002/03)
Province Increased Same Decreased No access Not applicable
National % 3.7 18.1 57.0 3.2 17.9
National  69 336 1057 60 331
Badakhshan 10.6 35.3 44.7 0.0 9.4
Badghis 5.6 3.7 90.7 0.0 0.0
Baghlan 6.2 56.9 16.9 3.1 16.9
Balkh 13.1 21.4 27.4 8.3 29.8
Bamyan 0.0 6.9 89.7 0.0 3.4
Farah 0.0 0.0 90.0 2.0 8.0
Faryab 4.0 38.7 36.0 4.0 17.3
Ghazni 2.5 7.4 68.9 3.3 18.0
Ghor 0.0 8.3 91.7 0.0 0.0
Hilmand 3.8 20.5 34.6 7.7 33.3
Hirat 9.6 10.6 71.3 2.1 6.4
Jawzjan 2.5 12.5 47.5 0.0 37.5
Kabul 2.6 7.9 75.0 2.6 11.8
Kandahar 4.1 21.6 9.5 2.7 62.2
Kapisa 0.0 3.3 63.3 13.3 20.0
Khost 5.4 30.4 57.1 1.8 5.4
Kunar 0.0 6.9 81.0 1.7 10.3
Kunduz 2.9 38.2 32.4 11.8 14.7
Laghman 0.0 66.7 33.3 0.0 0.0
Logar 0.0 7.9 78.9 0.0 13.2
Nangarhar 1.0 9.5 41.0 6.7 41.9
Nimroz 2.9 42.9 8.6 0.0 45.7
Nuristan 0.0 3.8 92.3 0.0 3.8
Paktika 1.2 1.2 90.6 0.0 7.1
Paktya 2.9 13.0 73.9 0.0 10.1
Parwan 0.0 12.7 64.8 2.8 19.7
Samangan 0.0 5.6 69.4 0.0 25.0
Sari Pul 0.0 7.1 66.7 11.9 14.3
Takhar 3.8 34.6 48.1 9.6 3.8
Uruzgan 4.3 0.0 87.0 0.0 8.7
Wardak 0.0 6.1 81.6 4.1 8.2
Zabul 17.6 55.9 0.0 0.0 26.5
Sources: NRVA 2003 as analysed by AREU.
NOTE:
Data derives from 1,853 male shura surveys, NRVA 2003.Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 102
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Table 5: Reduction in Grazing
Availability in Zones 4 and 5
Province % of Districts That Indicate
That Grazing Has Reduced In


































Sources: NRVA 2003 as analysed by AREU.
Table 6: Reduced Availability of
Grazing All Zones
Province % Districts That Indicate




































Source: NRVA 2003 as analysed by AREU.
NOTE:
Data from District Surveys of NRVA 2003.
Sample includes only those districts that have Zones
4 and 5 land in their districts (pasture).
Blanks indicate that no Districts in those Provinces
have Zones 4 and 5 land. 0.0 means that they have
Zones 4 and 5 land but no Districts reported reduction
in grazing land in recent past.
NOTE:
Data derives from District Survey Level only.
The high sample number (614) reflects that some
districts were sampled more than once. Only 279 of
614 survey forms responded that grazing had been
reduced. Only Laghman did not record a reduction in
grazing.AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
CSO Central Statistics Office
FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
GoA Government of Afghanistan
ha hectares
IDP internally displaced person
MAAH Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
NRVA National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
SCA Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
TISA Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID United Stated Agency for International Development
VAM Vulnerability Analysis Mapping
WFP World Food Programme
Abbreviations and Acronyms
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